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ABSTRACT 
Regional economic disparities have always 
been a topic of concern for the geographer as has 
the alleviation of this problem. In examining 
government efforts in this area, one must be aware 
of the parameters placed on such action by the 
established system of government. 
Federalism, in the same way as other major 
forms of government, is supported by a voluminous 
amount of theoretical material. This literature 
discusses the foundations of this system of 
government but also delves into some of its 
inherent problems. Such problems have led many 
political scientists to advocate co-operative 
federalism, a more contemporary form of this 
government, and to abandon, to a certain degree, 
the older dualistic notion characterized by its 
strict hierarchical division of powers. 
The dualistic character of the Canadian 
British North America Act of 1867 has created a 
situation of unclear jurisdiction over regional 
development within the Canadian system of 
government. With arguments and motives for both 
senior levels of Canadian government to become 
involved, Ontario has witnessed, over the past 
decades, a significant effort to battle regional 
disparities within its borders. The result has 
been a large number of both provincial and federal 
programs with ultimately similar goals and yet 
with varying emphasis and varying efforts for 
intergovernmental co-operation. The appearance of 
the General Development Agreement between Canada 
and Ontario signalled the revitalized intention of 
the two governments to continue in their efforts 
to work together. 
However, with equal vigor, the two bodies 
also continue to conduct unilateral regional 
industrial development programs. Each pours large 
sums of money into portions of the province. 
Although they are both working within the same 
geographic region of the country, the two programs 
vary as do their actions. The elimination of any 
costly administrative duplication in the field of 
regional economic development, is hampered by the 
political system of the country. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his book Regional Planning in Canada, 
L. 0. Gertler described regional development as 
being: 
...divisible into a number of component 
concepts. As an 'economic concept1 it is 
concerned with the problems of disparities 
in income, employment, welfare and rates of 
growth among regions. As a 'concept in 
geography' it deals with the spatial 
structure of a country as expressed in the 
distribution of people, economic activities 
and communities, and flows within and 
between regions. As an 'environmental 
concept', regional development is concerned 
with releasing the potential of the natural 
and man-made environment for the 
enhancement of the quality of life. 
(Gertler, 1972, p. 71) 
Finally, Gertler (1972, p.71) admits that 
regional development can be "viewed as a 
'political concept'". As such it relates to the 
tensions created between the have and the have-not 
regions within an individual country. These four 
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basic components are so complexly interwoven that 
all are involved to some degree in all regional 
development research. To attempt to provide 
comprehensive coverage of all four aspects of 
regional economic development in any particular 
piece of research would be an overwhelming task. 
Geographers, for the most part, have been 
interested in regional development since its 
inception because of the spatial connotation of 
the term itself. Political scientists have also 
had an interest. This would appear to be natural 
because of the major role which government now 
plays in regional development. Government is 
perceived as having a more conscientious long-run 
view of economic development than does the myopic 
private sector. Government is also in a position 
where it can concentrate on the quality as well as 
the quantity of economic growth. With 
intervention in the free market justified, 
governments in Canada have, for a number of years 
now, taken initiative in regards to regional 
economic development. The government seems to 
realize that a: 
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...broad general attack will be less 
useful now than they have been in the past. 
Accordingly... plans and policies are 
increasingly designed to meet the special 
needs of areas of the country or groups of 
the population confronted with special 
difficulties and problems. 
(Gordon, 1964, p.791-2) 
Unfortunately, due perhaps to academic 
specialization, studies of regional development 
tend to be conducted from one academic perspective 
at a time. The problems which can arise from such 
an approach are obvious. To bridge the resultant 
gap in a modest way, this thesis will research the 
political or administrative aspects of regional 
development from a geographer's perspective. 
Regardless of background or qualifications, 
"anyone embarking upon a study of Canadian 
economic policies encounters certain difficulties" 
(Brewis, 1969, p.xi). Several such problems can 
be mentioned: 
In the first place, there is the size of 
the problem. As in other Western 
countries, a far greater degree of 
governmental intervention in economic 
affairs is politically acceptable now than 
would have been a generation ago. 
(Brewis, 19S9, p.xi) 
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Certainly government's involvement in the 
economy is a gigantic and multi-facetted 
phenomenon. The scope of regional development 
itself is of such a magnitude and varied character 
that a comprehensive study of it presents an 
impossible task. The formidability of the task at 
hand has been reduced by the concentration of this 
research on a certain aspect of regional economic 
development. 
Brewis continues to outline regional 
development research problems: 
A second difficulty concerns the 
availability of data. There is a paucity 
of published material on certain aspects of 
the subject... 
(Brewis, 1969, p.xi) 
Despite a plethora of available government 
publications too often vital areas of interest are 
given only scant coverage. This problem is 
applicable to regional economic development 
research. Too often the available information is 
in a public relations format. Too often the data 
uncovered are not applicable to the subject at 
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hand. In addition, when it comes to government's 
more 'sensitive' areas, there is the problem of 
confidentiality. Fortunately, data for the 
empirical portion of the thesis, once rumoured to 
be unattainable, were made available. 
Brewis states a third problem: 
In addition, the policies themselves are 
subject to constant reassessment and change 
in light of developing circumstances and 
change. 
(Brewis, 1969, p.xi) 
This statement assumes, of course, that 
'policies' do exist. It is not uncommon for 
programs to precede written and clearcut policy. 
The inference of policy from the existence of 
programs may appear to be easy step to take and 
one must be wary. The problem becomes, thus, not 
only one of the evolution of policies, but also 
the changes in government programs themselves. To 
overcome this problem of change to a tolerable 
degree a limited period of study must be 
designated. 
Appropriately, the final research-oriented 
problem mentioned by Brewis is the most relevant: 
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These problems discussed above are 
related to a ... more fundamental 
difficulty. Government officials have an 
opportunity to co-ordinate economic policy 
to a certain extent... Nevertheless, the 
diverse interests of different departments 
and different political leaders, 
superimposed on the built-in jurisdictional 
conflicts between federal and provincial 
governments, ensure that economic as well 
as other policies are imperfectly 
co-ordinated and that they sometimes work 
at cross purposes. 
(Brewis, 1969, p.xii) 
It is this problem, so well expressed, 
which is the central concern of this researthesis. 
Of course, at the time of Confederation in 
1867 'regional economic development' was an 
unknown field of study. The politicians of the 
time were acutely aware of the regional 
diversities in their struggle to unite the 
original provinces to form a federal state. 
Government's increased role in the economy as 
outlined in Keynesian (1935) economics was not to 
emerge until the next century. Specific and 
organized programs to stimulate economic expansion 
in depressed regions in an organized fashion were 
not to be formulated for nearly a century. 
The past one hundred and ten years have 
seen Canada grow from four provinces to a nation 
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covering half a continent. Even more amazing have 
been the economic and technological changes over 
the same period. Large government expenditures in 
the name of regional development are now 
commonplace. However, the discipline of regional 
economic development, in both academic and 
practical terms, is still in its infancy. 
In 1955 A.H. Birch remarked that "the 
guiding principle of mid-twentieth century 
federalism is the need for co-operation beteween 
state and federal authorities " (Birch, 1955, 
p.305). 'Co-operation' is the key word in this 
sentence and is a term which will be used 
frequently throughout the thesis. A second 
significant word and one which will be used just 
as often is a word which can be closely aligned 
with co-operation and that is co-ordination. As 
they relate to intergovernmental practices ' they 
very often go hand in hand. 
Co-ordination and co-operation carry the 
connotation that certain components of a system 
are in some way interrelated. Boiser suggests 
that: 
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...there seems to have been a tendency in 
recent years to conceive of national 
development and regional planning as an 
indivisible and vital part of the more 
general process of development and national 
planning. This involves a systematic 
approach in which each of the planning 
regions is envisaged as a component of the 
national system of regions. Such an 
approach calls for the recognition of 
'relationships' between the components of 
the system and between the part and the 
whole. 
(Boiser, 1975, p.99) 
The role of regional development in a 
country's overall economic development plan is an 
important one. It serves to spread wealth and 
opportunities for economic advancement. 
Therefore, as with any economic development tool, 
regional development must be administered in a 
co-ordinated fashion. Its relationships to the 
overall picture of economic development must be 
clearly understood. 
'Co-operation' is a vague and loose word 
that is typically associated with other words such 
as 'communication' and 'consultation'. It 
basically means working or acting together. It 
also implies a certain degree of freedom on the 
part of those who are working together. 
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Co-operation thus implies a voluntary, working 
together type of relationship. 
According to Lindblom "a set of decisions 
is co-ordinated if adjustments have been made in 
them such that the adverse consequences of any one 
decision for other decisions are to a degree and 
in some frequency avoided, reduced and 
counterbalanced or overweighed" (Lindblom, 1965, 
p.154). The eradication or minimization of 
externalities is the crux of this definition. 
Despite the claim by Scitovsky (1954, p.143) that 
definitions of externalities "are few and 
unsatifactory" there are operational definitions 
available. One such definition states that 
"generally effects on persons not directly privy 
to the decision leading to an activity are termed 
'externalities' or 'third party effects'" (Heller 
and Starrett, 1976, p.l). Another straightforward 
and acceptable explanation appears in a 1972 
doctoral dissertation from the Economics 
Department of Columbia University. It expressed 
the following: 
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A technological externality exists when 
some activity of party A imposes a cost or 
benefit on party B for which A is not 
charged or compensated by the price system 
of a market economy. 
(Whitcomb, 1972, p.6) 
When externalities created by one level of 
government affecting the other level of government 
are avoided or minimized a state of co-ordination 
has been achieved. As far as applying these 
thoughts to the dilemma of regional economic 
development is concerned, C.P. Honey states that: 
...it must be clear that each level of 
government has an obligation or a duty to 
plan within its legitimate area of 
jurisdiction and concern, while at the same 
time respecting the purposes and plans of 
other levels of government. 
(Honey, 1976, p.10) 
When this is not the case and externalities 
which are uncompensated for do exist in 
unsatisfactory amounts then co-ordination has not 
been attained. Such a situation may have been 
brought on by a lack of co-operation and the 
result may be an externality of either a negative 
or positive nature. A negative externality may 
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result in a 'conflict' situation. Boisier (1975, 
p.100) suggests that the type of conflict which 
arises is dependent on the "way in which the 
'decision-making power' is distributed within the 
system and the way in which those powers are 
employed. 
Naturally, the federal system of Canada is 
not void of such problems. More specifically the 
administration of regional economic development 
seems to have the potential to fall prey to these 
problems. Brewis describes it as follows: 
Indeed, all provincial governments are 
now taking steps to attract industy within 
their own boundaries and in the process are 
displaying little or no regard for the 
effects of such development on the 
prospects and efforts of other provinces. 
(Brewis, 1955, p.324) 
This indicates the existence of interprovincial 
competition or conflict. More relevant to this 
thesis than interprovincial tensions is the 
existence of conflicting federal and provincial 
policies and programs. Gertler points out, "it is 
scarcely possible in the highly federalized 
Canadian state to consider the national aspects of 
11 
regional development without getting involved in 
the relationship with the provincial policies, and 
vice versa" (Gertler, 1972, p.72). 
Such intergovernmental externalities can 
take primarily two forms. In the first situation, 
the programs of one level of government may negate 
or retard the effectiveness of the programs of the 
other. A degree of co-ordination is necessary for 
the policies of either level to be both 
effectively and efficiently managed: 
Absence of a clearer picture of an 
agreed, federal-provincial development 
direction and set of priorities for each 
province has meant that various key federal 
programs have shown few signs of being 
influenced in practice by systematic 
regional concerns. Yet really to have an 
impact regional policy — for rich as well 
as for poor provinces — must obviously 
extend far beyond the operational 
responsibilities of any ... one level of 
government. 
(McAllister, 1972, p. 214 -
215) 
Apparently the actions of the provincial 
governments need to be more closely aligned with 
those of the federal government. It is difficult 
for either government to take a rational or 
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logical approach to development without common 
goals. 
The federal government also plays a role in 
influencing the effectiveness of provincial 
programs: 
Many of the programs of the federal 
government profoundly affect the provincial 
government's planning program and 
objectives. These include — to mention 
some of the most important — regional 
economic expansion... Failure on the part 
of the Government of Canada to respect and 
support provincial policies could largely 
frustate them. 
(Ontario, 1976A, p.52) 
Federal action can have an influence on 
provincial programs. Obviously such action could 
complement provincial programs but, on the other 
hand, it could also hinder them. Conflicting 
approaches could also limit the courses of action 
open to the provinces. The Government of Ontario 
(1975A) states that programs of a piecemeal nature 
on behalf of either level of government can lead 
to a situation of conflicts and frustrations. 
Unrelated programs will be more costly and less 
effective. 
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The second form which intergovernmental 
conflict may take is along the lines of killing 
one bird with two stones. Where jurisdictional 
overlap permits comparable fiscal policies on 
behalf of both levels of government the problem at 
hand may receive a double dose of medicine. Too 
much medicine can often do more harm than good. It 
may bring about unanticipated side-effects or may 
lead to addiction. G.L. Reuben views this as one 
of the problems currently being faced in 
governments' efforts to stimulate regional 
industrialization. He declares that "the 
co-ordination between federal and provincial 
policies needs to be improved to avoid duplication 
and other wasteful activity" (Reuben, 1976, p.51). 
Recognizing increased co-operation and 
co-ordination as the solution to the problem of 
conflict, externalities and waste and seeing the 
immediate need for such action has not been an 
observation of this author alone. The 
International Information Centre for Local Credit 
states that "it can be seen that there should be a 
high degree of co-ordination between the 
activities of the central government and those of 
14 
the municipalities with regard to regional 
development" (International, 1964, p.11). Simeon 
in a more theoretical vein reiterates this 
recommendation: 
...Another important form of adjustment 
is one in which governments try to 
co-ordinate their policies, resolve 
disagreements and reach mutually desired 
goals through direct relations with each 
other. 
(Simeon, 1968, p.2) 
Richard Rohmer takes this general concept 
of co-ordination one step further to a more 
specific solution — integration. He believes 
that in order to promote economic development and 
derive longer range policies integration of the 
relevant government bodies is necessary. (Rohmer, 
1975, p.90) Rondinelli, on the other hand, 
believes in 'rationalization' as opposed to 
'integration' and states that "federal and state 
development agencies must be organized into 
rationally ordered, centrally co-ordinated 
hierarchical units from which emerge clear lines 
of authority, central control over 'subordinate' 
decision-making units and comprehensive plans" 
(Rondinelli, 1969, p.271). 
15 
McAllister (1972) explains how regional 
economic development fits into such schemes. He 
recommends that the two levels of government meet 
regularly to deal effectively with the problem of 
regional economic development. Problems could be 
dealt with on a region by region basis. This 
formal degree of co-operation would serve to 
reduce the level of conflict and confusion which 
now exists between the two levels of government 
involved in this field. 
It can be seen that the problem of 
intergovernmental conflicts as they relate to 
regional economic development in Canada has been 
recognized and that some writers have gone so far 
as to propose possible solutions. However, other 
than generalized statements which allege that 
problems have arisen from this situation little 
supportive evidence that conflicts exist has been 
displayed. To understand the problem in greater 
depth, it is necessary to investigate several 
topics. First, one must have a basic 
understanding of the federal system of government 
particularly as it relates to Canada and regional 
economic development in Canada. With this 
16 
knowledge, one can review the evolution of 
regional economic development programs in Canada, 
or more specifically, within Ontario. 
Understanding the degree of co-operation which has 
existed between the federal government and the 
government of Ontario in these programs gives the 
reader the proper perspective on the unilateral 
regional industrial development incentives 
programs which the two levels of government 
currently operate. An analysis of their 
activities over a seven year period in Ontario 
gives the reader insights into the priorities of 
the two governments and the hurdles yet to be 
overcome in the co-operation among the governments 
in Canada's federal system. 
17 
II METHODOLOGY 
An outline of the approach to be taken in 
this study has been provided in the previous 
chapter. This chapter will provide some details 
relevant to the structure of the thesis. 
The thesis is essentially divided into two 
major sections. Although the first can be 
interpreted as providing a backgroud to the second 
the two must be accepted as being individual 
entities contributing to the overall picture being 
conveyed in this thesis. 
The first major section is descriptive. It 
incorporates a review of the relevant literature 
dealing with the topics of federalism and regional 
development both individually and as they relate 
to each other. This is elaborated upon to present 
the reader with a more complete picture of the 
co-ordination between the two levels of government 
as it relates to regional economic development. 
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The second section focuses upon two 
specific programs, one operated by each of the two 
senior levels of government to promote regional 
industrialization. This section concludes with an 
analysis of some data relevant to these programs. 
The analysis serves to exemplify some of the 
problems which continue to persist in the Canadian 
federal system as it relates to regional 
development. 
These two general categories will now be 
presented in greater detail. To understand the 
status of intergovernmental co-operation or the 
negative externalities created by the lack of such 
relationships, a basic understanding of the 
federal concept is required. Chapter III takes a 
look at this topic. Federalism will be examined 
from several perspectives. First the impact of 
space on the federal system will be investigated. 
This will be followed by a closer look at 
federalism per se and the basic concepts involved 
in this system of government. This discussion 
reveals one of the present problem areas of 
federalism. This point of contention is the 
19 
division of power among the various levels of 
government. As will be seen this particular area 
has an important role to play in the way in which 
the Canadian federal and provincial governments 
can attack regional disparities. Political 
science theory, along with some practical 
applications, has helped to evolve a more 
contemporary form of federalism — co-operative 
federalism. A discussion of the relevance of the 
preceeding discussions to the Canadian political 
environment closes the chapter. 
With the reader now armed with the 
knowledge of the constraints imposed by the 
federal political system, thoughts in Chapter IV 
turn to the more specific field of regional 
development. Some of the general problems of 
inter - governmental co-ordination and 
co-operation in a federal setting as they relate 
to regional development in Canada are discussed. 
Federal regional economic development programs are 
first to be viewed. The beginnings of federal 
involvement in this field in the first portion of 
this century led to the more specific programs of 
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the late 1960's and into the 1970's. Such 
programs were of either a unilateral and bilateral 
nature. The Ontario government also has an 
interesting history of involvement with regional 
development; this is also presented. An 
understanding of these programs along with those 
of the federal government gives the reader a 
greater appreciation of the significance of the 
General Development Agreement (GDA) between the 
two senior levels of government. 
Chapter V contrasts the co-operative effort 
of the GDA with the unilateral approaches of the 
two governments' regional industrial development 
incentives programs. The evolution into the 
federal governc.ent' s Regional Development 
Incentives Program of supplying grants to new or 
expanding firms in depressed regions of the 
country is outlined. The province's comparable 
Ontario Development Corporation loans funds to 
promote industrial development throughout its 
jurisdiction. 
In the final portion of the thesis, Chapter 
VI, the activities of the above two organizations 
21 
throughout Ontario and during the 1970 - 1977 
period are compared. This empirical section tries 
to illustrate the value of the lengthy discussion 
which preceeds it. It attempts to reveal the 
varying priorities of the two governments and any 
conflicts which may appear in their actions. 
Ontario was selected as the study area for 
a number of reasons. Government regional 
development programs have emerged over the past 20 
years. Residents of Ontario have had the 
opportunity to see two governments 
federal and provincial, become involved in this 
phenomenon. Thus, in Ontario, in addition to 
federal actions one has been able to see 
comparable activity on behalf of Canada's 
wealthiest province. 
There are additional reasons for the 
selection of the province of Ontario as the study 
area. From the national perspective, regional 
economic disparities have become blatantly 
obvious. Yet there has often been a tendency to 
"ignore rather substantial regional differences 
within the Province of Ontario itself 
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differences in rates of growth, income per capita, 
the availability of employment opportunities and 
so on" (Lawrence, 1974, p.3). The provinces size 
and geographic variation are also factors. Kenyon 
(1974, p.52) cites Ontario as being a 
"particularly opportune area to study in terms of 
the impact of distance on industry since the 
province runs the entire length of the Great Lakes 
and along the St. Lawrence system in the south and 
reaches deep into remote and empty country to the 
north." Gilmore and Murricane (1973, p.3), in 
their study of the Canadian manufacturing belt, 
refer to Dales' (I960) conclusion that Ontario 
comes close to the epitome of an 'industrial 
region'. As well as this wide range of activity 
level, the factors leading to different areal 
rates of growth have shown a "remarkable degree of 
consistency" . and are "generally applicable 
throughout the province" (Dulmage, 1970, p.2). 
An appropriate study period must also be 
selected. This thesis will cover, in varying 
degrees of detail, a large portion of our nation's 
history. Naturally greater attention will be 
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given to the period commencing in the early 1950's 
when regional economic development made its 
transition from academic theory and piecemeal 
action to organized and routine governmental 
practice. Finally greatest attention will focus 
on the 1970's. It was during this last period 
that both the federal and provincial governments 
were actively engaged in making available large 
sums of money in the name of regional economic 
development. The Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion (DREE) acts on behalf of the federal 
government and the Ontario, Eastern Ontario and 
Northern Ontario Development Corporations take 
action for the province in the field of regional 
industrial development. Also during the latter 
period of time the two levels of government have 
sought each other's co-operation in the area of 
regional development. The General Development 
Agreements (GDA) between Canada and the Province 
of Ontario are most notable in this respect. 
However, it should be kept in mind that their 
respective loan and/or grant programs have 
continued to function independently. The 1970's 
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are thus probably the most significant period in 
the evolution of unilateral and bilateral 
government regional development action. 
As indicated above the focus of attention 
will be on government sourced financial incentives 
directed towards the stimulation of industrial 
activities. The overt nature of such 
expenditures, a characteristic uncommon to many 
government programs, permits accurate empirical 
study. Funds directly applied to firms in the 
private sector provide clearcut data for analysis. 
Of course, a region can be aided or 
developed in a number of ways. Numerous writers 
have stressed the important role industry, 
especially manufacturing, can play in regional 
economic development. Wheat has stated that there 
are several sources of economic growth "yet as a 
practical matter, the best opportunities for 
economic development lie with manufacturing" 
(Wheat, 1973, p.l). Harris and Hopkins support 
this notion. They believe that "the most 
important income-generating factor in our economy 
is manufacturing activity" (Harris and Hopkins, 
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1972, p.2). Hunker feels that "the extension of 
manufacturing activity is a prime means whereby an 
economy can be stimulated to provide for growth" 
(Hunker, 1974, p.4). However, it is Estall and 
Buchanan who best verbalize this concept: 
Manufacturing is very important in all 
modern economies as a 'growth-generating' 
sector having a profound influence on jobs 
and incomes, not only in the actual 
manufacturing of goods, but also in other 
branches of economic activity which provide 
manufacturers with materials and other 
supplies and with services. Thus, 
national, regional and local interests are 
concerned with its development. 
Differences bwtween areas in income and 
economic growth rates can often, although 
not simply, be associated with differences 
in manufacturing activity. 
(Estall and Buchanan, 1951, 
p.16) 
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III. mHE POLITICAL SET^THG: FEDERALISM 
The concern for co-ordinated / co-operative 
government activities outlined in the previous 
section necessitates a review of the institutional 
aspects of the federal political system. Some of 
the problems of the federal system have been 
alluded to in a general manner. Further, such a 
review is a prerequisite to later chapters dealing 
with specific regional development programs. It 
is also relevant to a more conplete understanding 
of the final empirical investigation. ""he 
political setting acts as a road along which the 
vehicle of government development action has 
moved. 
1. The Geographic Input 
The division of governmental powers on a 
geographical and/or hierarchical basis is common. 
Muir suggests that "all but the smallest states 
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are internally subdivide^ for reasons of 
administrative convenience" (Muir, 1375, p.211). 
He recognizes the almost universal principle that 
such a division of powers is made on a combined 
hierarchical/geographical basis. Thus, Muir 
explains, most political systems share a common 
feature of responsibilities divided between larger 
and smaller areas and between higher and lower 
administrative levels (Muir, 1975, p.212). 
This widespread dualistic basis for 
national political organization is well 
exemplified by the system of government to be 
discussed at this time. "Federalism, like most 
institutional forms, is a solution, or an attempt 
to solve, a certain kind of problem of political 
organization" (Livingston, 1952, p.34). Its 
raison d'etre can be explained or justified in 
several ways, each from a different perspective. 
Livingston takes the sociological point of viev;: 
"^ ne essence of federalism lies not in the 
institutional or constitutional structure 
but in the society itself. Federal 
government is a device by wVch the federal 
qualities of society are articulated an-! 
protected. 
(Livingston, 1952, p.31) 
Others, such as Head, take the economic 
efficiency argument. Head believes that variation 
in the demand for public goods can only be 
satisfied when the political decision-making 
process is decentralized. He concludes that a 
more feieral and less central government will 
present the optimum structure (Head, 1973, p.25). 
Despite attempts, such as those above, to 
attribute the need for federalism to certain 
variables or factors, there is one element common 
to all federations. This common factor is 
geographic in nature and it is this spatial 
characterisitic which appears to be the very 
essence of the federal svstem. This fact is Mell 
recognized: "rTo government has ever been called 
federal that has been organized on any but a 
territorial basis" (Livingston, 1052, p.35). 
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Simeon (1972, p.3) also uses the term 
"territorial" to describe the basis on which a 
federal system of government is decentralized. In 
fact a federation has been described as being "the 
most geographically expressive of all political 
systems" (Robinson, 1951, p.2). Therefore, a 
reviev of federalism conducted by a geographer 
does not appear to be all that far-fetched. 
Muir suggests that a geographical analysis 
of federalism is made possible by the division of 
the nation into political regions (Muir, 1975, 
p.211). Robinson looks beyond these states 
themselves to the implications which they have for 
human behaviour. He states that "the regulation 
of human conduct within a defined political area 
c^n be geographically significant" (7obinson, 
1051, p.19) . 
The potential for geographic research and 
study in the acea of federalism is apparent. 
However, Dikshit has criticized geographers for 
their lack of interest in this field, a situation 
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which some investigation would tend to 
substantiate: 
Geographers have paid little attention to 
the study of federalism despite the fact 
that ... the spatial interactions in the 
functioning of the federal states are most 
easily recognized... Although some 
geographers now agree that federalism is 
the most geographically expressive of all 
such governmental systems, their published 
work... does not show a keen awareness of 
this fact. 
(Dikshit, 1971, p. 97) 
Dikshit cites two reasons for the 
geographic significance of federalism. One is 
similar to that mentioned above by Muir and it 
deals with the political sub-units of a nation 
being clearly and easily recognized. The other, 
and probably more relevant reason, is the 
existence of regional differences (Dikshit, 1971, 
p.10 5) The key word is 'regional'. This is the 
reason for Muir's insistence that "the aspects of 
diversity" must be "spatially grouped ani not 
1 istr ibuter1 on a class or intralocal fashion" for 
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federal-sm to exist ("ui-, 1^75, p.107). 
Livingston concurs stating that a society can be 
called federal only if its diversities are 
"grouped territorially, that is, geographically" 
(Livingston, 1052, p.35). 
That a federal state is or must be divide^ 
into component spatial units is a more obvious 
fact than the base's for suc^ divisions. Naturally 
all factors which can vary over- space will not 
adhere to the drawing of specific boundaries. 
"Federalism embraces not mere1y a diversity of 
opinion on one issue but a whole pattern of 
diversities on a number- of issues" (Livingston, 
1952, p. 35). One cannot expect al"1 diffe-ences 
to coincide with boundary lines. 
Some of the general criteria which are use! 
as a basis for intra-national divisions a-e 
psychological, social, political and econom'c in 
nature (Dikshit, 1972, p. 107). rTi th a number of 
different criteria which can be use'-1 as a basn"s 
for Provincial boundaries it becomes more obv'ous 
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that complete homogeneity within boundaries is 
impossible. One such variable may be the spatial 
pattern of regional economic development. One 
cannot expect uniform development across Canada, 
within a province such as Ontario or even within a 
politically designated economic region within a 
province. The result is the spatial variation in 
such development within both Canada an'"1 its 
individual provinces. 
2. Definitional Examination 
Up to this point the thesis has fallen prey 
to a criticism made by Wheare who suggests that 
often "the term 'federal government' is used very 
loosely" (Wheare, 1953, p.l) A more rigid 
understanding of this term nay avoid confusion 
later in the thesis and will give a better 
understanding of the dilemma of Canadian political 
institutions as they relate to regiona1 
development. 
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It is not an uncommon practice to avoi^1 the 
definitional issue completely because "federalism 
is not easy to define" (Dikshit, 1971, p.93). 
This situation arises because "there is no 
accepted theory of federalism" and there is no 
"agreement as to what federalism is exactly" 
(Duchacek, 1970, p.139). Perhaps this is one of 
the reasons why so much has been written about 
federalism per -se. Of course, an in-depth 
investigation is not warranted in a pape" such as 
this, however, a discussion of some of the 
conceptual components of federalism, as they 
relate to regional development, is deemed useful. 
a) Association of States 
A basic concept centres around the phrase 
"an association of states which has been formed 
for certain common purposes" (Wheare, 1953, p.l). 
Livingston takes this notion and becomes more 
specific. lie labels the 'states' as be'.ng 
1listinct political and constitutional entities'. 
He also expands upon this basic concept by adding 
that this association creates a new body "above 
and different from those that have come together" 
(Livingston, 1952, p.31). Dikshit identifies this 
'new body' as being a "single sovereign central 
government" (Dikshit, 1971, p.93). 
b) Autonomy 
The second basic idea relevant to an 
understanding of the term federal deals with the 
concept of autonomy or indepeniance. This need 
has arisen from the problem of regional diversity 
discussed earlier. Dikshit states that after 
union the individual political units do hold on to 
certain degree of their original regional autonomy 
(Dikshit, 1971, p.93). Wheare (1053, p.l) concurs 
and Livingston eloquently declares that "the 
component states retain their identity, 
sacrificing to the collectivity only such powers 
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and functions as are necessary for the 
implementation of the purposes for which the 
association is formed" (Livingston, 1°52, p.31). 
c) Division of Power 
"^ he idea of autonomy is closely ''i~.ke5 to a 
third concept, that of the 'division of power'. 
This concept is so basic that it forms the root of 
what Wheare (1953) refers to as the 'federal 
principle'. It simply represents the notion that 
one level of government has a certain set of 
powers or authority and another level of 
government another set. However, Wheare adds 
another condition. Such governmental powers are 
divided in such a way "that the general an""1 
regional governments are each, within a sphere, 
co-ordinate and independent" (Wheare, 1953, p.11). 
Thus, there is on the one hand, the desire for the 
individual regions to maintain their character 
through autonomy and the use of certain powers. 
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On the other hand there has been mention made of 
the more practical and less politically i ileal nee<t 
for co-ordination. A situation thus exists where 
each level of government has its own powers and 
autonomy. Considering that the diversities which 
form the basis of a federal state are spatially 
grouped then the appropraite division of power 
will maintain these diversities. Livingston 
introduces a further element. Once the powers and 
functions have been delegated to their respective 
levels: 
...neither can be deprived by the other. 
This is to say that the cenfa" 
government's functions cannot be assumed by 
local governments or the loca1 government's 
by the central. Each is placed in relation 
to the other in a position of autonomy; 
neither is subordinate ani each may 
exercise within its sphere the full extent 
of its powers. 
(Liviigston, 1052, p.3D 
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3. mhe Problem: The Division of Power 
This final concept which has been discussed 
as it relates to federalism warrants further 
inquiry because of its relevance to the topic at 
hand. it is, in fact, this division of power of 
the federal system which has brought on the need 
for this particular piece of research. As w'll be 
seen, this aspect of federalism has a great deal 
of influence on government programs for regional 
economic development. 
Certainly attempts have been made, 
primarily by political scientists, to construct 
the 'ideal' division of powers within a 
federation. Unfortunately, because of the complex 
nature of this task, "federal states and federal 
constitutions have resulted from political 
bargaining and not from ideal models" (Molgat, 
1072, p.43). 
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a) Methods of Division 
At this point it may be wise to examine 
some of the rules or criteria used to divide 
political powers between the nation and its 
component states. The most general principle or 
guideline to achieve this end is set up by Molgat 
who suggests that the division of powers should 
"reflect the political will and political reality" 
(Molgat, 1972, p.43). Another vague premise is 
forwarded by Pounds who considers such factors as 
geographic conditions and local feelings (Pounds, 
1953, p.34). 
Aside from these broad considerations there 
is a general rule of thumb which applies to the 
assignment of political authority. Two examples 
which illustrate this common principle are: 
The division of power in the mode"! 
federal system is such that the State i.e. 
national government has responsibility for 
matters affecting the federation as a 
whole, such as foreign policy an-' tariff 
and immigration control, while the state 
governments manage affairs particular to 
their states. 
(Muir, 1975, p.105) 
...The central government has 
jurisdiction over all matters that bear on 
the development and security of the nation 
as a whole, and the unit governments have 
the right to regulate matters of local and 
more immediate importance to their 
respective peoples. 
(Dikshit, 1971, p.03) 
This notion would seem to be nothing more 
than common sense. Molgat is one of the few who 
becomes more specific in dealing with this issue. 
He draws up what he sees as the 'competing 
criteria' in determining the allotment of powers. 
They appear here as a list: 
-economic prosperity and efficiency 
-national and uniform standards 
-the need for collective action 
-increased strength and power 
-the threat of foreign or external 
domination 
-greater mobility 
-cultural survival 
-i nd i v i du a1i sm 
-the right to self-determination 
of national groups and, peoples 
-power to the people 
-the need for more personal government 
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-the need for less bu'eaucracy 
(Molgat, 1072, 
p.43) 
b) The Problems 
Despite this and other attempts to outline 
solutions to the ideal division of power, no 
specifically applicable answer has yet been 
attained. This shortcoming in the fun^amenta"1 
theory of federalism appears to be the source of 
^any real-life federal government problems. mne 
problem boils down to one of the dfineation of 
powers to the respective governments within a 
federal nation. Writing ^most a century ago, 
Hart recognized this problem. "The division of 
power between central and state government "? a 
constant source of difficulty and il1-fea"! ing" 
(Hart, 1301, p.25). 
Most authors on the subjact agree t'->at t'~>e 
problem exists. As one reads their ''orks one 
cannot but be reminded of the current ""ilemma in 
Canada relating to regional economic deve1op^ent. 
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3owie and Friedrich state that "there is a 
considerable overlapping of powers so that some 
exist both in the central government and in the 
member states" (Bowie and Friedrich, 1954, p.314). 
Watts (1970, p.67) confirms this frequent 
coincidence of strong central and state interests. 
A consequence of this could be a situation where 
there are too many cooks in the kitchen. The 
result would be waste. Watts explains: 
The dual polity inherent in a federal 
political system composed of central and 
state governments would appear to imply the 
need for dual sets of administrative 
services to serve the two levels of 
government. 
(Watts, 1970, p.25) 
In a system of clearly divided powers this 
problem would be minimized. However, in Canada, 
particu1arly in reference to regional development 
where there is no such clear division, there is 
undoubtedly wasteful duplication. 
Waste, one symptom of 'maladministration', 
is "unavoidable, inescapable and nobody's fault" 
(Wheare, 1073,p.15). However, such problems are 
undoubtedly accentuated beyond a minimum 
acceptable level in a federal state with a 
non-ideal division of powers. Duchacek expresses 
this concept as follows: 
Of course, no system in the world is or 
can be immune to wasteful duplication of 
governmental activities anJ equally 
wasteful jurisdictional conflicts. But 
these wastes in a federal system seem 
inevitable. 
(Duchacek, 1970, p.313) 
Carnell agrees and suggests that the 
additional red tape necessitated by federalism has 
led to the high level of overlap and duplication 
(Carnell, 1951, p.43). 
The inapropriate division of power can 
create still another dilemma. mhis could be 
described as Lnter-governmental conflict and/or 
competition. "Federal governments and provincial 
governments compete to gain credit, status and 
importance and to avoid discredit and blame" 
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(Simeon, 1972, p.185). The manipulation of 
regional economic development programs for 
political credit is a prime example. It can even 
lead to the ironic situation where parallel or 
comparable departments of different levels of 
government can exist and develop programs which 
have conflicting goals or priorities (Parizeau, 
1955, p.45). 
Watts (1970) states that the division of 
responsiblities with economic significance has 
been very difficult and the result has been for 
the levels of government to share these powers. 
Sastri has preferred to explain this sharing as 
being more the result of economic necessity. ""he 
level of economic planning and the philosophy of 
equal economic opportunity even in the capitalist 
federations has brought on the need for econo-nic 
intervention at all levels of government (Sastri, 
1073, p.209). Muir (1075) believes that our 
society's complex economic structure an"" increased 
government intervention in the economy %as 
severely handicapped the abilities of the 
traditional federal framework. That is, a complex 
society and a federation whose powers have been 
divided into black and white are not likely to 
co-exist. Therefore Parizeau (1955) suggests that 
for economic policies to be effective they must be 
based on observable facts and not upon "the letter 
of the constitution". Unfortunately the allotment 
of government responsibilities in such an 
effectual manner has never been achieved according 
to Dikshit (1971). 
Bowie and Friedrich cite one of the most 
important explanations for the 'unworkability' of 
following 'the letter of the constitution' as 
being "the impossibility of finding a verbal 
formula which will solve the question" (Bowie an.-" 
Friedrich, 1954, p.342). In a traditional federal 
system it is believed. that "only a written 
constitution ... could precisely assign powers and 
functions in the necessary manner" (Livingston, 
1332, p.32). Apparently, in practical terms, this 
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has not worked. Robinson puts the blame, in part, 
on the passage of time and change. 
"Constitutions," he explains, are "a reflection of 
the attitudes and conditions of the time in which 
they were written" (Robinson, 1951, p.3). Thus a 
rigidly worded constitution is bound to become 
outmoded in the society for 'which it was 
originally created. Livingston (1052, p.34) 
explains that changes in social patterns over time 
will necessarily lead to changes in the way in 
which old institutions are operated. 
What impact will this have on a federal 
state? Robinson states that "the working of the 
constitution and rigid advances in technology 
create new situations to which a rigid 
constitution is ill suited" (Robinson, 1951, p.2). 
Using such an argument Carnell attacks old style 
federalism: 
... it might be argued that federal 
states are relics of the horse - and 
buggy days. Federalism may well have been 
4 5 
suited to a particular phase of unification 
of large continental states with small-
populations and poor communications, but 
today, by the very rigidity of their 
constitutions and the obsolescence of the 
economic philosophies underlying them, 
federal states are seriously handicapped in 
undertaking expeditiously and efficiently 
the tasks of modern government. 
(Carnell, 1951, p.13) 
This would appear to be a custom made 
description of the Canadian situation. Birch in 
his 1955 examination of pre- and post - World War 
II federations takes a stand similar to that of 
Carnell. The strict division of power in older 
constitutions, including Canada, has not been 
adopted by countries with newer constitutions 
(Birch, 1955, p. 304). Because of such problems, 
the theory of federalism has gone through a 
process of evolution and change (Dikshit, 1071, 
p.97). As one writer puts it: "Under the heat and 
pressure generated by social and economic change 
in the twentieth century, the distinct strata of 
the older federalisms have begun to melt and flow 
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into one another" (Corry, 1053, p.122). 
4. The Evolution into Co-operative Federalism 
It is not merely the creation of a 
federal structure but the particular form 
that structure takes which has a vital 
bearing on the capacity to promote economic 
development. 
(Watts, 1970, p.113) 
The previous examination of federalism an4 
the problems created by its necessary division of 
power revealed the pressure for changes in the 
structure of this political institution. 
Accompanying any changes in the form of government 
will be changes in roles which the individual 
governments assume. Thus the way in which 
federalism has changed may have a direct impact on 
the potential for inter-governmental problems 
relating to regional economic -qeveo1pment. 
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a) The Transition 
Dikshit (1971) gives a brief but valuable 
account of the transition from the older 
'dualistic' • form of federalism to a more 
contemporary form. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries the dualistic form of a 
strict division of powers prevailed. This model 
may well have been suited to the times. However, 
with increased government intervention in the 
economy and a more complex social system, the role 
of the federal system of government has changed. 
Now "co-operation, interdependence and 
interpenetration of national and. state agencies is 
inevitable" in government (Dikshit, 1971, p.102). 
The manner in which modifications are being 
made to old constitutions in order to adapt to the 
new circumstances and the characteristics of newer 
constitutions support the above notion. 
"Everywhere, in varying degrees, the old 
'dualistic' federalism has given way to 
.do 
'co-operative' federalism" (Carnell, 1951, p.17). 
Both Birch (1958) and Dikshit (1971) describe in a 
similar manner the appearance of this new phase 
apropriately labelled 'co-operative federalism'. 
Ideally, almost all federalisms should make 
the shift from dualistic to co-operative 
federalism (Muir, 1975). Even Wheare (1353), a 
proponent of dualistic federalism, stresses the 
importance of co-ordination between national and 
regional governments. 
b) Its advantages 
There are, in all likelihood, almost as 
many arguments in favour of co-operative 
federalism as there are writers about it. Watts 
falls back on the traditional problem of the 
division of responsibilities and the "inevitable 
overlaps and interrelations between the 
administrative responsibilities of different 
levels of government" (Watts, 1970, p.37). He 
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contends that to isolate their activities from 
each other is impossible. Beck continues this 
line of thought criticizing worshippers of the 
"sacred cow of federalism" by claiming that it is 
"not only unrealistic but foolish" (Beck, 1355, 
p.225). He suggests that different levels of 
government are no longer completely independent 
but instead have become mutually interdependent. 
Simeon suggests that the term 'interdependent' 
"implies that ... what one government does will 
nave implications for others". He goes on to say 
that governments must adjust to the spillovers of 
other levels (Simeon, 1972, p.3). Economic theory 
suggests that the existence of such externalities 
can lead to very definite problems. One economist 
explains that even under a system of optimal 
boundaries the existancce of significant 
spillovers will create the need for the 
co-ordination of governments (Head, 1973, p.33). 
Co-ordination is necessary not only to prevent one 
government's policies from frustrating the other 
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but also permit the formulation of policies for 
the nation as a whole (Simeon, 1972, p.4). If 
this is not the case the efficiency of federal 
policies will be reduced (Parizeau, 1965, p.50). 
It would also permit the "uneconomic duplication 
of administrative agencies" (Watts, 1970, p.25). 
Joint as well as independent action is needed on 
behalf of the two major levels of government to 
provide the optimum level of social services 
(Birch, 1955, p. 147). There are several 
advantages to the sharing of the administration of 
services. One is a smaller size of the civil 
service and thus, perhaps, a better staffed civil 
service (Watts, 1970, p.26). Such 
intergovernmental co-operation also avoids the 
necessity of a constitutional redistribution of 
political responsibilities. This difficult 
process is painfully obvious to Canadians who 
observe the frequent conferences aimed at 
constitutional reform. 
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The acclaim for co-operative federalism 
appears to be widespread. It may thus be wise to 
examine this term more carefully. Corry suggests 
that this new phase of federal government "has 
arisen because several seperate governments share 
a divided responsibility for regulating a single 
economic and social structure (Corry, 1053, 
p.121). The result of such a situation is an 
unrealistic alignment of responsibilities an^ the 
interpenetration of the two governments (Corry, 
1953, p.122). Birch therefore suggests that "the 
definition of federalism should be reworded so not 
as to suggest that intergovernmental co-operation 
... is an exception to the federal principle" 
(Birch, 1055, p.291). He goes on to state that 
"the following definition may now appear adequate: 
a federal system of government is one in which 
there is a division of powers between one general 
an'1 several regional authorities, eac^ of which, 
in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the other, 
and each of which acts direct1y on the people 
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through its own administrative agencies" (Birch, 
1955, p.305). Dikshit (1971) sees the difference 
between the two federal systems as primarily one 
of emphasis. "Dual federalism", he believes, 
"views the two sets of governments as equal rivals 
whereas 'co-operative federalism' views them as 
equal partners" (Dikshit, 1071, p.104). Watts 
(1970) maintains that a ceratin measure of the two 
components, co-operation and rivalry, are still 
present in such a system. He agrees that the 
federal form of government involves a degree of 
co-operation but contends that, at the same time, 
it also incorporates elements of bargaining, 
rivalry and even conflict (Watts, 1070, p.7). He 
therefore defines a more realistic federal 
organization as "a political system characterized, 
by two subsystems, one of central government and 
the other of state governments, in which the 
component governments are co-ordinate in the sense 
that neither is politically subordinate to the 
other, but which interact with each other at many 
-- A 
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points both co-operatively and competitively" 
(Watts, 1970, p.8). Watts thus feels that the 
term 'interdependent federalism' is more realistic 
than the more common phrase 'co-operative 
federalism'. This phrase is more descriptive of 
"the simultaneous co-operation and rivalry' in the 
system (Watts, 1970, p.7). 
Much of the conflict or rivalry which does 
exist between levels of government is politically 
based. 3irch (1955) claims that political 
relations between the two levels of governments 
can influence not only the co-operation between 
them, but ultimately the type of legislation which 
is passed. Watts (1070) believes that 
co-operation can be impeded by having different 
political parties in power in the t<*?o levels of 
government. Such a situation can give way to a 
feeling of distrust. Simeon (1972) also supports 
the notion of political competition giving rise to 
conflict. 
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c) Its Problems 
Despite the praise which the new phase of 
federalism has received such discussions have not 
been void of criticism. One criticism in 
particular conveys the idea that co-operative 
federalism deviates from the 'theoretical ideal' 
of federalism. It has also been noted by Watts 
(1970) in a more practical vein that the 
integration of any government activities would be 
frowneJ upon by their respective civil servants. 
He points out that individual career prospects may 
appear to be inhibited by the integration or 
sharing of administrative duties between 
government levels. Public servants may, therefore 
, try to resist any steps toward co-operative 
government. 
There are other problems which seem to 
inhibit the practical implementation of this nev/ 
phase of federalism. One is the inability to 
resolve disputes relating to intergovernmental 
administration. Should any conflicts arise there 
is in a federal system no superior body which has 
the authority to resolve them (Watts, 1970, p.75). 
A final problem Zeals with the different 
perspectives of the national and provincial 
governments. Simeon suggests that "each 
government has a set of interests and priorities 
it is committed to, and each, not surprisingly, 
feels that its priorities are the most important 
ones". He goes on to say that "each has a 
different electorate it must appeal to and a 
different set of groups it must be responsive to" 
(Simeon, 1972, p.139) . 
d) The Continued Meed for Intergovernmental 
Co-operation 
Thus, there are difficulties to be overcome 
in this newer form of federalism. Yet, ironically, 
it will only be through co-operation and 
consultation that these obstacles can be overcome. 
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Watts (1370) provides one of the better 
discussions dealing with the characteristics and 
functioning of co-operative federalism. First, he 
classifies the forms of co-operative 
administrative relations which exist. Basically 
there are two: 
1) joint action 
2) consultation 
'Joint action' involves the "establishment 
of joint programs or activities in which the 
decision-making powers and financial 
responsibilities are shared by the governments 
involved" ('Watts, 1070, p.73). Consultation, on 
the other hand, "is required where extensive 
financial and administrative responsibility for 
particular matters rest with one government or the 
other, but where the interests of both governmnets 
will be affected by the decision taken" (Watts, 
1970, p.73). The relevance of thesa t ;o schemes 
will become apparent in later chapters dealing 
with government's administrative rasponsas to 
regional economic development. 
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Watts also classifies intergovernmental 
co-operation based on the type of friction which 
had to be overcome. There are four such types: 
1) those natters where the Constitution 
assigns to the central government 
exclusive or concurrent legislative 
powers but where, in the interest of 
decentralized administration, the central 
government finds desirable to use the 
states as its administrative agents in 
part of the field. 
2) where neither the central constitutiona"1 
powers alone nor the state constitutional-
powers alone are clearly sufficient. 
3) v/here the central government has no 
clear power, the states have, but because 
of territorial limitations cannot procee""1 
singly. 
4) those matters which, though 
constitutionally state concerns, are ones 
in which the central government 
especially wishes to promote development. 
(Watts, 1070, p.78-70) 
There seems to be one category which "atts 
neglects. It is the situation where fr-'ction 
arises out of the absence of the delegation of a 
particular power to either level of government. 
As in the case of reaional economic ,:,evaloo^ent 
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both levels have assumed this specifically 
unassigned responsibility. The implications of 
this will soon be realized. 
5. Federalism and Canada 
It is a generally accepted fact that the 
political system of Canada is federal in nature. 
Canada seems well suited to that form of 
government. In fact Lawson goes so far as to say 
that "the federal principle is not merely suitable 
for Canada, it is a necessity" (Lawson, 1071, 
p.15). However, Lawson also notes that "the very 
reasons that federalism is needed in this country, 
namely differences in population, wealth, 
resources and religion, are also reasons why the 
distribution of power is difficult" (Lawson, 1071, 
P.15). 
SO 
a) The Division of Power in Canada 
The problem of the division of powers was 
probably first encountered in the formulation of 
the British North America Act of 1357 which acts 
as the Canadian Constitution. It was formulated 
primarily to state the conditions of the union of 
the original four provinces of the Dominion. 
However, as such "it contains almost nothing on 
the important question of how the Dominion and 
provincial governments are to operate" ' in 
practical terms (Lawson, 1371, p.11). 1071, 
p.11). Nonetheless it did attempt to divide the 
political powers between the central and 
provincial governments. In the style of 
traditional dualistic federalism it even went so 
far as to enumerate the powers over which the 
provinces would have exclusive control. The 
federal government 'was given the residual powers 
and these too were listed. 
The 3NA Act is characterized by vagueness. 
Bowie and Friedrich (1954) believe that the 
general nature of the document has led to the 
difficulty of trying to assign certain powers to 
one level of government or the other. Lawson 
(1371) explains this as a symptom of the times. 
Apparently in 1357 much of the workings of the 
federal system was based on convention and 
practice and the form of government preceeding 
Confederation seemed to be running smoothly. 
A second characteristic of Canada's 
Constitution is federal dominance. Molgat (1072) 
supports the contention that the feder^1 
j3vernnent, by receiving a greater share of the 
powers than its provincial counterparts, was given 
dominant authority. Lawson (1971) also explains 
this characteristic in terms of its point in 
history. Appreciation of the dangers of strong 
state powers which became visible in the American 
Civil War and the need for a strong defence of 
the colonies are two possible explanations. 
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b) The Influence of a Changing Society 
Despite the attempt for clarity relating to 
the division of powers in the BMA Act, problems 
have arisen. Lawson (1971) explains that most of 
the problems have been created by changing 
conditions over time. These would be matters 
unforeseen by the Fathers of Confederation. 
One of the effects of time and change has 
been the creation of a see-saw battle for 
political dominance between Canada and the 
provinces. Roughly speaking, the period from 
Confederation to the late 1930's finds the 
provinces closer to the people and more active 
than the federal government. In pre-Xeynesian 
times the federal government found it difficult to 
acquire widespread support for its economic 
actions. Keynes (1935) had, of course, made a 
case for greater government intervention in the 
economy. However during World. War II there seemed 
to come a turning point. At this time and for 
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about the next decade the Dominion government was 
to receive a greater share of the balance of 
power. Coming out of the war it planned to 
maintain its position of authority. Smiley (1072) 
contends that the provinces had never fully 
recovered from the problems of depression and war. 
Canadians had also grown accustomed to looking 
towards the federal government for the supply of 
services during times of hardship. Jewett (1053) 
suggests that, in addition, during World War II 
Canada had learned much about economic matters 
and, with accepted Keynesian theory as its tool, 
had confidence to continue its role as leader. He 
also notes that people were now turning toward the 
federal government and away from business and 
industry to pull them out of the wartime economy. 
However, in the late 1950's there came the 
beginnings of another change. Jewett (13S3) 
claims that both levels of government -were 
discontented. T'he federal government was unhappy 
in its position of tax collector and fun-1 supplier 
for provincial spending. The provinces were upset 
with being forced to abide by federal grant 
arrangements. According to Smiley (1972) it was 
also at this time that most of the matters which 
required government action seemed to fall under 
provincial jurisdiction. The people started to 
look towards the provincial authorities far social 
and economic actions. Smiley (1072) attributes 
the loss of confidence in Ottawa to its inability 
to handle the problems of the stagflation during 
the 1950's, a problem which even now Keynesian 
economics cannot handle. 
And so the tug-of-war continued through t'">e 
late 13S0's and into the 1370's when "after 105 
years of judicial interpretation an' of 
legislative and administrative practice, we now 
h=>ve a Constitution where the legislative power is 
about equally livided between the Provincial 
legislatures an^ the Federal Parliament" (Molgat, 
1072, p.43). Safarian adds that both levels of 
government also have "major economic roles ti 
Play" fSafarian, 1374, p.iii). 
55 
c) The Problems in Canada 
This practical division of powers has led 
to a number of problems and criticisms. Some of 
the public submissions received by the Special 
Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of 
Commons on the Constitution of Canada illustrate 
this situation: 
1) The Federal Parliament does not have 
sufficient power to manage and plan the 
economy. 
5) The present Federal role in social 
legislation (particularly in shared cost 
programs) interferes with or prevents the 
Provinces from varying the programs in 
accordance with Provincial needs, 
resources and priorities. It also leads 
to a poor allocation of public funds and 
an excessive bureaucracy. 
3) The present division of power is too 
rigid to allow for varying Provincial and 
Federal needs. The Constitution requires 
greater flexibility. 
9) The present division of powers is 
unclear and. imprecise, giving rise to 
much litigation and judicia1 
interpretation. It is also incomplete 
and does not provide for jurisdiction 
over modern technology and ^s resulting 
0 J 
problems. ^he division of powers must be 
more functional. 
(Molgat, 1972, p.42-43) 
3irch (1954) believes that such problems 
have brought on a situation where there is a 
considerable overlap of jurisdiction between the 
two levels of government. Thus one can begin to 
visualize some of the potential political problems 
which may face regional economic development 
strategies at both levels of administration. 
Among the common recommendations for change 
is the call for increased intergovernmental-
co-operation and co-ordination. Lawson (1071) 
states that federalism, particu1arly Canadian 
federalism, requires this same co-operation - 'a 
certain amount of give and take'. This type of 
working arrangement is particularly important, as 
Smiley (1972) suggests, when it concerns matters 
of economics. 
The Victoria Charter, a document of 
recommendations from the Canadian Constitutional 
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Conference of June, 1971, contained specific 
reference to 
federal and 
recommended 
Minister and 
Committee dealing with the Constitution used the 
Victoria Charter as the basis for many of its 
recommendations (Molgat, 1372). Although the 
Committee recommended the continued use of 
exclusive powers delegated to one level or the 
other, they also advocated the increased use of 
concurrent powers. Their ultimate recommendation 
dealing with intergovernmental relations read as 
follows: 
More communication and ful1er 
co-operation among all levels of government 
are imperative needs. The achievement of 
these ends involves the improvement and 
simplification of the means of liason, and, 
where necessary, the creation of new 
mechanisms. 
(Molgat, 1972, p.44) 
increased consultation between 
provincial governments. It 
an annual meeting of the Prime 
Provincial Premiers. The Joint 
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The provinces have given a considerable 
degree of support to such recomnandations (Simeon, 
1072) and Watts states that there has already been 
a distinct move towards joint programs. 
Jewett (1953) out1ines the beginning of 
these changes. The year 1053 is the point in time 
Jewett selects as the turning point in fe^era1 -
provincial relations. This new philosophy she 
describes as 'co-operative federalism". Symptoms 
of this evolution have been an increase in 
federal-provincial consultations, recognition of 
the expansion of provincial spanning needs, 
increased equalization payments an! the resultant 
decreased significance of shared cost programs 
(Jewett, 1953, p.342). of this evolution. Simeon 
(1972) also sees 1053 as being an important date. 
It was at this time that Prime Minister Pearson 
outline""' the elements of co-operative federalism. 
He stated that it "includes mutual respect for 
each other's jurisdiction, close consultation as a 
basis for co-or lination, equitable tax-sharing an-1 
equalization" (Simeon, 1972, p.172-3). 
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Despite this apparent change of attitude, 
problems do exist for the Canadian brand of 
co-operative federalism. Some believe that 
conflict within the system is simply inevitable. 
As one author puts it: 
It is wildly improbable that federal -
provincial conflict in respect to economic 
matters will be ended through either a new 
constitutional settlement or through those 
governments giving up their freedom of 
independent action to some kind of joint 
executive authority. Such conflict is 
inherent in the Canadian federal system. 
(Smiley, 1972, p.107) 
Simeon (1972) agrees that the different 
perspectives of the two levels of government 
create a built-in source of conflict. 
Smiley continues this argument and relates 
closely to the topic at hand. He is writing about 
the 1971 Ontario Budget Paper: 
Thus, according to the Ontario analysis, 
the net effect of federal policies was 
permanently 'contractionary' in Ontario and 
Ottawa's attempts to instigate 
interprovincial disparities had frustrated 
full employment and economic growth in the 
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province. From the Ontario perspective, 
provincial and municipal fiscal policies 
were necessary to counter the effect of 
federal action. 
(Smiley, 1372, p.113) 
There are a multitude of other difficulties 
which exist. Simeon (1372) criticizes the 
provinces for the jealousy with which they guard 
their powers. Corry (1953) concurs, noting that 
the provinces prefer to live off the system rather 
than become partners with the system. 
There are also the traditional political 
problems. These usually boil down to 'who-pays, 
who-gets-credit'. Simeon reported in 1072 the 
results of a number of surveys with government 
officials which substantiate the existence of just 
such a situation. He found that a common 
complaint among federal authorities was the fact 
that they supplied the funds for cartain 
provincial programs and yet received no credit. 
He also uncovered one further problem which deals 
with political credit and politica1 prestige. 
Simeon states that this is "simply ... the fact 
that two levels of government are competing for 
the support and taxation lollars of the same 
people" (Simeon, 1972, p.5). 
The Constitutional problems which Canada 
faces are more apparent now than ever before. The 
specific problems faced by those in government 
administering regional programs are symptomatic of 
those faced by the country as a whole. 
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IV. REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: IT'S 
STATUS IN A FEDERAL COUNTRY AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF PROGRAMS 
1. Regional Development in the Canadian Federal 
Setting 
Canada is a land of great diversity - diversity in 
a multitude of phenomena. Physically rich 
farmlands give way to barren rock and cattle graze 
within the view of skyscrapers. Similarly, the 
economic landscape is not uniform. 
Unfortunately, as is frequently pointed 
out, "geographic diversities may not always follow 
the boundary lines of the component units" within 
a federal country (Livingstone, 1952, p.85). To 
the frustration of many economic geographers and 
concerned politicians most boundaries have been 
"determined historically with little regard for 
economic considerations" (Head, 1973, p.28). Head 
adds that this situation is of greatest 
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significance in a multi-level governmental system. 
Economic activities tend to ignore 
provincial boundaries. This results in two 
particular problems according to Watts (1970). 
One is the problem of distinguishing between 
activities of national versus provincial interest 
and the other is the existance of interaction 
among activities at both levels. The relevance of 
this becomes apparent when one realizes that 
"economic development and the location of industry 
has almost always been of interest to both central 
and state governments" (Watts, 1970, p.68). 
The Fathers of Confederation were unable to 
create a constitution which could stand the test 
of time and weather all changes in society. In 
particular, they must have had little idea that 
regional economic disparities would be perceived 
as a problem of great significance and that 
governments would take such an active role in 
their alleviation. As Molgat sees it: 
Canadians are becoming aware of the 
problem of regional disparities and have 
been asking their governments for an 
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increasingly greater redistribution of 
wealth. Unfortunately, the Canadian 
Constitution did not explicitly assign the 
role to any government. 
(Molgat, 1972, p.26) 
a) Economic Policy and Federalism 
The result of constitutional failure has 
been the creation of a stumbling block in the 
fight against regional disparities. The "inherent 
difficulty in the field of regional development 
policy is the overlapping jurisdictional 
responsibilities of different levels of government 
in terms of both functions and geographic areas" 
(Lipnowski, 1969, p.ii). 
The existance of this situation leads Watts 
(1970) to believe that it would be difficult to 
delegate government responsibility for regional 
development to any one level. Corry (1958) 
suggests that there will never be a constitution 
created where the various economic functions of 
governments do not overlap. Duchacek (1970) 
recounts how politicians, both past and present, 
have been unable to properly assign authority in 
the area of economic policy. Even in more 
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recently created federations this has not been 
achieved. In such governmental systems there are 
frequently a number of concurrent powers 
"including such important subjects as industrial 
development" (Birch, 1955, p.304). 
In all cases what must be realized is the 
inevitable interaction between governments 
operations. Safarian (1974) points out that there 
are some types of policies which are very 
interdependent. Duchacek (1970) specifically 
mentions the interdependence of economic policies 
between the two senior levels of government. 
The constitutional predicament combined 
with government interest in regional economic 
development has led to a number of obvious 
problems. Watts observes that federations "appear 
to be inefficient, slow and costly, especially in 
such critical areas as economic planning" (Watts, 
1970, p.8). Others have similar comments 
concerning the more specific topic of regional 
development. In this respect Bacon notes the 
apparent "interdepartmental rivalry and lack of 
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co-ordination" (1969, p.18). A study by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) makes a similar remark with 
reference to Canada. It states that "in some 
instances, a large number of different agencies 
may be operating in a region and there are latent, 
if not apparent, co-ordination difficulties" 
(OECD, 1970, p.57). 
Describing the scene in 1968, Brewis and 
Paquet make a strong indictment of government 
practices regarding regional development: 
Therefore, what we have in Canada is a 
combination of miscellaneous goals defined 
by a number of agencies informally working 
in a somewhat complementary way but with an 
almost nonexistant unifying and overall 
direction. No clear and coherent plan of 
development is reflected in the regional 
policies . There is information gathering, 
much of it only tenuously related to 
specific action, but there is little or no 
indication of how the system is supposed to 
work, how one region is related to another 
in the national context, or what should be 
the timing of specific steps. 
(Brewis and Paquet, 1968, 
p.135) 
And they continue: 
77 
The lack of integration between the 
elaboration of regional policies and the 
broader policy framework of the larger 
units explains and illustrates the extent 
of the chaos on regional issues. Very 
little is done to guide the elaboration of 
a sound regional policy based on national 
and provincial priorities. This lack of 
planning leaves all sorts of freedom for 
many agencies at all levels of government 
to pursue contradictory policies. 
(Brewis and Paquet, 1968, 
p.136) 
Writing four years later, Brewis states 
that "such a lack of integration is common" 
(Brewis, 1972, pages not numbered). He 
illustrates his point by stating that "an 
individual province may subsidize the 
establishment of a plant within its boundaries, 
even though there may be excess capacity in the 
industry as a whole" (Brewis, 1972, pages not 
numbered). 
b) The Problem 
Although "it has seemed reasonable to 
expect each government within a federation to have 
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its own services" (Watts, 1970, p.8), it does not 
seem reasonable (let alone economical or 
efficient) to have unnecessary duplication. Such 
duplication may prove costly to the tax-payer. It 
is unlikely that a nation could support two 
seperate political administrations with the 
concommitant possibility of duplication and 
conflicts (Duchacek, 1970, p.313). 
A problem which may arise out of this could 
be labelled 'competition'. Provinces which 
participate unilaterally in regional economic 
development programs are, in fact, competing for 
development with other provinces. It may also 
have a bearing on the effectiveness of national 
policies: 
Such competition for industry at the 
provincial level has important implications 
for the nation as a whole. If there is to 
be a national policy of regional 
development, the actions of individual 
provinces cannot be a matter of 
indifference. 
(Brewis, 1969, p.324) 
Three years later Brewis continued his 
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argument: 
For the most part, provincial governments 
attach little importance to the possible 
repurcussions of their actions on other 
provinces, or the implications of their 
policies on national objectives... 
From the national point of view, little 
is to be gained by this type of 
competition. 
(Brewis, 1972, pages not 
numbered) 
From the perspective of the provincial 
politician it is easy to understand the rationale 
behind provincial interest in development 
programs. Unfortunately and too frequently 
provincial borders do not represent economic 
regions. It is simply coincidental if they do. 
However, as Brewis (1964) points out, when 
provinces take actions which appear to be based on 
a 'economic region* rationale, their actions may 
hinder rather than help the economic growth of the 
nation. A "preoccupation with provincial 
boundaries can lead to an inefficient allocation 
of resources at the national level" (Brewis, 1969, 
p. 325). 
80 
c) The Arguments for Federal Control 
The outline of the above problems provides 
a good starting point for the presentation of 
arguments which advocate national, or rather, 
federal control over regional economic development 
One of the cases most frequently used by 
federalists is the unity argument. In Lipnowski's 
M.A. thesis the following line of reasoning is 
presented: 
... a pre-eminent national political goal 
is the fostering of national unity... In 
fact, the impetus for a regional 
development programme at the federal 
level might derivj largely from the need 
to instill in all regions of the country a 
sense of belonging and participation in the 
mainstream of economic life. 
(Lipnowski, 1969, p.2) 
Gertler reports that Jean Marchand, the 
first Minister of the Department of Regional 
Economic Expansion (DREE), made an emotional plea 
at a conference for businessmen to help the 
government solve "the problem of regional 
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disparities for the sake of Canadian unity". 
Gertler goes on to recount how at a similar 
engagement Tom Kent, a former Deputy Minister 
under Marchand, stated that one of the "major 
motivations for current policy was nationalism" 
(Gertler, 1972, p.72-73). 
A second argument which federalists are 
quick to put forward could be classified as the 
'economic efficiency argument1. The concept of 
centralized control seems to be of paramount 
significance to this line of reasoning. For 
planning of any matters, particularly those 
economic, at the national level, centralization is 
necessary. (Carnell, 1961) Duchacek states this 
more specifically: 
To speed up economic progress, to 
eliminate territorially uneven social and 
economic development, and to ensure 
national security, it seems imperative to 
provide for centralization of economic and 
political powers on which a nationally 
unified policy and action may be based. 
(Duchacek, 1970, p.348) 
Hood concurs with the centralist arguments 
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of Duchacek: 
Policies to defend the national economy 
against unemployment, inflation and 
inadequate growth must be national 
policies, having national support and the 
active co-operation of all governments 
which have responsibility for their 
implementation., 
(Hood, 1964, p.76) 
Hood has thus introduced the idea of inter-
governmental co-operation. This facilitates 
discussion of a third line of reasoning which 
federalists put forth and might appropriately be 
labelled the 'central co-ordinator' argument. It 
basically states that because the federal 
government should be responsible for economic 
policy in the nation it should thus act as the 
'watch-dog' co-ordinator of the provincial 
implementation of the national policy. Bacon 
incorporates the idea of planning into this 
argument: 
Planning can only be carried out from the 
top down. A national framework is 
essential for provincial action, and for 
successful regional action, a form of 
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comprehensive provincial policy is 
unquestionably necessary. 
(Bacon, 1969, p.18-19) 
Before the creation of DREE, Kristjanson 
(1965) criticized the federal government for 
failing to provide the provinces with a framework 
for national development which could be used to 
assess their individual positions. Because of 
this situation, he contends that short-run 
programs had to be implemented. Watts (1970) 
observes that in federal nations with centralized 
planning in order to fully implement effective 
programs for development it is often necessary for 
the central government to co-ordinate state 
action. 
Such co-operation between federal and state 
governments in tackling the regional development 
problem would seem to be a realistic approach for 
Canada to take, particularly in light of the 
constitutional dilemma discussed previously (pp. 
38 - 48). There is, of course, a need for 
provincial input to regional growth policies 
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especially because natural resources and education 
fall within their jurisdiction (Kristjanson, 
1965). Richards explains this situation more 
concisely: 
National planning relating to regional 
development is difficult under the Canadian 
system of confederation where control of 
natural resources, education, and other 
sectors is the prerogative of the 
individual provinces. Except during 
periods of national emergency, national 
objectives involving these sectors may be 
achieved only through co-operation with the 
individual province; it is the province 
which assumes the planning function and, 
theoretically at least, deals with the 
problems and decides on the solutions and 
objectives. 
(Richards, 1968, p.19) 
Yet the residual nature of the Canadian 
Constitution should permit federal control of 
regional development. However, "this is of no 
great comfort in practical political terms today" 
(Burns, 1967, p.21). 
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d) The Arguments for Provincial Control 
Despite the constitutional assignment of 
power, and due to some of the problems discussed 
above, some writers advocate provincial 
jurisdiction over regional economic development. 
Indeed, the provinces have taken a keen interest 
in avtivities centred around regional economic 
development (Gertler, 1972). The result has been 
"a proliferation of industrial incentive programs 
across the country" (Brewis, 1972, pages not 
numbered). 
Arguments which advocate provincial 
authority can be grouped into several rough 
classes. One has already been mentioned. It 
deals with the Constitutional division of powers 
and could be labelled the 'provincial 
jurisdiction' argument. Gertler (1972) argues 
that the major structural economic problem in 
Canada is its dependence on the primary resource 
industries and that this problem is felt most 
conspicuously at the provincial level. Thus some 
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of the most critical changes in the economy must 
deal with resource use. Because natural resources 
falls under the jurisdiction of the provinces 
these units must be responsible for some of the 
major structural changes in the economy (Gertler, 
1972). A second major area over which the 
provinces have jurisdiction is the environment, a 
responsibility which may also have an impact on 
regional policies. Gertler defines this term as 
"the qualitative element in our standard of living 
(Gertler, 1972, p.50). 
The concept of the 'quality of life' 
expressed above allows a smooth transition into 
the next argument in favour of provincial control 
over regional economic development. More 
specifically it is the existance of 
intra-provincial disparities. There exist within 
the provinces "substantial economic and general 
cultural disparities" (Gertler, 1972, p.51). 
Gertler continues: 
In fact, because of the intra-provincial 
centralization of growth, the disparities 
tend to be sharpest in the more prosperous 
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provinces. This is illustrated by a recent 
ranking of the ten economic regions of 
Ontario. 
(Gertler, 1972. p.51) 
The final argument frequently voiced could 
be called the 'fiscal power argument*. One 
"factor of considerable consequence shaping 
provincial development policies is the fact that 
they are, as a group, becoming fiscally more 
important" (Gertler, 1972, p.51). However, Paquet 
and Lithwick (1967) suggest that, more 
importantly, it is the increased role of the 
provinces in the area of public policy relative to 
that of the federal government. There seems to be 
both increased "opportunity and concomitant 
responsiblity for policies affecting the level of 
economic activity" (Gertler, 1972, p.5). The 
results of this trend are described in the 
following passage: 
The developments have led to a new 
self-awareness on the part of all provinces 
and an acute desire on the part of the 
have-not provinces to achieve economic and 
social standards equivalent to their 
richest sisters ... The first phase of the 
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emergence of regional consciousness then 
has proceeded at the provincial level. 
(Paquet and Lithwick, 1967, 
p.64) 
Naturally, politicians are going to take 
either a pro-federal or a pro-provincial stance 
depending on their respective positions. However, 
all of the arguments must be weighed objectively. 
Certainly trade-offs in political power and 
prestige may have to be made but many realize that 
a more efficient and effective battle against 
disparities can only be waged in an environment of 
co-operation and co-ordination. Such governmental 
interaction is vital to the effective allocation 
of resources for policy purposes (Gertler, 1972). 
More specifically, Brewis (1969) and Lipnowski 
(1969) stress the need for co-operation and 
co-ordination in effective regional development 
policies. Smiley (1972) believes that the most 
effective measures for economic stabilization are 
those which are carried out co-operatively by all 
levels of government. Pullen states: 
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For regional economic development 
policies to be fully effective it has been 
argued that there is a need for development 
of three levels of planning and of 
co-ordination between these levels. 
(Pullen, 1966, p.39) 
It is highly unlikely that one level of 
government will give up its power in on area to 
the other level of government. Therefore, 
attempts to revamp the Canadian Constitution must 
move in the direction of co-operation and 
co-ordination. Watts (1970) illustrates the 
success of this approach in India particularly in 
the area of development planning. 
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2. Federal Regional Economic Development Programs 
To study existing federal programs, 
particularly as they relate to provincial 
programs, it is necessary to survey their 
evolution. "In the opinion of some, there is no 
possibility of dealing with the problem of 
regional development in Canada without sketching 
the economic and political structure of the 
country since 1867" (Brewis and Paquet, 1968, 
p.134). This detailed exercise is not necessary 
for this thesis. Most action taken in the field 
of regional development has taken place in the 
past 20 years. Nonetheless, it may be beneficial 
to provide some details of earlier times in order 
to see more recent events in their proper 
perspective. It might be wise to begin in 1867, 
the time of Confederation. 
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a) Background Developments 
As Brewis (1964) points out and as has been 
discussed before, 
even where, as in Canada, a constitution has been 
drawn up which delegates specific powers to 
provincial and federal governments, there will 
always be residual powers which have not been 
directly ascribed to either level. In order to 
overcome this dilemma and allocate these powers 
the British North America Act includes a section 
which delegates these remaining powers to the 
Dominion government. 
Bowie (1954) goes on and states that this 
situation "simplifies the federal handling of 
economic matters" (Bowie, 1954, p.317). Despite 
this apparent 'simplified' solution, "the conflict 
for power and authority in some aspects dates back 
to Confederation" (Burns, 1967, p.22). 
Most historical reviews of the evolution of 
regional development in Canada start after the 
turn of the twentieth century. Many seem to agree 
with Gertler that "the dominant fact in the 
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evolution of regional development was the 
Depression" (Gertler, 1972, p.77). Perry (1974) 
alligns its beginning more closely with the early 
conservation movement, associated with this same 
period. Gertler (1972) provides an account of the 
regional nature of the reports of the Commission 
of Conservation between 1909 and 1921 in that the 
reports showed little concern for regional 
•economic' development. The boom of the 1920's 
helped to "paper over the cracks in the Canadian 
economy" which were of a regional nature (Gertler, 
1972, p.77). Yet despite the general well-being 
at this time Springate (1973) points out that in 
1927 the Maritime Freight Rates Act was enacted to 
stimulate development by reducing transportation 
rates in the Maritime provinces for the purpose of 
attracting industry. 
One of the more relevant results of the 
Depression and the concurrent drought in the 
Western provinces was the adoption of the Prairie 
Farm Rehabilitation Act (PFRA) in 1935. This 
program still exists today and, as such, is the 
oldest running regional development program in 
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Canada. The introduction and acceptance of 
Keynesian economic theory also associated with 
this period was another significant development. 
Keynes' call for greater government intervention 
to smooth out the business cycles in the economy 
was an event which was to change governments' 
attitude toward regional economic development in 
the years to come (Keynes, 1935). Also 
interesting to note are the recommendations of the 
Rowell-Sirois Report which appeared at the end of 
the Depression decade in 1940. The one in 
particular which stands out was the denouncement 
of "joint arrangements between federal and 
provincial governments which came to be known, 
with considerable accuracy, as 'co-operative' 
federalism" (Smiley, 1972, p.108). Fortunately 
such recommendations were never given serious 
consideration. 
By this time the battles of World War II 
were being waged. To many writers this was 
another important stage in the evolution of 
regional development in Canada: 
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The war was a great turning-point in the 
Canadian federal system, involving a marked 
shift in the balance of power between the 
two levels of government. Even before the 
war was over, Ottawa had begun to make 
plans for the continued assertion of 
federal authority in the economic and other 
spheres. 
(Jewett, 1968, p.339) 
It was also a time when there appeared what 
are considered to be "the first steps towards a 
really explicit policy of regional development" 
(Springate, 1973, p.11). Springate goes on to 
explain that this was: 
...the adoption of a system of fiscal 
policy equalization arrangements. These 
grew out of the fiscal weakness of the 
poorer provinces which was exposed during 
the 1930's and in the report of the 
Rowell-Sirois Commission (1939). The 
report suggested that public services 
should be roughly of the same quality and 
quantity across the country without the 
imposition of heavier than average tax 
burdens... 
(Springate, 1973, p.11) 
Two other major and direct regional 
development programs were initiated before 1960. 
The first, appearing in 1948, was the Maritime 
Marshland Rehablitation Act (MMRA). Under this 
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agreement the federal government paid for the 
turning of marshland into productive agricultural 
land. The other was a program to help develop 
power generating facilities thus reduce the cost 
of power in the Maritimes. The Atlantic Provinces 
Power Development Act (APPDA) came into existance 
in 1958 with federal assistance taking the form of 
loans for the capital costs of construction of 
generating stations and transmission lines or in 
the form of coal subvention payments. 
The year previous to the implementation of 
this program, 1957, seems to be another crucial 
date in the evolution of federal involvement in 
regional development. "Until 1957 the regional 
distribution of growth, the rate of expansion in 
different sectors, were not a federal 
responsibility" (Parizeau, 1965, p.51). Smiley 
also sees this date as an important point in time: 
From the coming to power of the 
Diefenbaker government in 1957 there has 
been a steadily increasing recognition of 
the special needs of depressed areas of 
Canada. Special Atlantic Provinces 
Adjustment Grants above the regular 
equalization payments were made to the 
Atlantic provinces from 1957-58 onward and 
in the same year was enacted legislation 
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providing for federal assistance to those 
provinces for hydro electric development. 
(Smiley, 1972, p.125) 
Springate suggests two possible 
explanations for this increase in federal concerns 
for regional development: 
The recession that occurred in Canada 
from 1957 to 1961 demonstrated again that 
regional imbalances still existed. The 
high unemployment rates, in eastern Canada 
especially, combined with the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Canada's Economic Prospects (1957), 
resulted in a spate of new programs 
designed to attack certain aspects of the 
regional disparity problem. 
(Springate, 1973, p.12) 
The actions taken by the federal government 
may have been spurred on, in part, by other events 
of the day. Gertler points to the 'Resources for 
Tomorrow Conference' associated with the years 
1959-61. He states that this was a "period of 
philisophical research" and led to a renewed 
interest in and actions towards regional 
development (Gertler, 1972, p.78). 
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Gertler also points to the Cairncross 
report released in February, 1961. Undertaken to 
study the economic situation of the Atlantic 
provinces, "the Cairncross report explicitly calls 
on the Federal government to assume responsibility 
for regional development in Canada" (Gertler, 
1972, p.14). Brewis states that even "several 
provinces were urging the federal government to 
participate more fully and more directly" 
(Brewis, 1962, p.41). 
Despite the existance of such forces, the 
federal government was neither eager nor swift to 
take action in this area. Parizeau (1965) cites 
two explanations for this. One was the lack of 
tools required for such action. Second, and more 
importantly, was that taking such action would 
represent a radical change in the role of the 
central government as well as a similar change in 
its approach to economic development. Brewis 
(1962) explains the 'inertia' on the part of the 
federal government as being a result of past 
constitutionally forced compromises and provincial 
rivalries. The entrance of the federal government 
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to this arena was slow and replete with 
misgivings (Brewis, 1969). 
The cautious interest generated by the 
federal government in regional development did 
lead, however, to the creation of several 
important programs. For the most part, these do 
not require a detailed analysis here. However, a 
cursory review of them is necessary to appreciate 
better the evolution of Canadian regional 
development programs. 
a) ARDA 
(i) Its Evolution 
During the beginning of the 1960's many 
farmers were in serious economic trouble and 
struggled with low incomes. Many farms were 
perceived as being "redundant, in the sense that 
they could leave agriculture to the benefit of 
themselves as well as the remaining farm community 
and the national economy" (Brewis, 1969, p.98). 
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Brewis (1969) points out that some of the problems 
of the small scale farmer were poor quality land, 
an inability to keep pace with modern farm 
technology and inadequate skills and education. 
So, as a result of the Senate Committee's 
investigation into this phenomenon, ARDA was 
enacted. On June 22, 1961 assent was given to 'an 
Act to Provide for the Rehabilitation of 
Agricultural Lands and the Development of Rural 
Areas in Canada' which is more commonly known as 
the 'Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development 
Act' or ARDA. It was to be administered by the 
Department of Agriculture. However, in 1964 it 
was shifted to the Ministry of Forestry and then, 
less than three weeks later, back to Agriculture 
only to once again be given to Forestry. Brewis 
(1969) points out that no explanation was ever 
given by the government for this juggling act. 
Projects began in 1963 and the emphasis was 
on the improvement of land use. One of the 
products of this early program of particular 
interest to geographers was the Canada Land 
Inventory which was undertaken in 1963. 
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(ii) Efforts for Intergovernmental 
Co-operation 
At the same time as the federal ARDA 
legislation was passed similar legislation was 
being enacted at the provincial level. Such 
complementary laws at two levels of government 
permitted the signing of the first 'General 
Agreements' in 1962. Buckley and Tihanyi quote 
the first General Agreement to explain that the 
purpose of this federal - provincial action was 
one: 
... of facilitating the economic 
adjustment of rural areas and of increasing 
the incomes and employment opportunities 
and improving the standard of living of 
people in rural areas. 
(Buckley and Tihanyi, 1967, 
P.93) 
Brewis (1969) sees the aim of this 
co-operative venture more specifically as one of 
aiding 'sub-marginal' farms particularly through 
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the improved use of conservation techniques and 
research. The programs created via the bi-lateral 
Agreements to achieve the objectives were not 
undertaken until 1963 and were due to expire in 
1965. A second General Agreement came into effect 
in 1965 which was to endure for the next five 
years. This Agreement saw ARDA's name change to 
the 'Agriculture and Rural Development Act' and 
its administration now fell under the Department 
of Forestry and Rural Development. The new 
Agreements also saw a major change in policy. 
According to Brewis the emphasis was shifted from 
soil and water conservation and land use to a 
more comprehensive approach "directed towards the 
development of human resources in rural areas" 
(Brewis, 1969, p.111). The government began to 
encourage the exodus of farmers from uneconomical 
farms. Farms were often consolidated and 
occupational training was encouraged. These were 
now the important elements of ARDA (Lloyd and 
Dicken, 1972, p.257). 
Also appearing in 1965 was FRED which is 
considered to be one of the more important 
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features of the ARDA program (Brewis, 1969). FRED 
was the 'Fund for Rural Economic Development'. 
This program was undertaken "to permit the 
implementation of comprehensive rural development 
programs in specifically designated rural areas 
characterized by widespread low incomes and major 
problems of adjustment, but considered to have 
development potential" (Brewis, 1969, p.108-9). 
This new program and the new Agreements 
also brought a change in the amount of money 
allocated to ARDA. The federal government had 
made $50 million available to be used under the 
first Ageeements (1961-1965). Of this 
approximately two-thirds was used. However, under 
the second General Agreements the federal 
government made a total of $125 million available 
over the five year period at a rate of $25 million 
per year. FRED was allocated $50 million, a 
figure which was soon after increased six fold 
(Brewis, 1969). 
An important feature of the ARDA program 
was its formally co-operative and cost-sharing 
nature. The agreements between the federal and 
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provincial governments laid down the types of 
projects which could be undertaken. The provinces 
were free to choose from among these and were to 
initiate, conduct and administer them. "The main 
functions of the federal government were 
cost-sharing, policy co-ordination, technical 
advice and assistance with specialist services" 
(Buckley and Tihanyi, 1967, p.96). These authors 
conclude that "ARDA is essentially a collection of 
provincial programmes" co-ordinated and partly 
financed by the federal government. 
The amount of money available to a 
particular province was based on a formula. It 
took into account the rural population and the 
number of low-income farms. In the Second 
Agreement the number of poor rural, non-farm 
families was also included (Buckley and Tihanyi, 
1967, p.97). 
(iii) The Problems Encountered 
Although this co-operative, cost-sharing 
program sounds effective, one particular problem 
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was realized: 
As it happens, it is the richer rather 
than the poorer provinces that seem to 
benefit most from the ARDA program, one 
reason for this being that the former are 
more able to pay their share of the costs 
which are required to be borne jointly by 
the federal government. 
(Brewis, 1968, p.325) 
However, Lloyd and Dicken (1972) also note 
that, particularly during the first General 
Agreement, some of the wealthier provinces did not 
participate fully and that most of the projects 
were scattered. Buckley and Tihanyi (1967) concur 
and note that this "underutilization is ... most 
conspicuous in Ontario" (Buckley and Tihanyi, 
1967, p.104). On the other hand they also 
comment upon a 'breakthrough' by Ontario under the 
Second Agreement when it undertook a number of 
major projects requiring greater federal 
financing. 
Despite such problems, the development of 
mechanisms for co-operation which allowed ARDA to 
function was significant. The federal government 
set up regional ARDA administration offices in 
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each of the major Canadian regions. In addition, 
'Joint Advisory Committees' were formed with 
levels of government to "review progress reports 
and work out mutually acceptable criteria for ARDA 
policies in each province" (Buckley and Tihanyi, 
1967, p.96). As new and as progressive as the 
participatory nature of this operation appears, it 
is, in reality, "what it takes to carry through 
fundamental economic and social changes within 
Canadian society and within a federal state" 
(Gertler, 1972, p.80). Unfortunately a number of 
problems were encountered. Naturally there was a 
problem of priority and direction. With two 
levels of government involved, differences in 
opinion arose as to where the main emphasis of the 
program should lie (Brewis, 1969). Secondly, 
because of the shared-cost nature of the program 
there was often little regard by the provinces for 
the complete picture of costs and benefits 
(Brewis, 1969). The provinces were, in fact, 
reaping the full benefits for half the cost. 
A third problem area was that of 
inter-governmental co-ordination. Brewis provides 
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a general outline: 
The number of bodies involved in the 
fulfilment of the ARDA objectives is 
almost certain to lead to complex problems 
of co-ordination and overlapping powers, 
and to recommendations for coherent plans 
of development. This, in fact, is very 
largely what has happened. What started 
with a concern over the poverty of the 
marginal farmer has already developed into 
a broad network of programs extending 
widely over the economic problems of rural 
communities and has led ... to the 
introduction of specific plans for certain 
areas. Co-ordination of efforts is clearly 
necessary. Agriculture, power, lands and 
forests, fisheries, roads, health and 
welfare, manpower, labour, housing and 
municipal affairs are among the various 
bodies responsible for individual aspects 
of development; and not infrequently 
rivalries and differences of opinion arise. 
These differences exist not only between 
governments but also within governments. 
The broader the program envisaged under 
ARDA, the more serious the problems of 
co-operation are likely to be. One of the 
main difficulties is the lack of common 
purpose with the Department of Industry. 
(Brewis, 1969, p.113) 
However, even with the encounter of such 
problems, the attempts by the two levels of 
government to work together were encouraging. "To 
be acceptable and effective, regional planning 
must be a joint effort" (Brewis, 1969, p.132). 
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The joint preparation of plans under ARDA may have 
been a very important education for both levels of 
government. 
c) ADB 
(i) Its Evolution 
Everyone involved in Canadian regional 
development is keenly aware of the plight of the 
Atlantic provinces. The term 'disparities' when 
applied to this area becomes a very powerful and 
meaningful word. Both the Royal Commission on 
Canada's Economic Prospects (1957) and the 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC) had 
called on federal aid to strengthen the Atlantic 
provinces' faltering economy in the late 1950's. 
On December 20, 1963, perhaps as a result of these 
pleas, royal assent was given to 'the Atlantic 
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Development Board Act* (ADB). It was set up "to 
enquire into and report ... upon measures and 
projects for the fostering of economic growth and 
development of the Atlantic Region of Canada" 
(DREE, 1970, p.18). The region referred to is the 
four Atlantic provinces, roughly an area of 
193,000 square miles (Lloyd and Dicken, 1972, 
p.257). The Board originally had five federally 
appointed members but this was to increase to 
eleven in 1963 "to change the political 
complexion of the Board" (Brewis, 1969, p.176). 
The Board was to have worked in only an 
advisory capacity. However, to show that the 
government was serious, the Board was empowered in 
1963 to administer the Atlantic Development Fund 
with a federal purse of $100 million. The Fund 
was increased to $150 million in 1966. The total 
federal spending exceeded $208 million before all 
its commitments were met. 
The Board's attention was focussed upon 
weaknesses in infrastructure and social capital of 
the region, "especially those aspects likely to 
contribute to long-term improvements in the 
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economy" (Brewis and Paquet, 1968, p.149). The 
projects to which funds were devoted were water 
supply, sewer systems, industrial parks, 
transportation (primarily highways), power 
developments and facilities for industrial related 
research activities. The Board also conducted 
studies of various sector's of the region's 
economy and "devised input-output tables, which 
enabled the sectors of the regional economy to be 
analyzed in terms of their inter-relationships" 
(Springate, 1973, p.12). 
There were numerous criticisms of the ADB. 
Its stress on improving the infrastructure was 
one. "The provision of infrastructure may be a 
pre-condition of growth but it is unlikely to be a 
sufficient condition" (Brewis, 1969, p.180). 
While concentrating on individual projects, little 
attention was given to planning. Certainly a 
number of studies were undertaken but a 
comprehensive regional plan was never to appear. 
In all fairness to the ADB it should be mentioned 
that in 1968 work on such a plan had begun. 
Unfortuntely the Board was dissolved before its 
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completion and implementation. 
(ii) Intergovernmental Co-operation and 
Program Problems 
The ADB was financed by the federal 
government but did seek cost-sharing arrangements 
with the provinces for various projects using a 
formula which took into account the needs of the 
province involved. As well, the projects for 
which a grant application was made did not 
automatically receive government funding. This 
was left to the discretion of the Board. Despite 
the problems, Brewis and Paquet (1968) and Lloyd 
and Dicken (1972) claim that the ADB did have an 
impact in certain problem areas. 
The ADB was "unique in Canadian experience" 
in as much as it was a 'super-provincial' agency 
having jurisdiction over the whole of four 
provinces (Lloyd and Dicken, 1972). However, there 
were problems of a political nature which arose in 
its attempts to spread spending or benefits evenly 
over the four provinces. Each had varying needs 
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and, therefore, would require different types of 
projects to attain the common, desired goals. 
Naturally, the Board could not appear to favour 
one province more than any other. An agreement 
was reached to restrain favouritism. Brewis and 
Paquet (1968) point out that this formal 
constraint had little influence on the Board's 
ability to recognize economic merit rather than 
respond to political pressure. The need for a 
binding agreement was a formality to soothe the 
provinces or, rather, the competitive or jealous 
nature of the provinces. 
The ADB was not dependent on formal federal 
- provincial agreement as was the ARDA program. 
Thus one obstacle to progress was removed. The 
Board could reach agreement with provinces 
regarding specific projects if they would not 
otherwise be undertaken or if alternative modes of 
financing were lacking (Brewis, 1969). 
In a passage related to the concepts of 
co-ordination and co-operation, Brewis continues: 
In the fulfilment of its objectives the 
Board is required to consult and co-operate 
with the Economic Council of Canada and 
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with those departments and agencies having 
duties and objectives related to those of 
the Board. The main agencies and 
departments concerned would be ARDA, ADA, 
and the departments of Fisheries, Manpower, 
Energy, Mines and Resources, and Public 
Works. The provincial governments are 
consulted before action is taken on 
specific projects, whether or not they 
contribute to the cost, and Treasury Board 
or Cabinet approval is required for all 
expenditures. 
(Brewis, 1969, p.177) 
Unfortunately, there appears to be nothing 
in the literature which discusses the impact of 
this particular arrangement. From the tone of 
Brewis' (1969) concluding paragraph concerning the 
ADB the particular brand of co-operation and 
co-ordination employed by the Board does not 
appear to have been a success. In it he calls for 
"a comprehensive development plan for the whole 
region ... jointly approved by the provinces and 
federal government and in which the efforts of 
numerous government departments would be 
integrated" (Brewis, 1969, p.192). 
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d) ADA 
In 1963 the third major regional 
development program of the 1960's was initiated. 
It was the Area Development Act which was 
administered by the Area Development Agency (ADA) 
under the auspices of the simultaneously created 
Department of Industry. It was to encourage 
economic development in designated regions across 
the country. The means selected to accomplish 
this task was a systemm of tax-break incentives 
for manufacturing industries locating in the 
designated areas. 
In 1965 the Area Development Act was 
replaced by the Area Development Incentives Act 
(ADIA). The criteria for selecting those areas 
which could receive aid were changed and as a 
result a greater portion of the country was 
included. In addition the tax-break scheme was 
slowly phased out and was replaced by a system of 
capital grants. This program ran with only minor 
changes until 1969 when it was replaced by the 
Regional Development Incentives Act (RDIA), a 
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program of the Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion. A more detailed discussion of ADA, 
ADIA and RDIA will be presented at a later in this 
study This will allow the details of the program 
to be more closely associated with the empirical 
analysis of its actions. 
Other Programs 
In addition to those discussed above above 
and those such as the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation 
Act (PFRA), the Maritime Marshland Rehabilitation 
Act (MMRA) and the Atlantic Provinces Power 
Development Act (APPDA), mentioned previously, 
there are other programs with which the federal 
government had become involved. The Cape Breton 
Development Corporation (DEVCO) was one of these. 
Originally set up to smooth the transition from 
the coal industry to a more diversified economy, 
DEVCO now aims to stabilize the coal industry. 
The Canada Newstart Program was created to 
develop the human and social resources of the 
country. Six autonomous, provincially 
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incorporated bodies concerned themselves with 
adult training and education and job counselling 
and placement. 
The Newfoundland Resettlement Program was 
administered by that province under the guidance 
of a joint federal - provincial committee. It had 
been created to aid households in their move from 
isolated and poorly serviced settlements to larger 
and better serviced settlements with greater job 
opportunities. 
In 1969 the administration of all these 
programs would observe a significant change in 
federal government structure. 
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e) DREE 
The creation of the Department of Regional 
Economic Expansion (DREE) on April 1, 1969 "marked 
the beginning of the present phase of federal 
regional policy in Canada (Francis, 1974, p.193). 
Its creation seemed to stem from two basic 
factors. First, as Husband (1971, p.538) points 
out, the federal regional development policies of 
the 1960's seemed to have done little in the 
"narrowing of the gap in income and employment 
opportunities between the provinces and regions." 
The Monetary Times ("Is He.." , 1969, p. 39) 
agreed. It suggested that the pre-DREE programs 
were a mess and that through the creation of DREE 
the government acknowledged that "its high-priced 
policies have been poorly conceived, 
under-researched, badly-oriented and totally 
unco-ordinated" ("Is He ... " , 1969, p. 39). 
p.39). Arguments by Springate (1973) and Francis 
(1974) further substantiate this point. 
The second factor involved was one of 
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government priority. "Regional disparity was now 
thought by many in government to have become an 
important national problem" (Springate, 1973, 
p.16). This notion was initiated by the Pearson 
government and carried over into the 'Just 
Society' platform of the Trudeau government "The 
underlying themes remained those of equity and 
preservation of national unity" (Springate, 1973, 
p.16). Thus a realization that regional economic 
disparities continued to persist and that a 
stronger more co-ordinated attack was necessary 
lead to the creation of DREE. 
On April 1, 1969 The Government 
Organization Act, 1969 came into force. It created 
five new departments and three crown corporations. 
Under Part IV of the said Act, the Department of 
Regional Economic Expansion came into being. It 
was to have power over "all matters...relating to 
economic expansion and social adjustment in areas 
requiring special measures to improve 
opportunities for productive employment and access 
to those opportunities" (Statutes of Canada, 
1968-1969, p.594). 
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(i) Its Objectives and Component Programs 
In the literature, the purpose or goals of 
DREE vary with each author. Generally, however, 
its purpose seems to be one of forming a 
comprehensive, planned and co-ordinated attack on 
regional disparities. Its approach seems to be one 
of reducing underemployment and unemployment in 
certain pockets and thus allow all areas of the 
country to realize their full potential and enjoy 
the nation's wealth. Springate (1973) cites three 
more specific objectives of the program as stated 
by the first Deputy Minister of DREE, Tom Kent, in 
a 1970 speech. Basically they are: 
1) to assist the process of rural 
adjustment 
2) to improve industrial and community 
infrastructures 
3) to encourage private investment in 
certain regions of the country that lag 
economically 
(Springate, 1973 p.17) 
In order to conduct the co-ordinated attack 
that was necessary many of the regional 
development programs of the 1960's had to be 
consolidated under a single administration. These 
included ARDA and FRED, PFRA, MMRA, ADB, the 
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Canada Newstart Program, the Newfoundland 
resettlement program, and the Cape Breton 
Development Corporation(DEVCO). 
At the time DREE was formed, the Atlantic 
Development Board had been criticized for the 
spending of millions of dollars without ever 
producing a master plan of its intentions in the 
Atlantic provinces ("Is He ... ", 1969, p.40). It 
was dissolved upon the establishment of DREE and 
replaced by an Atlantic Development Council. It 
was to serve only in an advisory capacity ("Is He 
... ", 1969, p. 41). 
The FRED Act was repealed by the Government 
Organization Act of 1969. Between its inception in 
1966 and its demise in 1969, five FRED projects 
were undertaken - one in each of Manitoba, Quebec 
and P.E.I, with two in New Brunswick. Although 
the FRED Act itself was repealed its commitments 
have been honoured by DREE throughout the 1970's. 
Some of the reasons it may have been disbanded are 
given by Brewis: 
The substantial sums of money involved were 
a source of concern, the areas were too 
small to permit effective development 
planning, and there was a feeling 
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that the plans were inadequately conceived 
and their administration should be in other 
hands. 
(Brewis, 1972, pages not numbered) 
However, FRED was significant in that it 
represented an effort on behalf of both the 
federal government and the four provinces involved 
to co-operate with each other. This was 
accomplished by means of a bodies known as 'Joint 
Advisory Committees'. Technical representatives 
from the two levels of government were responsible 
for plan implementation and general management 
(Perry, 1974, p.86). Perry continues: 
A senior technician from each government is 
appointed Plan Co-ordinator, and the two 
co-ordinators form a management group that 
reports to the Joint Advisory Board. The 
management team co-ordinates the programmes 
operated by the various agencies within the 
two administrators. The effective 
implementation and periodic review of the 
programme is the responsibility of the two 
co-ordinators. 
(Perry, 1974, p.86) 
The ARDA program, really a partner of FRED, 
has been continued. Although it was "basically 
sound", ARDA was criticized for its 50/50 federal 
- provincial payment arrangement which favoured 
wealthy provinces and for its effectiveness 
particularly in terms of encouraging the 
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continuation of marginal farms ("Is He ... ", 
1969, p. 40). The first federal - provincial ARDA 
agreements ran from 1962-1965 and the second ran 
from 1965-1970. The ARDA III Agreement was signed 
between Ontario and the federal government in May, 
1970 and provided 30 million federal dollars for 
the period 1970-1975. The program was again shared 
on an equal basis (Canada, DREE, Annual Report 
1970-71, 1972, p. 29) ARDA III terminated March 
31, 1975. However a new Rural Development 
Agreement was signed which became effective from 
August 1975 to March 31, 1977. 
Although the Monetary Times in 1969 
predicted an overhaul or deletion of the PFRA 
because of its program conflicts with ARDA it has 
continued to function with programs affecting both 
land use and water distribution in the three 
prairie provinces. 
The ADIA (formerly ADA) program was 
transferred from the Department of Forestry and 
Rural Development on April 1, 1969. The final 
date for applications under the old program was 
December 31, 1969. The RDIA (Regional Development 
Incentives Act) had become effective July 1, 1969. 
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It continued along the path of ADIA offering 
grants to new, modernizing or expanding industries 
in certain "designated regions" across the 
country. 
(ii) The Role of Intergovernmental 
Co-operation 
One of the most significant characteristics 
of the legislation establishing DREE was its 
frequent mention of co-operation and consultation 
with the provinces. It gave the Minister of the 
Department power to "undertake in co-operation 
with ... the provincial governments, the 
preparation and implementation of development 
plans and programs designed to meet the special 
needs of slow growth areas" (Perry, 1974, p.85) 
As the OECD interprets it, 
The federal programmes for regional 
development... operate in conjunction with 
the programs of the provincial governments, 
and it is intended that they complement 
each other. Thus, for example, the 
"designated regions" and "special areas", 
where the new federal regional policies 
provide a wide variety of special 
assistance , are selected as a result of 
federal - provincial consultations, and the 
"development plans for special areas" will 
be formulated jointly by the federal 
government and the provincial government 
concerned. (OECD, 1970, p.113) 
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Gertler (1972, p.76) suggests that this 
aspect of DREE is one of its more significant 
features. The legislation states that such 
consultation and co-operation must take place and 
the Monetary Times ("Is He ... ", 1969, p. 42) 
suggests that the close relationship which would 
have to develop between the two levels of 
government is "absolutely necessary to the success 
of the new department." Don Jamieson (1973, p.l) 
a former Minister of DREE stated that "the great 
bulk of its activity has been carried out under 
federal - provincial agreements, providing it with 
a unique and challenging experience with 
co-operative working arrangements between the two 
senior levels of Canadian government." 
Perry suggest three possible reasons for 
the active participation of the provincial 
governments in the joint planning process. The 
first was that they could not refuse the offer for 
funding. This financial lure, he notes, may have 
caused provincial governments to adjust their 
priorities in order to attain greater congruity 
with federal objectives and thus be eligible for 
funding. The second factor leading to provincial 
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partnership was the use of the federal governments 
technical know-how and greater resources and 
facilities. Finally, Perry believes that the 
provinces, with smaller bureaucracies, were not 
afraid of any problems in communications and 
additional bureaucracy brought on by 
inter-governmental actions. (Perry, 1974, p.93) 
(iii) Its Programs 
This new co-operative power of the federal 
government lead to the development of two programs 
in DREE. One was the negotiation of General 
Development Agreements (GDA) in the mid-1970's. 
The GDA's were drawn up between the federal 
government and the provinces individually. 
Associated with them are a number of Subsidiary 
Development Agreements (SDA) in which the two 
governments involved jointly finance specific 
projects. 
The other, which was really the forerunner 
of the GDA's, was the Special Area program (SA). 
The creation of this particular program was of 
significance because it meant that, at last, part 
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of the federal regional development program was to 
have an urban emphasis. More specifiaclly the 
Special Area program will make use of the 'growth 
centre1 concept. Thus "the notion of growth 
centres has finally exerted an impact on federal 
policy" (Brewis, 1972, pages not numbered). Thus 
most of the centres listed are seen as potential 
focal points of growth. "A 'Special Area1 may 
therefore, be defined as one where special action 
is needed to promote economic expansion and social 
adjustment because employment opportunities are 
exceptionally inadequate within the area itself, 
or in the larger region of which the area 
constitutes (or has the capacity to develop into) 
the major activity centre" (Canada, 1972, p. 55). 
To tackle this problem a "two-pronged 
thrust" ("Experiment... ", 1970, p.50) was 
utilized. First, the Special Areas' 
infrastructure were given a boost. Concentration 
was on transportation (eg. roads and bridges) and 
communication facilities, essential services and 
utilities (eg. sewage and water systems), 
education and training, port facilities, the 
assembly of serviced residential land and 
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industrial parks, and other programs of 'social 
adjustment'. This it was believed would make 
these centres more attractive to business. 
To be teamed up with this instrument was 
the RDIA program which would grant funds to 
secondary manufacturing firms locating, expanding 
or modernizing in the Special Areas. However, in 
these areas the program was to be expanded: 
Under the Special Area Legislation primary 
industries, including primary processing 
activities such as oil refining, mineral 
concentrating and pulp and newspring 
production are eligible for assistance and 
so are service industries. 
(Brewis, 1972, pages not numbered) 
(iv) The Results of Provincial Co-operation 
In addition, in some special areas extra 
help was available "in the form of loan 
guarantees, grants and loans for capital costs, 
and grants to cover location-related operating or 
starting costs incurred within three years of the 
start of commercial production" (Springate, 1973, 
p.18). 
As well as its growth centre orientation, 
the Special Area program had another significant 
characteristic. "The federal and provincial 
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governments will be working together to promote 
the industrial and commercial growth of urban 
centres" ("Experiment ", 1970, p.55) in what 
Perry (1974, p.85) described as a "planning 
partnership". 
Perry (1974) also provides a valuable 
picture of the co-operative machinery which was 
constructed. In a similar process to that under 
which the FRED agreements were negotiated, the 
federal and individual provincial governments 
carried on the Special Areas joint planning. The 
Joint Planning Committees (JPC's) "were the main 
mechniam of federal/provincial consultation" 
(Perry, 1974, p.93). They comprised civil 
servents from both levels of government with a 
majority of its members from the federal 
government. Most of their discussions were of a 
technical nature. The JPC was responsible for 
both negotiation and plan formulation. 
Discussions at the Ministerial level were usually 
formal and infrequent being used primarily for the 
signing of final agreements. Perry (1974) 
believes that this process taxed more heavily the 
limited resources of the provinces and that it was 
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the federal government which determined the degree 
of 'jointness'. "As a result joint planning 
became a middle-management and negotiation tool 
for specific programs (the J.P.C.'s power was 
limited to the Special Areas program) as opposed 
to a means for developing strategy, the J.P.C.'s 
often taking on the role of approval boards for 
the financing of projects" (Perry, 1974, p.94). 
"The J.P.C.'s were supported by working 
groups that developed sector strategies (for 
example, secondary manufacturing, service 
industries and social development)" (Perry, 1974, 
p.89). In addition Joint Liason Committees were 
created. These technically orientated groups 
"approved and monitored all stages of project 
implementation and managed details of program 
implementation" (Perry, 1974, p.89). 
Under this co-operative administrative 
system twenty - three Special Areas in 8 of the 10 
provinces were selected between 1969 and 1972. 
Eighteen of these were to receive infrastructure 
assistance as well as be eligible for 
consideration under the RDIA (Economic Council of 
Canada, 1977, p.148). The first federal 
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provincial Special Area ageement ran from 1970 to 
1972. During that time some agreements were 
negotiated and extended to 1973 or 1975. After 
1972 DREE dropped the Special Area spproach. 
The only Special Area designated in Ontario 
was the Renfrew-Pembroke area. However, it was 
designated for incentive (ie. RDIA) assistance 
only and not for infrastructure development. It 
was made eligible for special sector grants. 
Francis and Pillai identify these sectors in the 
Renfrew - Pembroke area: 
the improvement of employment and incomes 
depends particularly on the development of 
wood-based industries. The special program 
for these areas are thus to help these and 
other related industries. 
(Francis and Pillas, 1972, p.59) 
(v) Program Review and Decentralization 
In its first few years of operation DREE 
ran into some problems created primarily by its 
organization. It was very centrally orientated 
(Ottawa) with field offices that "were strictly a 
geographic dilution of programme management" 
(Perry, 1974, p.94). In addition to this, problems 
of both intra and inter-departmental co-ordination 
existed. As a result an "extensive programme and 
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policy review" (Perry, 1974, p. 94) was undertaken 
by DREE. Perry (1974) describes the review's 
approach: 
The intent, throughout the review, has been 
to achieve a more productive relationship 
with each of the provinces, and other 
federal agencies. There are two basic 
guidelines for new direction: an emphasis 
on the recognition and promotion of the 
development opportunities unique to various 
regions; and direct support for development 
planning for these opportunities at the 
local, provincial and regional level. The 
approach was to be accompanied by more 
effective interdepartmental and 
intergovernmental co-ordination and liason. 
(Perry, 1974, p.94-95) 
The review resulted in two significant 
changes. One was the use of the General 
Development Agreement (GDA) approach and the other 
was a massive decentralization program.(Perry, 
1974, p. 95). The latter task was undertaken and 
completed in the 1973-74 fiscal year. It was a 
process "in which staff, administration and 
decision-making authority were moved to selected 
points across Canada" (Canada, 1976, p. 6). This 
process would delegate more authority down the 
line. In fact the 1974-75 Annual Report of DREE 
states that the staff in the field has doubled 
from 30% to 60% of the total staff. In 1974 it 
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was also projected that 80% of the RDIA 
applications would be handled in the field. 
("DREE's Move ..., 1974, p.3). This report 
expressed the idea that the new organization had 
almost been broken in at the time it was written. 
The new administrative arrangement is 
composed of four primary levels. At the top of 
the ladder is the national office in Ottawa. Its 
main responsibilities are "general policy 
formulation, co-ordination and support" (Canada, 
DREE, Annual Report, 1974-75, p. 3). It also has 
the responsibility of examining and assessing 
applications for incentives over a certain dollar 
limit. The Financial Post (Rolfe, 1975, p.5) 
estimated this limit to be above $400,000 or 
$500,000. 
The second level of the organization 
consists of four regional offices. These were 
allocated to each of the four traditional regions 
of Canada: Western Canada (Saskatoon); Ontario 
(Toronto); Quebec (Montreal); and the Atlantic 
Region (Moncton). Each is headed by an Assistant 
Deputy Minister. These offices analyze 
applicatons for medium-sized incentives as well as 
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provide analysis and recommendations on larger 
requests both of which are forwarded to Ottawa for 
final decision. The offices are also responsible 
for "the planning, implementation and 
administration of all departmental policies and 
activities within the region" (Canada, DREE, 
Annual Report, 1974-75, p. 23). This includes 
co-ordinated efforts with the region's provincial 
counterparts in joint action efforts. 
The provincial DREE offices, with one in 
each provincial capital formerly had roles 
restricted simply to the implementation of 
programmes. This role has been considerably 
strengthened. Each is now headed by a 
Director-General. They deal with "small cases 
under the incentives program ie. RDIA and have a 
basic planning and implementation capacity" 
(Perry, 1974, p. 95). 
At the bottom of the totem pole are the 
branch offices. These are located in major 
project areas. The two in Ontario are at Thunder 
Bay and Sudbury. 
Perry provides a brief synopsis of the 
functioning of the major levels of the 
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administrative organization of DREE: 
Common to all offices, four major functions 
are to be undertaken: planning, 
implementation, incentives and 
administration. On the planning side, all 
levels will have a planning staff. The 
provincial office planners will work with 
provincial government staff in identifying 
priorities and in plan preparations; the 
regional office planners will have a 
co-ordinate role and will provide 
provincial office staffs with expertise not 
locally available; and the national office 
will have the capability for overall 
planning review and co-ordination. 
(Perry, 1974, p. 97) 
There appear to be a number of specific 
reasons for the decentralization, or more 
particularly a number of results which it was 
hoped could be achieved through decentralization. 
Some of these are listed: 
- greater federal presence in the regions 
better integration of department 
functions 
- better administrative capacity 
- greater ability to enter into subsidiary 
development agreements (SDA's) with the 
provinces 
- greater co-operation and co-ordination 
with other federal departments and the 
provinces (Canada, 1976, p.6) 
- provinces will receive a bigger say in 
policy 
- may quicken and streamline administrative 
processes
 fJ . . -mm r\ 
r
 (Lewmgton, 1973, p .5) 
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However, also expressed at the time of 
decentralization were fears that the exercise 
would merely create more layers of bureaucracy 
which would have to be penetrated. This would 
apply not only to industries seeking incentives 
but also to the provinces seeking federal liason. 
Alex Campbell stated that the step would be a 
backwards one if it was to create another level of 
red tape between the federal and provincial 
governments ("DREE Decentralization ..., 1973, 
p.E7). It was also feared that the processing of 
applications for large incentives would be slowed 
because they would have to penetrate the 
provincial, regional and ultimately the national 
offices before the final word was given ("DREE's 
Move ..., 1974, p.3) 
This fear was to be substantiated in the 
findings of a Financial Post survey. (Rolfe, 
1973, p.5). It stated that although the processing 
of applications for small incentives may have been 
stepped up, that of the large incentive 
applications is as slow, if not slower, than 
before. However, none of the provinces wanted to 
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abandon the scheme. 
Decentralizing in 
greater provincial / regi 
and plaudible move on 
government. It appears 
assigning a greater value 
individual provinces. In 
hope, this attitude o 
attitude will result in a 
integrated approach 
development in Ontario. 
an attempt to secure 
mal input is a realistic 
behalf of the federal 
to be a step towards 
to the sentiments of the 
the long run, one may 
, rather, this change in 
more comprehensive and 
to regional economic 
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3. Ontario's Regional Economic Development Programs 
a) Background Developments 
(i) The Rationale for Programs at the 
Provincial Level 
The provinces have not been idle observers 
while the federal government single-handedly 
attacked the problems of regional economic 
disparities. Ontario, in particular, has shown an 
interest in this area and displayed a commitment 
to the spreading of economic benefits throughout 
the provinces (Magladry, 1967, p.74). As Gertler 
suggested in a paper in 1965, Ontario was not in a 
position where its economy, measured in the 
aggregate, must 'catch up' with other provinces. 
Rather, it was in a position where it could begin 
to look into its own internal problems. One of 
the factors which has been responsible for this 
phenomer?*»i was the increased fiscal power of the 
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For example, between 1950 and 1963 the net 
expenditures of the government of Ontario 
increased from $282 million to $1,107 million 
(Gilles and Richmond, 1974, p.82). By about 1965 
the provinces in Canada made 3/4 of all public 
capital expenditures and accounted for 4/5 of all 
public purchases of non-defence goods and services 
(Parizeau, 1965, p.50). Thus the power of the 
provinces had increased considerably and their 
efforts as economic agents had significant 
results. 
While the federal government had hesitated 
to enter the field of regional economic 
development the provinces had already shown some 
interest in this area. The provinces had been 
moving in this direction since the 1940's and 
1950's. The federal government had dragged its 
feet and did not really start to get involved 
until the 1960's (Parizeau, 1965, p.53). 
Kristjanson (1965) felt that the increased 
provincial participation in the economy, referred 
to as 'the revolt of the provinces', was due to 
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the federal government's lack of planning and its 
outmoded and ineffective institutions. By the 
time the federal government did take action the 
provincial governments were unwilling to forfeit 
either their powers or their fiscal tools 
(Parizeau, 1965, p.53). Added to this situation 
of financial power was the fact that the 
provinces, as political units, were in close 
contact with regional problems (Parizeau, 1965, 
p.52) 
Before venturing into the labyrinth of 
Ontario's regional development efforts, one 
characteristic of this area of research should be 
noted. Scollie,a professor of library technology, 
suggests that the literature dealing with this 
subject is "technical, highly professional, and 
difficult of access" (Scollie, 1973, p.5). The 
last characteristic is particularly valid. Gilles 
and Richmond describe "the evolution of regional 
economic development policies in Ontario" as being 
"tortuous" and go on to say that: 
Indeed, anyone without a reasonable 
knowledge of the organization of the 
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Ontario government and the changes that 
have taken place in the government through 
the years finds it almost impossible to 
sort out the various pieces of legislation 
which have influenced the development of 
policy. 
(Gilles and Richmond, 1974, 
p.181) 
(ii) The Evolution of Programs 
The sorting-out process, as a result, is a 
very slow and complex one. Most accounts of 
Ontario's regional development efforts do not 
start prior to the creation of the Department of 
Planning and Development in 1944. Gilles and 
Richmond (1974, p.181) interpret its creation as a 
reaction to the post-war adjustment problems 
facing Ontario. 'The Department of Planning and 
Development Act, 1944' stated that its function 
was to formulate "plans to create, assist, develop 
and maintain productive employment and develop the 
human and material resources of the Province" 
(Statutes of Ontario, 1944, p.51). It was also 
given powers to collaborate with other departments 
in the Ontario government as well as with the 
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federal and other provincial governments. Thoman 
(1971, p.33), the creator of the Design for 
Development program, (1971, p.33) suggests 
thaouggosts that this concept of 'co-ordination' 
has been caried over into more recent government 
programs. He also notes that although the 
Department of Planning and Development did not 
really have a regional orientation, that, in 
practice, it did try "to attract manufacturing 
activities into various parts of the province" 
(Thoman, 1971, p.34). However, Gilles and 
Richmond point out that it was more concerned with 
encouraging "the development of the province as a 
single economic entity" (Gilles and Richmond, 
1974, p.181). Krueger (1965, p.30) also notes 
that the department was never able to carry out 
its co-ordinating responsibilities. 
In 1947 a 19 economic region system was 
devised and accepted by Ontario and in 1949 the 
government began to publish the annual Economic 
Survey of Ontario using those same 19 regions as 
the basis for its data collection. In 1953 and 
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1954 a series of Conferences and documents 
created a 68-region system for Canada. Ontario 
was divided into 10 regions and in 1956 this 
system replaced the older 19 region system as the 
basis for economic data collections. 
Also in 1953 a regional development section 
within the Trade and Industry Branch of the 
Department of Planning and Development was 
created. It made possible the formation of 
Regional Development Associations. They were to 
be set up in the 10 regions of Ontario funded 
equally by the provinces and the member 
municipalities. Scollie (1973, p.6) points out 
that they were to be set up "to develop their own 
regional plans and to set their own priorities". 
However, instead of planning they tended to serve 
more as industrial development promoters. In 1954 
the first was set up. It was Eastern Ontario 
Development Association. Williams points out that 
with elections just over a year away this was 
merely a device to appease the voters in the more 
depressed regions of the province (Williams, 1971, 
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p.67). Between 1954 and 1966 both Thoman (1971, 
p.34) and Scollie (1973, p.6) state that all 10 
economic regions of the province formed such 
associations. 
Competition for industry between 
municipalities had been possible until a section 
of the Municipal Act was repealed in 1962. 
Williams (1971, p.68) believes that by the 
formation of the Regional Development 
Associations intermunicipal competition had been 
replaced by competition between the Associations. 
He also notes that the Associations had no 
legislated power to direct industry to certain 
locations within their areas. 
Krueger, another critic of the 
Associations, states that there was never any 
official government document which outlined the 
specific terms of reference for the associations 
(Krueger, 1965, p.36). They therefore had no 
legislated powers. One also notes that the 
boundaries of the associations coincided with the 
10 data collection regions. However, no claim had 
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ever been made that these data collection regions 
could be deemed to constitute a region in terms of 
planning for economic development. (Krueger, 1965, 
p.40 and Scollie, 1973, p.6). 
Because membership by municipalities was 
voluntary and required payment, Krueger points out 
that a great deal of effort by the associations 
was directed to selling themselves to potential 
member municipalities. (Krueger, 1965, p.40) 
Krueger*s statistics show membership in the 
associations varied. In 1964 for example, less 
than one third of the possible municipalities had 
memberships in the 10 associations. (Krueger, 
1965, 39). 
In 1966 the associations went through a 
number of changes. They were given greater 
financial assistance, recognized by legislation 
and their names were changed to Regional 
Development Councils (Thoman, 1971, p.40). 
Although they were also asked to advise the 
government on later regional planning, Scollie 
claims that they did not live up to the 
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governments' expectations and merely became 
"clearing houses for regional social and economic 
data" (Scollie, 1973, p.6). 
Although the 1960's was the decade of 
change in the orientation of Ontario's economic 
towards more regional concerns, at its outset the 
government was still primarily concerned with 
aggregate economic growth. The speech from the 
throne in 1962 called for the creation of more 
jobs to keep up with the increasing population. 
The Ontario Development Agency was to be created 
for this purpose (Ontario Legislative, 1962, p.4). 
The Financial Post of May 4, 1963 (Baxter, 1963, 
p.24) detailed the province's plans to create 
300,000 new jobs during the next five years by 
stimulating secondary manufacturing. To this end 
the Ontario Development Agency was to both advise 
and financially assist new endevours in industry. 
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(iii) Indications of a New Approach 
However, there also appeared signs of 
change in the development 
orientation of Ontario. In 1966 the Ontario 
government initiated work on the Metropolitan 
Toronto and Region Transportation Study (MTARTS). 
It was really the first attempt at a planning 
study which involved co-operative efforts on 
behalf of several government departments as well 
as Toronto and the Canadian National Railway 
(Gilles and Richmond, 1974, p.183) It was raising 
questions "which could be answered only by a 
different approach to regional development" than 
had been taken in the past (Scollie, 1973, p.8). 
Those involved found that even in this specific 
study factors other than transportation per se 
were involved and required definite consideration. 
There had also been some changes in 
government organization in the early 1960*s. In 
1961 the Department of Planning and Development 
became the Department of Commerce and Development 
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(Krueger, 1965, p.32). In 1962 it was merged with 
the Department of Economics and thus created the 
Department of Economics and Development. Gilles 
and Richmond desribe the results of this move: 
This brought together the economic advisory 
function, industrial development and 
regional development under one Minister. 
For the first time there was a link between 
economic planning and regional development. 
Even at this stage, however, there was 
little recognition of regional development 
as something other than industial 
development. 
(Gilles and Richmond, 1974, 
p.183) 
Krueger adds that the F jgional Development 
Division of the new Department had not been 
established by formal legislation, had 
insufficient manpower particularly among 
specialists, and, most significantly, was 
unsuccessful at intra-governmental liason and 
co-ordination. (Krueger, 1965, p.32-33). 
An interesting piece of legislation was 
passed by the Government of Ontario in 1965 which 
seems to have received very little academic 
scrutiny. Information regarding it appeared in 
the August 1965 volume of Canadian Business. In 
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an article entitled "What the Provinces Do to 
Attract New Industry" it was stated that: 
"Ontario Corporation Act has been amended 
to match federal corporation tax incentives 
for... establishment of new manufacturing 
or processing enterprises in designated 
areas... (p.82) 
A search through the Statutes of Ontario 
for the first half of the 1960's showed no such 
amendment to 'The Corporations Act'. However, 
'The Corporations Tax Act1 was amended in such a 
manner on June 22, 1965. This legislation had 
been amended several times before and was again 
changed in 1968. It permitted an income tax 
holiday for new manufacturing or processing firms 
which began production after Dec. 4, 1963 and 
before as late as (in certain cases) April 1, 1968 
and which were located in ADA designated areas. 
Thus in terms of supporting regional economic 
development efforts of ADA, there could be said to 
be perfect co-ordination between the two levels of 
government. The Ontario legislation matched the 
federal legislation. 
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Of course, it was only a little over a week 
after the Ontario legislation received assent that 
the federal ADIA program came into effect. It was 
not until over one year later, July 8, 1966, that 
the Ontario government again amended 'The 
Corporations Tax Act*. This time the amendment was 
to restrict new manufacturing or processing firms 
who received grants (as opposed to a tax 
incentive) from the ADIA program from being 
eligible for tax relief in Ontario. However, if 
the firm should take the option of receiving the 
ADIA tax incentive in lieu of the grant the 
Ontario government did not disqualify them from 
receiving provincial taxation assistance. 
Therefore, when the federal government changed its 
approach to regional development, it lost the 
co-ordinated effort of Ontario. 
In and around 1965 there were a number of 
other events which have resulted in 1965 being 
called "the turning point in the history of 
regional development policy in Ontario" (Gilles 
and Richmond, 1974, p.183). 
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suggests that one final idea emerged from the 
conference: 
The enormity of the challenge would require 
complex administrative machinery and 
excellent co-ordination not only of 
Provincial departments and agencies, but 
also involving the Federal Government... 
(Thoman, 1971, p.35) 
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b) Design for Development 
(i) Its Beginnings and Objectives 
The recognition of both the "existance and 
persistance" (Lawrence, 1974, p.3) of Ontario's 
regional disparities and that its government's 
efforts to put an end to them were inadequate 
(made clear at the conferences of 1965) led the 
government to bring together a new venture. It 
was to be a completely revamped regional 
development program. When John Robarts, the 
Premier of Ontario, announced in the Legislature 
on April 5, 1966 the Design for Development 
program it was "the first senior government policy 
commitment to a regional planning program in 
Canada" (Perry, 1974, p.30). 
When Robarts rose in the Legislature he 
stated: 
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In the first place, this government 
accepts the responsibility of guiding, 
encouraging and assisting the orderly and 
rational development of the province. 
In the second place, we believe that our 
efforts should be complementary to the 
private sector of the economy in helping to 
create an atmosphere for growth and 
development. 
In the third place, we believe that 
policies must be cast in the mould of 
Ontario's conditions and not simply 
borrowed from other jurisdictions where 
fundamental characteristics and 
institutions may differ. 
(Ontario Legislative, 5 
April 1966, p.2254) 
He realized that "appropiate regional 
development requires comprehensive planning" 
(Ontario Legislative, 5 April 1966, p.2255). 
Equally important, he recognized the significance 
of intergovernmental relations: 
Recognizing the interrelationships among 
the three levels of government, federal, 
provincial and municipal, Ontario must 
continue in its efforts to maintain close 
co-ordination, not only among its own 
departments and programmes but also, where 
possible, with relevant programmes and 
activities at other levels. 
(Ontario Legislative, 5 
April 1966, p.2255) 
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Although one could list the objectives of 
Design for Development as, for example, Thoman 
(1971, p.38-39) has done, a summary of these goals 
is sufficient. Basically, the "overriding 
objective ... was to encourage each region of the 
Province to realize its full potential, in harmony 
with the social and economic development of the 
Province as a whole" (Lawrence, 1974, p. 4). 
Lawrence also points out that in contrast with 
traditional regional development programs which 
have focussed on alleviating disparities, the new 
Design for Development would, in addition to this, 
guide growth in the wealthier urbanized areas. 
Scollie (1973, p. 8) adds the "wise use of the 
natural environment" and the improved 
effectiveness of provincial services to the list 
of summarized objectives. 
With the decision to create a challenging 
program such as Design for Development must come 
the comcommitant alterations in government 
structure. First the Regional Development 
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Associations were to be changed. Although Robarts 
contended that they had "performed creditably" 
(Ontario Legislative, 5 April 1966, p. 2257) he 
did admit that they had encountered some 
difficulties. They were to be strengthened both 
by statutory and financial means and renamed 
Regional Development Councils. "These bodies were 
expected to provide advice and participation from 
local citizens and municipalities and to assist in 
the preparation of five year economic 
development plans for their region" (Tindal, 1973, 
p. 111). Two other organizations composed of 
civil servants were formed. The Advisory 
Committee on Regional Development which consisted 
of the Deputy Ministers of several departments was 
to advise the cabinet. The second, the Regional 
Advisory Boards, comprised senior field civil 
servants from various departments was to both 
build and react to regional development proposals 
and create interdepartmental liason. 
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(ii) Its Structure 
The Regional Development Branch (created in 
1966) of the Department of Economics and 
Development was the body of government handling 
Design for Development. In early 1968 it was 
transferred to the Department of Treasury and 
Economics. In a massive reorganization of the 
public service of Ontario in April, 1972 this 
department became the Ministry of Treasury, 
Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs (TEIGA) 
and continues to exist as such today. 
As it was originally set up the Design for 
Development program was to proceed for the ten 
economic regions of Ontario as follows: 
Stage 
1.Inventory 
2.Evaluation 
3.Plan - Phase 1 Analysis 
Phase 2 Policy Recommendations 
Phase 3 Policy Implementation 
The year 1967 was scheduled to be the year 
in which the first stage, Inventory, would be 
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completed. It was to gather information 
concerning all government activities in the 
province. The province would then know what 
programs could be manipulated to achieve its 
regional development goals. 
The following year, 1968, was to be the 
Evaluation year. This stage would study 
socio-economic trends and try to determine the 
needs and resources of the province. 
The next year, 1969 was to see "the 
initiation of full-scale development planning" 
(Thoman, 1971, p. 45). At this time there would 
be an analysis of specific problems for each 
region, priorities set and policy recommendations 
made (Scollie, 1973, p. 10). 
The first phase of this planning stage was 
to be known as 'Analysis'. Using the research 
conducted in the two previous stages the needs and 
problems of the regions would be determined. The 
potential of the region would also be specified 
and thus priorities determined and goals stated. 
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The second phase, 'Policy Recommendation', would 
follow a review of the findings of the previous 
phase and would project a series of alternative 
policies and one would be recommended. The third 
and final phase, 'Policy Implementation", would 
consist of only brief statements from the 
government accepting ,and usually modifying, the 
second phase recommendations after "a period of 
reaction from the areas affected" (Scollie, 1973, 
p. 11). 
(iii) Its Results 
By the end of 1972 all ten economic regions 
had published the Phase 1: Analysis reports. The 
Central Ontario region and some of the surrounding 
regions had been incorporated in a study entitled 
the 'Toronto-Centered Region'. This areal 
approach was encouraged by the existance of the 
MTARTS research, the findings of which were 
released in June 1968. The Toronto-Centered 
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Region and the Northwestern Ontario region were 
selected as pilot regions for which the third, or 
planning stage, was to rapidly evolve. Thus, by 
1971 both had, in effect, proceeded to the third 
phase of the planning stage. They were to 
represent the far ends of Ontario's regional 
economic spectrum. The challenge in the 
Toronto-Centered region would be to channel growth 
while in the Northwest portion of the province it 
would be to stimulate economic development. 
However,changes in the attitude of the 
government had already taken place and more were 
brewing. Before discussing these changes one must 
return to 1966 and the Design for Development 
statement by John Robarts of which Scollie cites: 
It must be emphasized that this statement 
is concerned with regional development and 
not regional government. Any regional 
development structures created by this 
government will be such that they will not 
disturb the existing power and authority of 
the existing municipal and county councils 
within the regions. Great caution has been 
excercised to avoid the imposition of new 
forms of government. 
(Scollie, 1973, p.9) 
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However,Scollie (1973, p. 9) also cites 
three Ontario government reports between 1965 and 
1968 all of which, in their own way called for "a 
drastic overhaul of regional boundaries." 
Thus in a complete reversal of Robart's 
statement in December, 1968 Design of Development: 
Phase II was introduced by both the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and the Premier. "This document 
reiterated the provincial commitment to continue 
developing its regional planning programme, and 
stressed its close association with a new 
programme to bring regional government to the 
province" (Perry, 1974, p.34). Ten pilot regional 
governments were created by 1973 and all had 
regional plans under preparation (Perry, 1974, p. 
45). Tindal has interpreted Phase II not as a 
change in orientation but rather as "as a single 
policy statement which simply continued the 
initiative begun in 1966" (Tindal, 1973, p. 114). 
Thoman (1971, p. 91) points out that regional 
development and regional government are different, 
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although they do overlap or as MacNaughton (1969, 
p.8) expressed it, they are "hand-in-glove". 
Thoman suggests that only strengthened local 
government can plan effectively. 
In June, 1972 another major policy 
statement was made - this one predictably entitled 
Design for Development: Phase III. It 
re-emphasized the implementation of regional 
government as proposed by its predecessor, Phase 
II, and "called for increased provincial 
initiative in the reform of local government" 
(Tindal, 1973, p.114). The government was to 
accelerate its program of municipal reform in 
attempts to financially strengthen these local 
units. In addition it called for a closer 
relationship between regional development and the 
reformed local governments and co-operation 
between the various ministeries involved. The 
creation of TEIGA two months earlier would 
probably facilitate the former objective in that 
it brought together the Department of Treasury and 
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Economics and Department of Municipal Affairs. To 
reflect this new local government orientation the 
senior Advisory Committee on Regional Development 
was adjusted and renamed the Advisory Committee on 
Urban and Regional Planning (ACURP). 
Another significant change announced in the 
statement was the introduction of new planning 
regions. The previous 10, which had been adopted 
in the 1950's, were found to be inadequate and 
were reduced to five. Basically the 
Toronto-Centred Region was retained and labelled 
Central Ontario. The others are Southwestern 
Ontario, Eastern Ontario, Northeastern Ontario and 
Northwestern Ontario. This new delination became 
effective January 1, 1973. 
Despite the fact that the government had, 
up to this point, praised the efforts of the 
Regional Development Councils, it was decided that 
they were inadequate and an unnecessary 
duplication (Tindal, 1973, p.115). On June 22, 
1973 The Regional Development Councils Repeal Act, 
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1973 officially liquidated them. To complement 
this move the ten Regional Advisory Boards were 
disbanded and replaced by five new Public Service 
Advisory Boards. 
(iv) Its Evaluation 
Shortly after the presentation of Design 
for Development: Phase III a number of papers 
appeared reviewing the entire program and making 
some evaluation of it. Scollie (1973), a library 
technologist, reviewed the available literature 
and used such terms as "sensible", "realistic" and 
"well thought out" to describe the program. Allan 
Lawrence (1974), a member of Ontario's 
Conservative government at the time, called it 
"people-oriented". Gilles and Richmond (1974) 
also made some positive statements concerning the 
Design for Development program: 
The Ontario apprj'. ich to regional economic 
development... embraces total planning of 
the environment... It is a far cry from 
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the concept of regional development as a 
plan to provide more jobs. 
It is an organized effort to achieve 
continuing economic growth aiming at the 
highest possible standard of living 
attainable for all residents. 
(Gilles and Richmond, 1974, 
p.185-186) 
However, most of the discussions concerning 
the program have not dealt with its aims but 
rather with its practical achievements. Tindal's 
(1973) main criticism was the slowness of the 
program to develop specific plans and policies. 
Also, "the program has involved the establishment 
of extensive administrative machinery, only some 
of which has proven effective" (Tindal, 1973, 
p.116). Even Lawrence (1974) agrees that some of 
this structure may have been established 
prematurely but as MacNaughton explains, "one 
can not launch a total development program from a 
superficial base or from the seat of one's pants" 
(MacNaughton, 1969, p.5). 
Another criticism which Tindal (1973) has 
made was the necessity of having to change one's 
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course in mid-stream by reducing the number of 
planning regions from ten to five. Lawrence 
(1974) expresses a similar opinion. The regions 
should have been delineated more selectively in 
the beginning. The fact that Ontario admitted 
that these ten federally established regions "were 
never intended to be units for the development and 
implementation of plans" (Davis and McKeough, 
1972, p.18) is disheartening. Tindal asks the 
question: 
If this is the case, one can only ask why 
they were used for this purpose by Ontario 
for more than six years. 
(Tindal, 1973, p.119) 
In selecting such regions the province 
should have tied them in with an overall 
provincial plan, a plan which, in terms of 
economic development and local government reform, 
was conspicuously lacking. 
Tindal (1973) was also displeased with both 
the ineffective performance of the Regional 
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Development Councils (p.116-117) and the lack of 
integration between regional development and 
regional government (p.113). Therefore he was 
pleased when Phase III announced the elimination 
of the RDC's. He suggested that local views should 
be expressed through local and regional government 
(Tindal, 1973, p.120). 
In June, 1973 the Ontario Planning and 
Development Act was given assent. It was the 
first legislation to outline the planning process. 
Perry (1974, p.39-42) provides a informative 
summary of the steps in the planning process. 
Between this time and 1976 little seems to 
have taken place in Ontario in terms of policy 
change or government actions. However, in March 
of 1976 a new round of major Regional Development 
Branch publications appeared. These numbered no 
fewer than seven. A regional strategy was 
released for Northeastern Ontario and an updated 
Toronto-Centred Region strategy also appeared. 
Two subregional strategies were also unfolded as 
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were more general publications dealing with 
Ontario as a whole. These latter were perhaps in 
response to criticisms levelled at the absence of 
an overall study. 
(v) The Role of Intergovernmental Co-operation 
Probably one of the most significant 
documents to appear under the name of Design for 
Development was one which was dated September, 
1977. It was entitled Northwestern Ontario 
Initiatives and Achievements. Released jointly by 
TEIGA and Northern Affairs it evaluates the 
Northwestern Ontario Strategy. This was done by a 
simple matching of goals and actual development or 
government actions in regards to these goals. The 
objectives are taken directly from Design for 
Development: Northwestern Ontario, Phase2 and are 
organized under seven main headings. Of course, 
in such a report it is difficult to seperate 
government intervention forces, which claim 
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success wherever possible, from natural market 
forces. A case in point would be the number of 
jobs created in the region. Can government action 
claim full credit? Regardless, it is satisfying 
to see that some actions have been taken with 
regards to specifically recommended plans. 
Federal participation in this respect is 
notable. Thoman (1971) in reviewing the role of 
regional development from the national perspective 
concludes that the federal government has not yet 
come to the "full realization that development is 
a total process involving... all geographic and 
sectoral parts of the economy - fast growth, 
intermediate growth and slow growth" (Thoman, 
1971, p.26). Thus he deems the federal approach 
to be inferior to the provincial approach of 
Ontario. Thoman is also aware of the confusion 
created by the participation of several levels of 
government in regional development - a confusion 
which must be reduced or, better still, 
eliminated. To this end he states that liason was 
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established with the federal government for the 
purpose of Design for Development. The federal 
government was noted to have contributed both 
financially and in terms of 'fact finding1 
(Thoman, 1971, p.43 § 51). However, this was only 
mentioned briefly despite its great significance. 
Political rivalry may be the explanation. On the 
other hand, both speeches (Honey, 1976, p.10) on 
behalf of the Ontario government and its 
publications (Ontario, 1976A, p.52) express the 
opinion that federal policies were having a 
profound influence on the effectiveness of 
provincial programs. In fact in Ontario's Future: 
Trends and Options the following statement was 
made: 
Ontario is firmly committed to the 
opinion that ... federal programs and 
policies applying to Ontario should 
invariably be guided and supportive of 
Ontario's planning policies and objectices 
and integrated with Ontario's own 
corresponding programs. 
(Ontario, 1976A, p.52) 
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Thus, Ontario believed that it should be 
the federal government which should conform to 
Ontario's policies. This belief has been pressed 
for so strongly by Ontario that it has been 
carried through to the GDA negotiations which will 
be discussed later. 
In the Phase2 report concerning 
Northwestern Ontario, the recommended actions 
frequently recorded the province's desire to 
secure the co-operative efforts of the federal 
government. The Initiatives and Achievements 
publication of September, 1977 confirms that this, 
to some extent, had been achieved. It states that 
of the $70 million directed to Northwestern 
Ontario over the four year period a little over 
30% was the contribution of the federal government 
through DREE (Ontario, 1977, p. 6). As well, 
Northwestern Ontario continued to qualify as a 
designated area under DREE's Regional Development 
Incentives Act program. Over $7 million worth of 
grants had been contributed. Although its 
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contribution has been significant, the credit 
given the federal government by Ontario has been 
quite limited. Usually it is restricted to brief 
mention or is footnoted. One can interpret this 
situation as one where the Ontario government has 
attempted to retain the maximum amount of credit 
and glory for itself. 
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4. The GDA: A Step Toward Co-operation 
As indicated earlier, the Department of 
Regional Economic Expansion initiated a major 
internal review during the 1972-1973 fiscal year. 
Although generally satisified with the functioning 
of the Department, the review "also made clear 
that the existing programs, each of which 
attacked primarily a single factor in the total 
problem of regional disparities, were not in 
themselves sufficient to enable full realization 
of the development opportunities identified in the 
various regions" (Canada, DREE, Annual Report, 
1972-73, p. 2). The following conclusion was 
reached: 
A new multidimensional approach was 
required one that would bring to bear on 
the problems of disparities not only the 
programs of the department i.e. DREE but 
also a wide range of public policies and 
programs involving other federal and 
provincial agencies. The essence of this 
approach would be the co-operative 
identification of major opportunities for 
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development in the various provinces or 
regions and their realization through the 
co-ordinated application of federal and 
provincial efforts together ... 
(Canada, DREE, Annual 
Report, 1972-75, p. 2) 
a) The Goal of Intergovernmental 
Co-operation 
Thus the General Development Agreement 
(GDA) approach to regional development was 
conceived. As can be seen, one of the major 
reasons for this was DREE's desire to secure 
greater provincial co-operation. In a recent 
interview with David Dallimore of the Toronto DREE 
office the following explanation for the creation 
of the GDA approach was given: 
Well the realization, I think ... that 
we i.e. DREE needed more federal 
provincial co-operation ... to try to 
rationalize the problem of working against 
each other ... led to the GDA approach . 
I think it was realized that you had to 
work very closely with each province to 
maximize the effectiveness of regional 
development. If you didn't do that you 
would come across this resentment of the 
provinces of the federal government working 
against them ... 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
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Curtin (1975, p.189) hoped that this 
co-operative atmosphere between the two senior 
levels of government might facilitate a move 
toward a more comprehensive national regional 
planning policy from which the provinces could 
take their planning cues and priorities. However, 
Dallimore discounts the possibility of such a 
plan: 
I think politically it just would be 
impossible ... In theory, that is the way 
to do it - you start with the plan for the 
whole and you go down the political or 
administrative hierarchy . But in practical 
terms, I don't think it would ever work. 
That is why you start the other way around. 
As illogical in planning terms as it may be 
it works ... You have to live with the 
political realities . 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
The GDA approach was also foreseen to have 
the advantage of approaching each province as 
having its "own unique set of economic and social 
circumstances and development opportunities" 
(Canada, DREE, Annual Report, 1974-75, p.2). DREE 
wanted to develop each region to its potential 
and: 
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Also, I think DREE ... hadn't looked at 
each province in totality and this 
approach would enable us to do just that. 
That may help to comprimise the situation 
between looking at Canada as a whole and 
then working out a strategy and then taking 
it for each region or bits of a region ... 
(Dallimore,1978) 
The GDA approach would replace the 
co-operative Special Areas effort and thus the 
orientation would change from infrastructure 
development to "development potential" (Perry, 
1974, p.97) 
Thus, in the 1972-1973 fiscal year, General 
Development Agreement negotiations began between 
the provinces (individually) and the federal 
government. Within two years Agreements had been 
drawn up between all of them with the exception of 
P.E.I, which already had a 15 year comprehensive 
plan signed with Ottawa. The GDA's with each 
province have several general characteristics. 
These are listed below: 
-provides a general framework or 
"umberella" agreement 
-permits and encourages federal 
provincial co-operation 
-runs for a 10 year period 
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-are a formal declaration 
-outlines general objectives and broad 
strategies (based on socio-economic 
analysis of individual Province's 
circumstances) 
-provides for the signing of subsidiary 
agreements which are more specific and 
well defined action projects 
-does not call for commitment of any 
resources - this will be the job of the 
subsidiary agreements 
b) The Subsidiary General Agreements 
The Subsidiary Development Agreements 
(SDA's) mentioned were to be negotiated under the 
authority of the GDA's. They were to define more 
specifically the co-operative action to be taken. 
They would run for specific periods of time (from 
1 to 5 years) and would explicitly state the 
resources to be allocated by the respective 
governments. New projects would be jointly 
initiated or existing programs co-ordinated to 
support agreed development opportunities. Such 
agreements would involve key industries. Some 
would involve forestry and fishing. Others would 
deal with community services and infrastructure 
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development (Canada, 1976, p. 10). By the fiscal 
year 1974-1975 twenty-nine SDA's had been signed 
with more than $533 million contrbuted by the 
federal and a total input of over $1 billion by 
the two levels of government and the private 
sector (Canada, DREE, Annual Report, 1974-75, p. 
5). By 1976 the number rose to 43 SDA's with a 
total combined government investment of $1.3 
billion (Cook, 1976, p.62). 
To complement this move toward greater 
co-operation and co-ordination was the concurrent 
decentralization of DREE following its 1972-1973 
internal review: 
It is also basic to the new concept that 
the federal officials responsible for 
administering the efforts of the department 
i.e. DREE should be physically located in 
the areas of the country where they can be 
most accessible and responsive ... to 
provincial governments ... 
(Canada, DREE, Annual 
Report, 1972-73, pi 27 
Thus, four regional offices were established and 
the provincial offices strengthened. Has this step 
facilitated greater federal - provincial 
co-operation?: 
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I think it probably has I think from 
the provincial point of view they are not 
having laid on them a preconceived ,across 
Canada notion ... It means we i.e. DREE 
are not trying to play off one region 
against another ... We are trying to 
develop each region according to its 
potential. 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
c) The Canada / Ontario GDA 
On Feb. 26, 1974 a ten year General 
Development Agreement was signed between the 
Government of Ontario and the Government of 
Canada. Its purpose was "to facilitate joint 
federal - provincial co-operation in initi ttives 
undertaken in respect of economic and 
socio-economic development in Ontario" (Canada, 
1974, p.2). The three basic objectives of the 
document are: 
1) To improve opportunities for productive 
employment and access to those 
opportunities, and to sustain existing 
employment in economically-depressed 
parts of Ontario; 
2) To encourage residents in these areas to 
participate to a greater degree in the 
benefits of economic growth; and 
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3) To reinforce the policies and priorities 
of Ontario for regional development. 
(Canada, 1974, p.l) 
The first objective appears to be rather 
weak, setting out only to 'sustain' the levels of 
employment in the poorer parts of the province. 
The second one is so general that it can be 
considered no more than good political public 
relations. The third objective implies that the 
federal government had some idea of what Ontario 
was doing. Certainly these objectives can be 
criticized for their broad and general nature, 
however, one must keep in mind that in signing 
this document neither level of government wanted 
to commit itself to anything specific. Instead 
they wanted to leave all avenues open, thus the 
term, 'General' Agreement. 
This last objective is indicative of the 
federal government's new policy to approach each 
province as a unique situation. In fact, as Curtin 
(1975, p.125) points out, according to the GDA, 
the federal government must recognize the 
province's Design for Development strategy. 
It seems odd that the mere recognition of 
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the priorities and policies of the other level of 
government is interpreted as an important step. 
Of course, each government had to tread wearily 
not giving in to the other but instead trying to 
meet the other half way. For one government to 
simply follow the other's priorities and policies 
would certainly mark the end of that government's 
jurisdiction over regional economic development. 
The Canada / Ontario GDA's strategy is to 
identify and support development opportunities and 
to analyze Ontario's socio-economic situation in 
the nation. The power to enter into SDA's is 
outlined as are co-ordination, finance and other 
matters. The Agreement is due to expire March 31, 
1984. 
'Schedule A' of the document describes 
Ontario's present circumstances and again lists 
the objectives of the Agreement. However, it is 
the last section of 'Schedule A' which becomes 
more specific. It states that Ontario's 
socio-economic circumstances shall be subject to 
continuous review and a process of identifying 
possible development opportunities under both 
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federal and provincial criteria should be 
introduced. The importance of the objectives of 
the Design for Development program are again 
stressed (Canada, 1974, p.18-19). At the time the 
GDA was signed it already included a number of 
priority areas which were to be considered for 
subsidiary agreements. They were: 
1) Cornwall area of Eastern Ontario 
2) Northwestern Ontario 
3) Forest-based Industries 
4) Single-Industy Communities 
5) Industrial Incentive Program 
6) Special Project Initiatives 
7) Transportation and Communication 
8) Rural Development 
9) Ontario Northlands 
(Canada, 1974, p.19-24) 
Each of these headings is described briefly 
in the document and reasons presented as to why it 
should receive attention for development. It is 
interesting to compare some of these priority 
areas with a discussion which took place in 1969. 
According to a confidential government document, 
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Federal-Provincial Ministerial Committee on 
Regional Disparities (June 10, 1969) some of these 
topics are by no means new to federal - provincial 
discussions. On page 1 of this document: 
Ontario suggested that it would be 
impossible to attract secondary industries 
to northern areas unless resource-based 
industries were first attracted to serve as 
a catalyst. 
Under heading 'f. Special Projects 
Initiative' the GDA states: 
Special projects initiatives will 
probably relate largely to the tourism and 
manufacturing fields with particular 
emphasis being given to resource processing 
and similar activities. 
(Canada, 1974, p.22) 
Heading •c. Forest-based Industries' of the 
GDA stressed the problems of these industries in 
Ontario, particularly in reference to the strength 
of U.S. competition. In the 1969 document "Ontario 
... referred specifically to the difficulties of 
attracting new pulp and paper operations in the 
face of competition from the southern United 
States" (Federal-Provincial, 1969, p.3). A similar 
correspondence exists in the area of 
transportation, particularly with reference to 
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roads in Northern Ontario. Ontario's concern for 
its northern areas was repeatedly expressed in 
1969, and the GDA demonstrated that these 
sentiments had been carried along into the 1974 
Agreement as exemplified by the discussions under 
'b. Northwestern Ontario1 and 'i. Ontario 
Northlands'. Although the efforts on behalf of 
both governments to get together must be 
commended, it is frustrating to know that many 
areas of discussion had begun five years in 
advance of the signing of the GDA, a document 
which itself took no specific action on these 
problems. Added to this five year period was the 
time before the signing of the individual SDA's. 
is curious as to why a wealthy province like 
Ontario, expressing such concern over its sectoral 
and geographical problem areas, should have to 
wait for a federally initiated joint venture to 
take action. It is even more peculiar for a 
province which is so jealous of its planning and 
development position. One must conclude that, 
despite the concern which it expressed, its 
actions in response to the problems had been 
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either inadequate, ineffective or non-existant. 
d) The Canada / Ontario SDA's 
Some of the general strategies discussed 
under the various headings in 'Schedule A1 of the 
GDA have been transformed into action - oriented 
agreements, SDA's. A note should be made here 
that all Ontario's SDA's are financed on a 50/50 
basis between the two senior levels of government. 
By December, 1977 seven such documents had been 
agreed upon. The most recent is the Upper Ottawa 
Valley SDA in the Pembroke - Renfrew area. 
No literature is available concerning it at this 
time, however it was discovered that: 
It's basically a study exercise, at this 
stage, to identify potential industrial 
activity in the area and also to help with 
the establishing of an industrial 
development commission. It's a first part 
and there will be a second part which will 
be more specifically industrially 
oriented. 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
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The other Subsidiary Development Agreements 
are as follows: 
TOTAL VALUE AGREEMENT DURATION TITLE 
Cornwall 
Northwestern 
Ontario 
Dryden 
Development 
Infrastructure 
Interim 
Northlands 
Northeastern 
Ontario 
$ 16,330,000 26/02/74 to 31/03/77 
$ 47,344,000 23/05/74 to 31/03/78 
$ 3,201,000 24/03/75 to 31/03/77 
$ 427,500 07/07/75 to 31/03/78 
$ 17,128,650 25/03/76 to 31/12/79 
Single-Industry $ 15,755,000 18/10/76 to 31/03/80 
Resource 
Communities 
TOTAL $100,185,150 
(Canada, 1977, p.3) 
Each Subsidiary Agreement varies in its 
objectives and projects and each can be quite 
detailed. The following is a list of the SDA's 
and with each SDA title are the major projects 
which have been or are to be undertaken. Each has 
been abstracted from 'Schedule A' of their 
respective SDA: 
CORNWALL 1) Eastern Industrial Park 
a) internal services-
eg. sanitary sewers and 
watermains 
b) local roads 
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2) Canal Lands Development 
a) civic complex - athletic 
and cultural events 
b) trunk services - storm sewers 
and watermains 
c) arterial roads and sidewalks 
d) landscaping civic complex 
3) West-End Single Industry Site 
a) trunk services - sewers, 
b) internal services 
4) Tourist and Recreation Area 
a) landscaping and internal services 
b) local roads 
watermains 
NORTHWESTERN 
ONTARIO 
. Community Infrastructure Program 
1) Thunder Bay sewage system 
improvements 
2) New town site in Lake St. 
Joseph area 
3) Ignace sewage treatment plant 
expansion 
II. Road Construction Program 
1) Resource access roads 
2) Upgrading Highway 599 
III. Study Program 
1) Study Thunder Bay infrastructure 
needs 
2) Study of harvesting of wild rice 
DRYDEN 
DEVELOPMENT 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
1) Dryden water system 
improvements 
2) Dryden sewage system 
improvements 
INTERIM 
NORTHLANDS 
NOTE: 
1) Life skills - improve social 
functioning 
2) Teach homemaker skills 
3) Recreation area - develop 
camping and canoeing 
4) Manpower adjustment study 
5) Evaluation of SDA 
This SDA covers numerous areas 
of Northern Ontario characterized 
by severe poverty 
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NORTHEASTERN I. Sudbury Area 
ONTARIO 1) Industrial park -
water and sewage service 
and access roads 
II. Parry Sound Area 
1) Carling Township Industrial 
Park - water source and 
distribution system, 
sanitary sewer system 
2) Assessment of industrial 
development activity 
SINGLE- 1) Community infrastructure program 
INDUSTRY a) wells, pumps, etc. in Nakina 
RESOURCE b) water treatment in Longlac 
COMMUNITIES c) water system improvements 
in Geraldton 
2) Transportation development program 
a) Geraldton airport 
b) airport access 
Athough such a brief account of the 
individual programs does not do justice to the 
objectives or strategies involved, it does give 
some idea of the type of projects being activated. 
The fact that the provincial and federal 
governments have hammered out an agreement and 
have been able to match priorities is an important 
step in itself. 
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e) Its Evaluation and Prospects 
A recent joint review of the above six 
SDA's states that: 
the implementation and administration of 
the subsidiary agreements signed to date 
has proceeded satisfactorily. 
(Canada, 1977, p. 1) 
Out of the Agreements and actions taken, 
very few problems have arisen. There seems to be 
a problem of underestimating costs, a problem 
apparent in the Northwestern agreement. This has 
been overcome by the use of an existing 
contingency fund and the deletion of two projects 
through a bilateral amendment. Additional funds 
have been allocated to the existing projects from 
federal and provincial as well as municipal (i.e. 
Thunder Bay) sources. This seems to serve as an 
indication of the ongoing co-operative effort. As 
far as a solution to the underestimation problem 
is concerned, the joint review states: 
Hopefully, better analysis and control of 
estimates in subsequent subagreements is 
bringing this problem within manageable 
limits. (Canada, 1977, p.l) 
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A second problem which has arisen deals 
with some accounting problems. However, a current 
review with respect to this matter has been 
undertaken (Canada, 1977, p. 1). 
One of the provisions made by the GDA is 
for the joint evaluation of each SDA upon its 
completion. Only one such document is available 
at this time and it is the evaluation of the 
Cornwall Subagreement. The program was scheduled 
to be completed at the end of March, 1977 and its 
evaluation appeared in July, 1977. An immediate 
review of this experimental approach is justified 
in order to apply the knowledge gained through the 
functioning of this first program to those 
Subsidiary Agreements which were to follow. 
However, one must also take into consideration the 
fact that infrastructure - oriented projects may 
not produce any immediate or short - run results. 
What is necessary is a number of longer run 
standardized evaluations or reviews repeated over 
certain time periods to gain further insight to 
the results of such development efforts. This 
problem has been recognized: 
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Although it is premature at this time to 
measure the full impact of the Agreement on 
Cornwall's economic prospects, this report 
provides a preliminary evaluation of the 
experience encountered during the 
implementation phase and the immediate 
ascertainable effects on Cornwall's 
development. 
(Canada, 1977, p.l) 
As this was the first SDA to be completed 
the value of the evaluation exercise is obvious. 
However, formal agreement should be made between 
Ontario and Canada to undertake the later 
additional evaluations. At this time no plans for 
such an amendment to the Canada / Ontario GDA 
exist (Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) Despite the 
problem of cost over-runs the Cornwall evaluation 
sees the implementation of the plan as being 
generally successful. In addition, the short-run 
tax assessment base of the area has "increased 
significantly ... since 1973" (Canada, 1977, p.2). 
The Subsidiary Agreement has also helped to create 
construction employment in the short - run when 
the Cornwall economy was suffering. There have 
also been indications of the attraction of new 
industry to the area and tourism may also be on 
the rise. The separation of natural market 
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forces, of course, has not been possible. The 
government written evaluation is satisfied that it 
has achieved its government set objectives. 
The joint effort for drawing up an SDA does 
not seem to be a complex one. Basically it runs 
as follows: 
1) Each year the Ontario government draws 
up its regional priority budget. It is a 
number of projects listed in terms of 
Ontario's priorities. 
2) It is presented to the Ontario DREE 
office, which has its own priorities. 
3) The two sides meet to discuss and agree 
upon mutually desireable projects. 
4) The various offices of the two 
governments then meet to thrash out the 
details 
5) Analyses pass between the two 
governments and on the basis of these an 
agreement will be drawn up and signed. 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
Thus, in terms of initiative, it is usually 
the Ontario government which starts the ball 
rolling with the presentation of its regional 
priority budget. However, on occasion, DREE, 
seeing the need for a particular action to be 
taken, might approach the province. However, 
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Dallimore of DREE points out: 
They i.e. Ontario are very jealous of 
us getting into the planning area. They 
don't want us to get into it. You have to 
realize the political context. 
Because the province is so involved in 
planning they don't want us involved in it. 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
Mclntyre (1976) suggests that this is a 
problem. The federal government must attempt to 
reinforce the province's priorities as expressed 
primarily in its Design for Development program. 
Thus, Ottawa is unable to take any action in areas 
where Ontario has not completed or revised its 
plans. Apparently DREE has offered to assist in 
the planning effort, offers which have been 
accepted by other provinces, in order to speed up 
the process, but Ontario has turned them down: 
I would like to suggest that DREE could 
bring to bear a unique and useful national 
perspective to the field of regional 
planning should Ontario be prepared to 
modify its existing stance. 
(Mclntyre, 1976, p. 58) 
Another political problem deals with the 
priorities of the two governments. Dallimore 
(1978) points out that some of the programs 
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suggested in "the province's regional priority 
budget are more politically oriented than others". 
He suggests that DREE tries to weed these out and 
look for those with a sound socio-economic base. 
Most certainly many of DREE's priorities are 
politically motivated as well, merely an acceptd 
symptom of a democratic system. 
A final political problem, the kind which 
one would naturally associate with 
intergovernmental co-operation, deals with 
political credit. The GDA states that there is to 
be credit given to both levels of government for 
the joint projects which are undertaken. 
Nevertheless, is there still some competition for 
political credit? 
It's true. Obviously one never likes to 
think that the other side is getting more 
credit than you are when it's a joint 
funded project. 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
Despite its verbal source, the use of the phrase 
•the other side' serves as an indicator of the 
intergovernmental tensions which still exist. 
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The future of co-operative action seems 
assured via the GDA. More projects are currently 
under discussion and those signed thus far seemed 
to have helped the spirit of federal - provincial 
relations. At this time, however, the GDA would 
appear to be the upper limit in the state of the 
art of federal - provincial regional development 
action. The GDA approach will be the principle 
medium of co-operation at least until its 1984 
expiration date (Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978). The 
development of the GDA seems to be a step in the 
proper direction with an eventual goal of 
minimizing intergovernmental conflicts. To this 
end is a more formal integration of the two 
administrations of the two governments foreseen? 
I can't see us i.e. DREE ever working 
completely with TEIGA like that. It means 
it takes away from the federal government 
their interest in trying to ensure that 
there is less regional disparity across the 
country. And I suppose that although we 
are looking at each region seperately, at 
least when you are in an organization like 
DREE you are conscious of what is happening 
in other areas of the country. You try to 
bring to bear some of the benefits and some 
of the problems you have incurred across 
the country . You can learn a lot from the 
national thing. You try to keep this 
national perspective in focus. 
(Dallimore, 21 Feb. 1978) 
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Discussions with provincial authorities 
also cast a shadow on any further integration of 
federal - provincial regional concerns. As far as 
they are concerned any move in this direction 
would only mean the loss of power and potential 
political credit. 
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V. FEDERAL AND ONTARIO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
The development of the GDA approach for use 
in the battle against regional economic 
disparities appears to be a step in the proper 
direction according to the discussions of the 
theoretical material in Chapter III. Yet the 
projects of the Subsidiary Agreements resulting 
from this approach are only one of the efforts 
being put forward by the two senior levels of 
government. The two governments also operate 
independent industrial development types of 
promotions. Fortunately, with this kind of 
program, government efforts can be easily 
scrutinized. This is due to the direct nature of 
the government effort involved. Such effort 
usually involves some type of direct monetary 
incentive provided to a firm or an individual. 
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Typically they are in the form of a loan or a 
grant. This allows the researcher to observe 
exactly where the money has gone. 
Another advantage provided by the study of 
this type of programs is the possibility of making 
comparisons. Certainly there will be differences 
in the programs. As will be seen, the most 
obvious example is the loan versus grant type of 
incentive. One may argue that such a difference 
may result in varying economic impacts. 
Nevertheless direct comparison of the distribution 
of the funds involved remains possible. As it 
turns out, the terms of the loan program are 
generous enough in nature to make inter-program 
comparison valid. 
Finally, these programs are of interest 
because of their value in light of the preceeding 
research and theory. This is brought about by 
their independent or unilateral character. Just 
as the GDA approach can be said to reflect the 
newer co-operative federalism, so too do the 
development incentive programs correspond to the 
older, dualistic form of federalism. Such 
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unilateral programs may tend to reflect the 
priorities of the federal and provincial 
governments individually. 
However, before the industrial development 
incentive type of regional development programs 
are analyzed, it would be wise to review the 
evolution of the two major programs involved. 
Such a review should in itself illustrate certain 
priorities of the two governments. 
The significance of the two programs to be 
presented is considerable. Although some data 
could be obtained for the federal program, facts 
and figures relevant to its provincial counterpart 
are held somewhat more secretively. The 
functioning of the Regional Development Incentives 
Act accounted for 17.4% of DREE's expendtiures in 
1976 - 77 (Canada, DREE, Annual Report, 1976 - 77, 
p.4). This figure declined in 1977 - 78 to 12.9% 
(Canada, DREE, Annual Report, 1977 - 78, p.3). It 
is interesting to note that over that same two 
year period the share of DREE's expenditures going 
to Subsidiary Development Agreements rose from 
41.8% to 56.7%. 
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1. ADA, ADIA and RDIA 
In Canada, federal governments have 
hesitated in the past to become involved in 
the issue of industrial location, but ... 
recently there has been a change in 
attitude. 
(Brewis, 1968, p. 320) 
a) Its Beginnings: ADA 
This change in attitude became visible in 
1963. It was in that year that the federal 
government proposed the creation of the Department 
of Industry. It would have the responsibility of 
implementing suggestions made by the Economic 
Council of Canada also formed at that time. "The 
Department of Industry was to be for manufacturers 
what the Department of Agriculture was to 
farmers", the Department of Fisheries was to 
fisherman, and so on (Brewis, 1969, p.134). The 
Area Development Agency (ADA) was designed within 
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the realm of the Department of Industry to relieve 
the heavy unemployment problem in certain areas of 
the country. It would aid manufacturers in 
setting up operation in such problem areas and in 
this way complement "the ARDA legislation on the 
rural front" (Brewis, 1972, pages not numbered). 
The Department of Industry in its first Annual 
Report gave justification for the ADA program: 
While broad national policies help to 
moderate regional economic problems, it is 
recognized that a program of special 
measures is also required to foster 
development in certain regions of Canada. 
(Canada, 1964, p.18) 
"Although there had been numerous measures 
in the past to assist certain areas of the 
country, this was the first time that the federal 
government had made provision for a specialized 
organization to concentrate on area problems in 
all regions of Canada" (Brewis, 1969, p.136-7). 
On July 22, 1963 the Department of Industry 
became a legal entity receiving particular support 
from those members of the House of Commons whose 
constituencies would benefit from the ADA program 
(Brewis, 1969). One of the provisions of the Act 
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was the creation of the Area Development Agency 
(ADA). According to the Department of Industry 
Act, Part II, Section 10 the function of the ADA 
was expressed as the following: 
The powers and duties of the Minister in 
relation to the Agency ... shall include 
a) the undertaking of research and making 
of investigations respecting the means of 
increasing employment and income in 
designated areas; and 
b) the preparing and carrying out of such 
programs and projects to improve the 
economic development of designated areas 
as may be appropriate to the purposes of 
this Part and that cannot be suitably 
undertaken by other departments, branches 
or agencies of the Government of Canada. 
(Canada, 1963, p.61) 
In early September, 1963 the first list of 
areas designated to receive assistance under the 
ADA program was released. Thirty-five such areas 
across Canada were selected involving seven 
provinces. "The areas have been so designated 
because they are experiencing high levels of 
unemployment and slow rates of growth" ("35 
Designated ..., 1963, p.864). Brewis lists the 
four general guidelines which the federal 
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government had employed in the selection of the 
designated regions: 
1) unemployment is very severe; 
2) there has been a large and persistent 
decline in the number of people employed; 
3) Unemployment is substantially above the 
national average and the rate of increase 
in employment is substantially slower 
than the national average; 
4) Unemployment is reflected in income 
levels below the national average. 
(Brewis, 1969, p.139) 
Naturally, more specific criteria were used by the 
government. 
The 'areas' referred to were local office 
areas of the National Employment Service. They 
later became Canada Manpower Centre areas. Such 
areas provided the best available data and 
"administrative simplicity" (Brewis and Paquet, 
1968, p.145). In such designated areas 
manufacturing and processing industries would be 
induced to settle by means of tax concessions. It 
was a three-part tax incentive program: 
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1) A three year exemption from federal 
income tax for new enterprises; 
2) Accelerated capital cost allowances on 
new machinery and equipment acquired for 
use in certified new manufacturing and 
processing enterprises at a rate of 50 
per cent on a straight line basis, 
instead of the usual 20% on a diminishing 
balance basis; 
3) An accelerated capital cost allowance on 
new buildings acquired in designated 
areas, at a rate of 20 per cent on a 
straight line basis, instead of the 
normal 5 per cent on a diminishing 
balance basis ... 
("35 Designated ..., 1963, 
p.864) 
Shortly after the second anniversary of the 
creation of ADA, it was to undergo some radical 
changes. 
The most significant was the switch from a 
tax incentive program to a system of grants. 
Brewis (1968) stated that the tax incentives would 
have had little influence on the location of 
industry. The problem was that the original plan 
would benefit "companies only after their projects 
were in operation and not companies who needed 
cash to begin with" (Bergeron, 1976, p.46). 
Brewis and Paquet (1968) point out that profits 
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made by successful firms in their first years of 
operation were likely to be 'quite nominal'. 
Burpee, a chartered accountant, sees 
another disadvantage of the tax incentive scheme: 
Added to this was the suspicion that the 
Department of National Revenue was not a 
real promoter of these incentives which 
were economic in nature and not related to 
the collection of taxes. It was realized 
that under the tax incentive programmes 
that the tax-payers' gain was the Revenue's 
losses ... Linked to this problem was the 
fact that the Department of Revenue would 
receive little credit ... if the designated 
areas programme proved successful. 
(Burpee, 1967, p.54) 
He then goes on to detail the advantages of 
the use of grants by ADA: 
The main advantage of grants as a fiscal 
measure is the control given to the 
government. Not only do grants produce an 
immediate effect but they can be directed 
to a select group of recipients who must 
submit all plans for approval. Moreover, 
the cost appear on the expenditure side of 
the government accounts where they can be 
scrutinized and weighed, rather than on the 
revenue side where the costs are invisible 
and not subject to any scrutiny or 
judgement. 
(Burpee, 1967, p.55) 
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In addition to this the Department of 
Industry was now in the open position where it 
could receive direct credit or blame depending on 
the success of its programmes. 
b) From Tax Savings to Grants: ADIA 
For reasons such as those above the 'Area 
Development Incentives Act' (ADIA) received Royal 
Assent on June 30, 1965 and came into force the 
following day. It was set to run until March 30, 
1971. 
It was through this legislation that firms 
would now receive grants for settling in 
designated areas rather than a tax incentive. The 
grants applied to both new manufacturing and 
processing activities and the expansion of 
existing ones, although the formula for 
determining the two differed. In each case an 
upper ceiling of $5 million was set. The grant, 
determined according to a specific formula, could 
be received by a particular firm either as cash 
under a standard payment shedule or in an amount 
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equivalent to the grant deducted from its federal 
income tax. Companies applying as late as March 
31, 1967 could also apply under the tax exemption 
scheme of the ADA of 1963. 
As well as changes in the form of the 
incentive, there were also considerable changes in 
the criteria used to designate qualifying areas. 
In the list of criteria provided by the Labour 
Gazette ("The War ..., 1965, p. 795) one notes the 
inclusion of the traditional unemployment and 
employment criteria as well as certain average 
annual family income considerations again using 
National Employment Service areas. However, along 
with the NES areas, county and Census districts 
could also be used. They would be included if 
they met the criteria and were contiguous to a NES 
area which was also designated and together they 
formed an 'economic region' (Brewis, 1969, p.140). 
Continuing along this 'economic region' line of 
thinking, groups of NES centres would be 
designated if, when taken as a whole, they 
qualified. Also notable is that the sparsely 
populated northern areas of the country would not 
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qualify ("The War ..., 1965, p. 795). Under the 
new criteria 65 NES areas and 16 counties or 
Census divisions were designated as being eligible 
for ADIA assistance. All 10 provinces were 
involved and effected portion of the labour force 
more than doubled from 7 1/2% under ADA to 16% 
under ADIA ("The War ..., 1965, p.794). 
c) Its Problems 
Despite the radical changes brought about 
by the new legislation, criticisms of the 
industrial incentive type of regional economic 
development programme under the guise of ADIA 
continued. The major criticism, and the one 
around which most of the others revolve, lies in 
the fact that these programs had not been 
particularly concerned with planned regional 
development but rather with the alleviation of 
local unemployment. Brewis and Paquet (1968) 
explain that this approach was symptomatic of many 
of the programs established in the same era. It 
was a time when the primary concern of the federal 
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government was unemployment: 
The Program was designed to encourage 
industrial development to take place in 
areas of chronic and severe unemployment, 
but there was no intention to provide for 
a comprehensive program of regional 
development as such 
(Brewis and Paquet, 1968, 
p.141) 
However, to attack regional unemplyment per 
se is to attack only a symptom of the problem and 
not its underlying causes. Some believe "that to 
achieve regional prosperity calls for major 
changes in the structure of the economy" (Brewis, 
1969, p.145). The program, therefore, may have 
served only to sprsad growth by acting as an 
'Industrial Location Agency* or, according to 
some, a "Misallocation Agency" (Brewis and Paquet, 
1968, p.141). It has thus been "branded by the 
critics as being more of a welfare scheme than a 
regional development project" ("Is HE ..., 1969, 
p. 39). 
A glance through the Annual Reports of the 
Department of Industry shows the commitment of ADA 
to conduct research in the area of regional 
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development. However "ADA has done the least of 
ARDA, ADB and ADA in the way of investigation, 
being uncommitted to plans of development" (Brewis 
and Paquet, 1968, p.152). Such research which 
would be required to handle the problems related 
to regional disparities and industrial location is 
lacking if one uses the number of pulications as a 
measure. 
The areas designated in which industry 
would receive financial assistance to settle were 
based primarily on unemployment and income 
measures. This too has been criticized. No 
account of development potential was made. The 
interest generated within the past decade in the 
'growth pole' or 'growth centre' concepts is 
indicative of the recent awareness of the 
development potential concept. 
Despite the objective nature of the area 
designation criteria, problems in their selection 
are apparent. "Equal incentives have not given 
rise to equal results ... and ... the most 
depressed areas are not likely to benefit as much 
as the less depressed ones" (Brewis, 1969, p.143). 
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Naturally, some of the designated areas will be 
perceived by the entrepreneur as being more 
attractive to entrepreneurs than others. Brewis 
(1969) illustrates this point using the example of 
southern Ontario versus north-eastern Quebec. The 
ADA program attracted more industrial investment 
to Ontario than any other province except Quebec 
and, despite this, the lesser investment in 
Ontario relative to Quebec created more jobs. 
"Ontario's designated areas had ... a more 
sophisticated infrastructure, easier access to 
markets and a ready-made labour force" and thus 
had an obvious advantage over less fortunate 
regions such as the Maritimes ("Is He ..., 1969, 
p. 39). In fact, George (1970) found that: 
Most of the the new plants were built in 
the poorer parts of the prosperous 
provinces rather than in the depressed 
regions of the country. About 60 per cent 
of these new jobs were in Quebec and 
Ontario -- which corresponds closely with 
the proportion of new firms which went to 
those provinces before the ADA grants. 
(George, 1970, p.149) 
This statement would seem to support 
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Springate's (1973, p. 14) claim that the ADA 
program was of very limited use. Its inefficiency 
is further exemplified by the cost per job. The 
Monetary Times ("Is He , 1969, p.40) reports 
that the average cost per job created across the 
country was $36,959 of which the federal 
government paid approximately 25%. 
(i) A Lack of Provincial Co-ordination 
The other major area of criticism which has 
been directed toward the Agency is in the area of 
co-operation and co-ordination. During its 
formative years this was not foreseen to be a 
source of difficulty. In a statement in the House 
of Commons in 1963 concerning the creation of the 
Department of Industry and the Area Development 
Agency, Prime Minister Pearson made this point 
clear. Both intra- and inter-governmental matters 
of co-ordination and co-operation were discussed: 
...I believe the new Department of 
Industry will make it easier for 
provincial departments of industry to do 
their work. Therefore, far from being 
hampered or interfered with, provincial 
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action in support of industry will be, we 
hope, assisted by this development. 
Opportunities for fruitful 
federal-provincial co-operation will be 
improved. 
Various departments of the federal 
government can be helpful in different ways 
to such designated areas. 
It i.e. ADA will create in Ottawa a 
small group of people whose special 
responsibility, on behalf of the minister 
of industry, will be to make sure that 
various public policies are conceived and 
co-ordinated in ways which will be of 
maximum help to the areas of maximum need. 
... In this sense the area development 
agency will be more co-ordinating than 
executive. In this way it will not 
interfere with provincial action to the 
same end. Quite the contrary. If the 
co-ordination and effectiveness of federal 
action are improved, actions by the 
provinces in their areas of responsibility 
will become easier to take and will be made 
more fruitful. 
(Canada, 1963, p.803) 
The actions of the new Department of 
Industry, and, more specifically, those of the 
Area Development Agency were to be co-ordinated 
with both provincial and other federal government 
actions. In fact within the Act provision was 
made whereby other departments could be directed 
to take action to aid the efforts of the Agency. 
However, the government seems to have failed to 
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use this option and the Agency became "an 
executive rather than a co-ordinating body" 
(Brewis, 1969, p.138). ARDA, which, through FRED, 
was to tackle the problem of rural development, 
could do little towards this end without ADA 
co-operation. Brewis and Paquet (1968, p.155) 
suggest that ARDA and ADA should have "come under 
one overall direction, an interlocking of action 
being needed." Indeed ADA should have been 
integrated with a number of other similar efforts 
by the federal government. 
While discussing the relationship of ADA to 
other development programs, one other facet of its 
character should be mentioned. "ADA provide[d] 
assistance directly to firms independently of 
other provincial governments, whereas ARDA and the 
ADB operate d in co-operation with the provincial 
governments and to some extent in response to 
them" (Brewis and Paquet, 1968, p.153). Joint 
programs seem to be generally more acceptable to 
the provinces and give them less grounds on which 
to complain. This is particularly valid in the 
case where regional development which has 
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traditionally remained within the domain of the 
provinces It is interesting to note that while 
before the Standing Committee on Industry Research 
and Energy Development the Minister of Industry 
said in reference to the tackling of the problem 
of uneveness in regional economic development: 
This, however, can only be done under the 
terms of our constitution as a joint 
federal-provincial program. 
(Canada, 1966, p.293) 
In an attempt "to secure the goodwill of 
the provinces" they were consulted during the 
formulation of ADIA designation criteria and to 
appease the provinces it worked out such that each 
province had qualified areas. Despite these 
efforts, the Monetary Times ("Is He ..., p. 40) 
claims that the Atlantic provinces were 
particularly unhappy with the lack of their 
consultation in this area. In addition, claims 
made by the federal government that their actions 
in regional development would compliment those of 
the provinces were never justified (Brewis, 1969). 
In fact he states that "a number of provincial 
governments do not regard the ADA program as 
215 
complementary to their own but as one that is apt 
to work at cross purposes" (Brewis, 1969, p.153). 
While some provinces may have taken the 
'development potential' approach to their regional 
diparity problems, the federal government 
countered by trying to attract new activity to the 
most depressed areas. This weakened the 
effectiveness of the actions of both governments. 
Should a province have wished to achieve a certain 
type of development or perhaps a degree of 
regional out-migration, ADA efforts may have 
foiled them (Brewis and Paquet, 1968, p.159). The 
Minister of the Department of Industry was aware 
that such efforts by the provinces could lead to 
provincial competition. However, he stated that 
the federal government would not become involved 
in such competition (Canada, 1966, p. 266). 
According to the charges of Brewis (1969), the 
federal government has failed to do this. 
Nevertheless, the Minister went on to say that: 
This larger question of differential 
regional incomes and growth rates in Canada 
has always been and will continue to be a 
major federal preoccupation. 
(Canada, 1966, p.266) 
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d) More Modifications: RDIA 
To this end on April 1, 1969 the functions 
of ADIA were taken over by DREE under the 
authority of the Regional Development Incentives 
Act (RDIA). It was to continue to function in 
basically the same way. With provincial 
consultation, areas across Canada were to be 
designated as being eligible for grants. There 
were two types of grants --a primary grant to 
expand and modernize existing facilities (20% of 
costs) and a secondary grant for new facilities 
(5% of costs plus $5000/created job). Thus the 
federal government was giving some incentive to 
more labour intensive activities by directly 
trying to stimulate job creation. By the 1970-71 
fiscal year a portion of south-eastern Ontario had 
been added to the list of designated regions. The 
degree of assistance also varied with the degree 
of depression in a region thus making this portion 
of Ontario eligible for a primary grant up to 10% 
of costs and a secondary grant of up to 10% of 
capital costs and $2,000 /job. By the 1971-72 
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fiscal year the secondary grant of the originally 
designated section of northern Ontario had been 
raised from 5% to 25% of capital costs with no 
change in the $5,000/job (Canada, DREE, Annual 
Report, 1971-72, p. 4). In 1974 south-eastern 
Ontario was no longer eligible leaving the 
northern portion of the province as Ontario's only 
RDIA designated area. 
With the 1974 review of DREE came several 
modifications to the RDIA program. One 
significant one was the use of a standard formula 
to determine incentive amounts for small and 
medium sized firms by the DREE field offices. 
This was to speed up the processing of 
applications. Also mentioned was the "frequent 
consultation with provincial governments who are 
advised of applications received" (Canada, DREE, 
Annual Report, 1974-75, p. 5). 
In addition to the 'standard formula' 
approach to grants there was also a provision made 
for the guaranteeing of loans. These are available 
to manufacturing and processing enterprises as 
well as certain new service industries. However, 
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this tool has been used only to a limited degree, 
a point substantiated by Dallimore (1978). 
2. ODA and ODC 
The government of Ontario has also taken on 
the role of providing industrial development 
incentives. Unfortunately, these provincial 
programs seemed to have received very little 
scrutiny from the academic world. This is 
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probably due to the fact that Ontario publishes 
very little about such programs except in the form 
of brief reports or pamphlets. In addition to 
this, whereas the funds spent by the federal 
government under the RDIA are published monthly, 
comparable provincial information becomes 
available only to the aggressive researcher. The 
reason for this is the criticism which the Ontario 
government received concerning this program upon 
its initiation. Since that time it has maintained 
a low profile. 
a) Its Beginnings: ODA 
The industrial incentive portion of the 
regional development program of Ontario has an 
interesting history. It did not start out with a 
regional development goal. Rather it started out 
as part of a five year economic program to 
stimulate the industrial development of the 
220 
province as a whole. It was particularly 
concerned with the secondary manufacturing sector. 
The Ontario Development Agency was first mentioned 
in the speech from the throne in 1962. At that 
time its purpose was to: 
provide the job opportunities that will 
be required in Ontario in the coming years 
for a growing labour force and, at the same 
time, increase our incomes and living 
standards. 
(Ontario Legislative, 1962, 
p.4) 
Thus on December 19, 1962 The Economic 
Development Loans Guarantee Act, 1962-63 was given 
assent. No mention of "regional" economic 
development was made. Under the authority of the 
Act the Ontario Development Agency was to operate 
as a branch of the Department of Economics and 
Development. It guaranteed bank loans to existing 
firms which were running into difficulty and later 
took on the role of a business management 
consultant. The two services were directed 
primarily at small and medium sized businesses. 
By 1965 it had worked with more than 3000 
companies ("Two Simple ..., 1965, p.5). 
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Williams (1971, p.72) describes the 
problems of the ODA's first actions -- the ones 
which caused the ODA to withdraw from the public 
eye. The first company which the Agency helped 
was the H.J. Fairfield Company of Owen Sound. 
This sock and yarn manufacturer was originally set 
up in Preston in 1959 and had gone bankrupt. With 
the help of the Jamaica Industrial Development 
Corporation it re-established in that country but 
again went bankrupt. It returned to Canada 
settling in Owen Sound only to go bankrupt a third 
time, this time to be bailed out by the ODA. It 
had supported by ODA funds until September 23, 
1963 -- just two days after a provincial election. 
Fairchild's losses during the period of assistance 
were over $100,000. 
Williams (1971) also outlines the 
geographic distribution of ODA funds. By May 1966 
almost $4 1/2 million had been loaned. Only 15% 
of this was used in eastern Ontario. On the other 
hand, over 45% was employed within a 50 mile 
radius of Toronto. 
In the section dealing with the 'Design for 
222 
Development' concept mention was made of the 1965 
turning point in regional development attitudes in 
Ontario. Apparently, this also had an influence 
on the ODA for by then it had come to be described 
as a tool for "regional" economic development: 
We have been carefully studying the ways 
and means by which the programme of the 
Ontario Development Agency may be expanded 
and sharpened into a more comprehensive 
tool for regional development. 
(Ontario Legislative, 1965, 
p.2309) 
b) With Modifications: ODC 
On the same day that the Design for 
Development programme was announced so was a bill 
concerning the ODA. This bill was to "do much to 
increase ODA's effectiveness in the regional 
context" (Robarts, 1966, p.2257). This bill would 
create a new crown corporation which would assume 
and extend the duties of the ODA. This new body 
was the Ontario Development Corporation. It would 
have the power to lend funds not only to existing 
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companies but also to new firms. This development 
support was to be directed towards small and 
medium-sized firms. Service activities and tourist 
operations were now also eligible for assistance. 
The government money could be applied to 
buildings, both new or expanded, as well as to the 
purchase of new equipment. The loaning of funds 
was seen as being justified because of the tight 
money situation in 1966. By creating a more even 
distribution of the availability of capital in the 
province it was hoped that eastern and northern 
development would be encouraged. Assent was given 
to The Ontario Development Corporation Act, 1966 
on May 18, 1966. It is interesting to note that 
this potentially powerful tool for regional 
economic development has remained in the control 
of the Ministry of Industry and Tourism. The 
Design for Development program, responsible for 
the comprehensive planning and development of the 
province, is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Treasury, Economics and 
Intergovernmental Affairs. There thus exists the 
situation where the ODC, a primary influence on 
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regional industrial development, is operately 
seperately from the province's 'comprehensive' 
Design for Development program. 
In late 1967 the ODC announced the 
Equalization of Industrial Opportunities program. 
Its objectives were: 
to equalize industrial growth 
opportunities in the lesser developed 
areas of Ontario 
to expand industry and employment 
particularly in areas of slow growth 
to encourage the decentralization of 
industry 
- to provide jobs for young people in small 
centres 
- to help Ontario's exports and import 
replacement program 
to establish a wider base for industrial 
assessment in smaller municipalities 
(ODC, 1968, p.6) 
The program designated a number of 
municipalities throughout Ontario which appeared 
to be less well developed than the main industrial 
regions. Firms setting up or expanding in these 
areas would be eligible for forgivable loans under 
the EIO program. The 'loan' would be interest -
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free for the first six years of the companies 
production. If at the end of that time the 
company is still functioning satisfactoraly, the 
full amount of the loan would have been forgiven. 
Thus, in effect, the ODC was employing a grant 
system similar to that of the federal government. 
Notably, companies receiving funds from the ADIA 
program were not eligible for EIO loans. By 
providing this forgivable loan incentive to 
depressed areas Ontario was now in the business of 
regional economic development. By the end of 1968 
some 95 companies had received over $15 million. 
The geographic breakdown was as follows: 
Region # of Loans Amount 
Southern Ontario 45 $6,200,000 
Eastern Ontario 39 $7,300,000 
Northern Ontario 11 $1,700,000 
(ODC, 1968, p.3) 
To try to encourage development in northern 
and eastern regions of Onatrio loans to a maximum 
of $500,000 were available while firms in southern 
Ontario were eligible for only one half that 
amount. 
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In 1970 the Northern Ontario Development 
Corporation (NODC) was founded to function in 
Northern Ontario in the same way the ODC operated 
in the remainder of the province. The ODC would 
remain the parent organization. Another change in 
the laws regarding these corporations in 1973 
created a third body -- the Eastern Ontario 
Development Corparation (EODC). The aims of this 
body parallelled those of its predecessors. Again 
it was to supply capital to manufacturing and 
tourist operations having difficulty acquiring 
funds from other sources. The maximum loan for any 
eligible company would be 90%, 75% and 50% of 
costs in northern, eastern and southern Ontario 
respectively to a limit of $500,000. (Ontario, 
1974, p.42). 
One can speculate on a number of reasons 
why these 'branch' corporations were created. 
They may have been an expression of true concern 
by the Government of Ontario for regional 
development. Both eastern and northern areas of 
the province present special problems and 
therefore require special attention. 
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They could also be interpreted as a popular 
political move. The residents of the affected 
areas must perceive the provincial government as 
putting forward a special effort to aid their 
economic development. 
The creation of NODC and EODC could be seen 
as a move towards more efficient administration. 
As such it could perhaps be compared to the 
decentralization of DREE as an effort to obtain 
more regional input. 
c) Its Problems 
By 1970 the program appeared to be 
successful. On page 03 of the April 25,1970 
Financial Post an article applauded the efforts of 
the EIO. The program seemed to have created more 
jobs and more investment than had been 
anticipated. However, there had also been 
criticisms. Greer (1969, p.17) in a brief article 
exemplified what appeared to be some of the not so 
deserving recipients of forgivable loans. On the 
top of the list were some American-owned, 
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multi-million dollar profiting firms which had 
received $500,000 from the Ontario government. 
The throne speech of 1971 indicated a change in 
the government's policy suggesting that Canadian 
firms would be given preference for the loans and 
grants (Financial Post, April 24, 1971, p.8). 
Other criticisms also appeared. John 
Calvert (1971) provides several good arguments in 
this respect. First, he cites that 200 of the 271 
loans made by the ODC by February of 1971 had gone 
to companies in Conservarive constituencies. He 
also emphasized the "Americanization of the 
Canadian economy" aspect of the problem (Calvert, 
1971, p.25). A third argument presents the lack 
of a cost-benefit analysis or even a follow up of 
the loan recipient's books to assess its success. 
(i) A Lack of Federal Co-ordination 
Calvert also makes a strong argument 
emphasizing the lack of co-operation which existed 
at that time between the federal and provincial 
governments. The Ontario government did not seem 
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to be aware of which companies were receiving 
federal grants. Also mentioned was the fact that 
Ontario was competing for industry not only 
against federal programs but also against other 
poorer provinces. With respect to federal 
policies Stanley Randall (Minister of Industry) is 
noted to have said: 
Now my responsibility is to bring 
industry into Ontario. I do not give a 
damn what happens in the rest of Canada ... 
(Ontario Legislative, 1969, 
p.9605) 
Even co-operation within the Ontario 
government was lacking. In designating eligible 
municipalities the ODC's EIO program ignored the 
growth centre approach advocated by Design for 
Development. Calvert (1971, p.25) also 
illustrates a case where the ODC took action 
contrary to the plans of a Regional Development 
Council. 
The EIO program terminated June 30, 1973 to 
be replaced by the Ontario Business Incentive 
Program. The loans were no longer forgivable but 
rather they became long term and often interest -
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free for five years. In order to re-emphasize the 
need for development in the less economically 
healthy areas of the province, relatively larger 
loans were made available to them. In northern 
Ontario up to 90% of approved costs could be 
received in the form of a provincial government 
loan to a maximum of $1 million. Up to 75% and $1 
million are the figures applicable to eastern 
Ontario. These apply to both new and expanding 
businesses. New projects in the remainder of the 
province are eligible for loans up to 50% of 
approved costs to a total of $1/2 million. 
Lacroix (1976) criticizes the ODC for its 
"lack of cleary defined economic strategies" 
(Lacroix, 1976, p.70), a comment which has also 
been directed against the federal RDIA program. 
He also suggests (p.67) that the NODC in 
particular should become more aggressive in its 
investments rather than wait for applications. 
Rohmer (1976) agrees. The corporation should 
actively seek out investment opportunities. He 
also cites the "need for longer range policies and 
the integration of all bodies involved in the 
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promotion of economic development" (Rohmer, 1976, 
p.90). In a more realistic vein, he suggests that 
the corporations should be given increased power. 
Particularly, they should be able to "launch out 
into many more fields in concert with other 
agencies" (Rohmer, 1976, p. 90). 
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VI. RDIV vs. ODC: ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL 
CONFLICT 
In this section a brief comparative 
analysis will be made of the regional industrial 
development programs of the two senior 
governments. This will be done to determine the 
degree to which the independent programs involved 
work in harmony. Data for each was obtained for 
the seven fiscal years 1970-71, to 1976-77. The 
data for these years was then disaggregated by 
counties and districts (geographically), by 
economic sector and by urban centres. This 
disaggregation made manipulation for the purpose 
of analysis possible. 
After a short perusal of the figures 
mentioned above, the observer can derive general 
impression of the pattern of the geographic 
distribution of funds. Throughout the time period 
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involved both the federal and Ontario governments 
have operated their respective programs in the 
northern portion of the province. The Ontario 
government has also been active in southeast 
Ontario while its federal counterpart was involved 
for only a limited period and in a limited segment 
of this region. The federal government did not 
enter south central or southwestern Ontario during 
the period involved. On the other hand the 
provincial government has been more active in this 
region than in any other. Thus one sees the 
following picture: the Ontario government 
promoting activity throughout the province with 
the federal government very active in the north 
and to a lesser degree in the southeast. This 
pattern can be seen in Map 1. 
From these general observations it would 
seem reasonable to approach a closer look at the 
distribution of government's development incentive 
funding using the three basic regions identified -
northern Ontario, southeastern Ontario and the 
southwestern/south central region of Ontario. 
These parallel the areas which fall within the 
jurisdiction of the provincial Development 
Corporations - the Northern Ontario, Eastern 
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MAP 1 
AREAS OF FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS REGIONAL 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS; 1970-77 
g £ ] Regional Development Incentives 
Act (Federal Government) 
Ontario Development Corporation 
J (Provincial Government) 
Ontario and Ontario Development Corporations. 
These regions are identified in Map 2. 
Southwestern and South-central Ontario 
In a search for direct evidence indicating 
intergovernmental policy or program conflicts one 
naturally expects to find the actions of one 
government negating those of the other. However, 
in the case of southwestern/south central Ontario 
this is not so. The type of conflict illustrated 
in this particular region consists of action taken 
on behalf of one government with the other 
choosing to remain totally passive. As such it is 
a more subtle form of intergovernmental 
conflicting priorities. 
For this region, then, it is not possible 
to directly compare the actions of the two 
governments. It must suffice, therefore, to 
examine briefly the distribution of the funds by 
the provincial Ontario Development Corporation in 
this area. It may be worthwhile at first to 
present a statistic employed in the previous 
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section which relates to an earlier time period. 
It expresses the concentration of funds loaned 
within a 50 mile radius of Toronto. Figure 1 
indicates that during the seven fiscal year period 
from 1970-71 to 1976-77 the ODC injected about 50% 
of the regions funding into the Toronto area. The 
corresponding figures for the individual years are 
rather inconsistant ranging from a low of 16% to a 
high of 63%. Williams (1971) pointed out that by 
May 1966 about 45% of all ODA funds had been 
dispersed within the same area. 
A pattern becomes obvious. Millions of 
provincial dollars continue to be poured into what 
is commonly seen as the most developed area not 
only of the province but of the country as a 
whole. It is a situation of subsidized 
development within the 'Golden Horseshoe'. This 
would appear to contradict the general principles 
of the Design for Development concept where 
development was to be encouraged in depressed 
regions and controlled in the heavily urbanized 
areas. The federal government takes a similar 
approach by aiding only those regions showing 
greatest need. The federal government has thereby 
avoided involvement in southern Ontario during the 
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Figure 1 
ODC Loan Concentration within 
Toronto Vicinity 
Fiscal Year Total Funds % within 50 mile 
Loaned Radius of Toronto 
($000) 
70-71 
71-72 
72-73 
73-74 
74-75 
75-76 
76-77 
TOTAL 70-77 
4,452.7 
10,825.9 
22,835.9 
32,257.5 
43,058.6 
10842.3 
17,866.3 
142,139.1 
16.0 
42.0 
62.9 
54.6 
48.3 
48.1 
45.4 
50.6 
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study period. In contrast to the provincial 
government it has managed to basically set a 
policy to which it has adhered. 
To substantiate further the point that 
Ontario continues to help the most developed 
regions of the province two more statisics were 
employed. In both cases a particular measurement 
of development was correlated with the geographic 
distribution of ODC funds in south central and 
southwestern Ontario. In one case, the population 
of the urban centres was correlated with the 
dollar value of loans going to firms receiving ODC 
funds. In the second case a similar operation was 
undertaken this time correlating ODC loans with 
the manufacturing employment density of the 26 
counties of this study area. A density measure was 
used to overcome variations in the areas of the 
counties involved. 
The values appearing in Figure 2 show that 
for the entire study period there was a 
significant relationship between the dollars 
invested and the size of the urban place in which 
they were invested. Thus, the larger the urban 
centre the greater the investment made for 
industrialization by the Ontario Development 
Corporation. 
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Figure 2 
Dollar Value of ODC Loans Correlated 
with Population of Urban Places in 
which Firms Received Funds 
Fiscal 
70-71 
71-72 
72-73 
73-74 
74-75 
75-76 
76-77 
Total 
Year 
70-•77 
r-value 
.18 ** 
.72 ** 
.97 ** 
.98 ** 
.93 ** 
.55 ** 
.31 ** 
.89 ** 
** - r-value statistically significant at both 
.05 and .01 level of confidence 
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The second statistic generated confirms 
these observations. Figure 3 shows how the 
distribution of ODC funds relates to the 
distribution of industrial activity as measured by 
the manufacturing densities of the counties of the 
regions. For six years of the seven year study 
period there was a significant positive 
relationship between the amount of funds allocated 
to any given county and the degree of development 
already present in that county. This correlation 
was also relevant to the study period as a whole. 
Therefore, in south central and southwestern 
Ontario the nature of the development investment 
activities of the provincial government seem to be 
one of reinforcing the existing pattern of 
industrialization. This would imply an acceptance 
of growth centre theory on the part of Ontario. 
They must be relying in part on 'spread' effects 
to achieve their goal of equal economic 
opportunities across the province. 
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Figure 3 
Dollar Value of ODC Loans Correlated 
with Manufactucring Employment Density 
of Counties in which Firms Received Funds 
Fiscal 
70-71 
71-72 
72-73 
73-74 
74-75 
75-76 
76-77 
Total 
. Year 
70--77 
r-value 
.04 
.66 ** 
.85 ** 
.76 ** 
,85 ** 
.83 ** 
.82 ** 
.87 ** 
** - r-value statistically significant at both 
.05 and .01 level of confidence 
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South Eastern Ontario 
Southeastern Ontario refers to the portion 
of the province over which the Eastern Ontario 
Development Corporation has jurisdiction. The 
pattern of governments' industrial development 
activity here parallels quite closely the pattern 
displayed in the southwestern and south central 
region. This has resulted from the far greater 
provincial interest in the area relative to that 
of the federal government. In Map 3 the general 
distribution of funds from two sources is 
presented. One can see that, except in the case of 
Renfrew county, federal participation in regional 
industrial development under the RDIA scheme has 
been of both a minor and transitory nature. 
Renfrew is the exception because of its northerly 
position in the region. 
The county of Hastings received only one 
federal grant which was in the first year of the 
study period. The three most easterly counties 
received federal development funds but only in the 
early years of the study period. On the other 
hand there was provincial participation in all the 
counties of the region throughout the study 
period. Most of the southeastern counties have 
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MAP 3 
GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EODC AND RDIA FUNDS 
1970 to 1977 
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been excluded from RDIA financial assistance. 
This is due, in part, to the fact that DREE 
designates certain specific areas which qualify 
for RDIA assistance. According to the criteria 
employed only a portion of southeastern Ontario 
qualified for such aid and only for a limited 
period of time. This designation criterion seems 
to be one of the major differences between the 
federal and provincial programs. The federal 
government must have perceived southeastern 
Ontario as a region which could achieve an 
appropriate level of development through free 
market forces. On the other hand, lacking a 
similar type of designation criterion, the 
provincial government perceives the whole province 
as requiring industrial development assistance. 
Once again there are apparent conflicts in terms 
of the priorities of the two governments. 
Some statistical comparisons have also been 
drawn to determine differences in policies and 
priorities of the two governments in this region. 
From Figure 4 one notes that for the most part 
provincial industrial development money provided 
by the Eastern Ontario Development Corporation was 
highly correlated with the population of the urban 
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Figure 4 
Dollar Value of EODC Loans Correlated 
with Population of Urban Places in 
which Firms Received Funds 
Fiscal Year r-value 
70-71 .20 
71-72 .35 ** 
72-73 .46 ** 
73-74 .86 ** 
74-75 .67 ** 
75-76 .26 * 
76-77 .39 ** 
total 70-77 .73 ** 
* - statistically significant at .05 level 
of confidence 
** - statistically significant at .01 level 
of confidence 
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places in southeastern Ontario. This parallels 
the pattern observed in south central and 
southwestern Ontario craeted by the Ontario 
Development Corporation. Again the provincial 
government is reinforcing the present pattern of 
industrial development. 
Figure 5 indicates that for the study 
period as a whole the federal government created a 
similar pattern of investments in the region. 
There is a high correlation between dollars 
invested by DREE and the population of the urban 
centres in which those funds were invested. On an 
annual basis a different pattern appears for the 
federal government in Figure 5. This wide 
variation in coefficients was brought on by the 
seemingly haphazard pattern of RDIA investment 
both chronolgically and geographically. 
Because of the great differences in the 
degree of activity between the two levels of 
government a comparative analysis of the economic 
sectors receiving funds would be of little value. 
However, in the singular case of the county of 
Renfrew the two governments were about equally 
active. The provincial government loaned 
$7,691,859 while the federal government granted 
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Figure 5 
Dollar Value of RDIA Grants Correlated 
with Population of Urban Places in which 
Firms Received Funds — Southeastern Ontario 
Fiscal Year r-value 
70-71 .11 
71-72 .88 ** 
72-73 .92 ** 
73-74 .29 
74-75 .04 
75-76 .13 
76-77 .06 
Total 70-77 .77 ** 
* - statistically significant at .05 level 
of confidence 
** - statistically significant at .01 level 
of confidence 
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$8,723,275 over the same 1970-77 period. These 
amounts were disaggregated according to a 22 
sector economic classification. The results of 
this can be seen in Figure 6. A list of the 22 
economic sectors appears in Appendix 1. In Figure 
6 the dollar values have been converted into per 
cent values to allow for easier comparison. When 
these figures were correlated a coefficient of 
.322 was computed but found to be statistically 
insignificant at both the .05 and .01 levels of 
confidence. There was, therefore, a significant 
difference in the economic sectors which the two 
governments were promoting in this region. 
Particularly notable with respect to the 
latter notion is the heavy emphasis on the tourist 
industry (23) in Renfrew by the provincial 
government. The federal government on the other 
hand confined themselves to helping manufacturing 
industries, especially the primary metal industry 
(12). Closely related to this would be the 
provincial government's stress placed on the metal 
fabricating industry (13). However, one also 
notes similar priorities of the two governments in 
their aid to the wood industries (8) of Renfrew 
county. 
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Figure 6 
Recipients of EODC and RDIA Funds by 
Sector in Renfrew County 
EODC RDIA 
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414,000 
675,000 
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156,091 
36,875 
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7.0 
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.0 
.3 
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.0 
4.3 
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.6 
1.3 
33.1 
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10.6 
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1.6 
.8 
.0 
.8 
.0 
.0 
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$ 
101,024 
21969 
192,604 
174,013 
371,595 
2,156,106 
586,184 
51066 
113,100 
2,885,512 
133,412 
924,350 
522,027 
136,600 
67750 
72,540 
8,723,275 
r = .322 n = 27 
r-value not significant at .05 or .01 
level of confidence 
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One can thus see important differences in 
the approaches of the two governments in this 
area. The Ontario government was quite active 
while the federal government was relatively 
passive. They obviously look at this area from 
different perspectives and naturally have 
different priorities. The latter point is 
confirmed by the analysis of the governments' 
respective sectoral support. There appears to be 
little correspondence in the sectors which the two 
governments were promoting. 
Northern Ontario 
The region referred to as northern Ontario 
includes the counties/districts of Parry Sound, 
Nipissing, Sudbury, Manitoulin, Timiskiming, 
Cochrane, Algoma, Thunder Bay, Rainy River and 
Kenora. It is also the area over which the 
Northern Ontario Development Corporation (NODC) 
has jurisdiction. It is an area of considerable 
relevance to this thesis because of the comparably 
high levels of industrial development activity 
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carried on by both the federal and provincial 
governments. 
The geographic and temporal distribution of 
these funds can be seen in Map 4. Perhaps the 
most striking characteristic of this map is the 
lack of consistency in the actions of the two 
governments over both space and time. Neither 
level of government provides the same level of aid 
in any one district over the period involved. For 
example, RDIA (federal) grants in Algoma ranged 
from a high of over $12 million in 1972-73 to a 
low of just over $62,000 in 1975-76. 
In a similar fashion NODC loans in Kenora 
ranged from over $7,000,000 in 1973-74 to less 
than $300,000 in 1971-1972. There seems to be no 
paralleled action between the two levels of 
government. Such variations in the activities of 
each program are due in part to a reliance on the 
private sector for the initiation of development 
action. Under both programs firms from the private 
sector must approach the government to apply for 
funding. Thus, fluctuations in economic 
conditions and the attitudes of entrepreneurs may 
influence both the temporal and geographic 
distribution pattern of funds. 
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GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF NODC AND RDIA FUNDS 
1970 to 1977 
$8 million 
$6 million 
JMw] M f i n r (Northern Ontario Development 
kg&j IMUUL Corporation) 
; RDIA 
poration) 
(Regional Development Incentive 
Act) 
I34567 
Represented 
In terms of the spatial distribution of 
incentive funding no true pattern seems to emerge. 
This may result from the variations in the sub 
regional priorities of the federal and provincial 
governments. Federal action through RDIA is 
somewhat limited in the west (Rainy River, Kenora) 
and the southeast portion (Manitoulin Island, 
Parry Sound) of the region. Greatest emphasis has 
been placed on the eastern and central areas. 
However, more than a visual impression is 
necessary. One must consider the varying sizes of 
of the districts. A certain amount of funding 
spread over a large district should be viewed 
differently than that same amount of money 
injected into a small district. It is therefore 
wise to consider the use of a density figure 
representing funding dollars per square mile. In 
Figure 7 the districts have been ranked according 
to their 'development incentive funding density'. 
One notes that three of the four districts cited 
above as having received proportionally less 
funding than the others appear at the bottom of 
the RDIA list. 
A different pattern was produced when a 
similar ranking operation was undertaken with the 
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Figure 7 
Districts of Northern Ontario Ranked 
According to Development Incentive 
Density ($/sq. mi.) 
Nipissing 
Algoma 
Parry Sound 
Timiskaming 
Cochrane 
Sudbury 
Thunder Bay 
Rainy River 
Manitoulin 
Kenora 
RDIA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
NOi 
2 
8 
1 
6 
9 
7 
5 
4 
3 
10 
256 
NODC data. The results of this also appear in 
Figure 7. A comparison of the two lists reveals a 
number of discrepancies. Algoma, Rainy River and 
Manitoulin are probably the most obvious. 
Variations in the regional priorities of the two 
governments becomes apparent. 
Another aspect of spatial distribution 
which must be considered relates to the urban 
orientation of the two programs. One notes from 
Figures 8 and 9 that both programs have a 
statistically significant urban orientation. The 
statistically significant positive correlation 
coefficient indicates that there was a 
relationship between the dollars invested and the 
population of the urban centre in which they were 
invested. In the case of Ontario particularly an 
almost perfect correlation exists between urban 
population and NODC loans for the study period as 
a whole. Looked at individually, one observes 
significant r-values for 6 of the 7 years in the 
case of Ontario but for only 4 of the 7 years for 
the federal government. A greater and more 
consistent urban emphasis on the part of the 
Ontario government thus appears. 
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Figure 8 
Dollar Value of NODC Loans Correlated 
with Population of Urban Places in 
which Firms Received Funds 
Fiscal Year 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
Total 70--77 
r-value 
.166 
.617 ** 
.741 ** 
.637 ** 
.750 ** 
.707 ** 
.843 ** 
.935 ** 
* - statistically significant at .05 
level of confidence 
** - statistically significant at .01 
level of confidence 
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Figure 9 
Dollar Value of RDIA Grants Correlated 
with Population of Urban Places in which 
Firms Received Funds — Northern Ontario 
Fiscal Year 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
Total 70--77 
r-value 
n/a 
.187 
.456 ** 
.111 
.703 ** 
.785 ** 
.594 ** 
.613 ** 
* - statistically significant at .05 
level of confidence 
** - statistically significant at .01 
level of confidence 
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In addition to the varying spatial patterns 
in the distribution of industrial development 
funds, the sectoral distribution of these funds 
should also be examined. Such an analysis has 
been completed for both the individual districts 
and for northern Ontario as a whole. As in the 
previous section dealing with southeastern Ontario 
the economy was divided into 22 relevant sectors. 
This list was drawn up from the 20 basic S.I.C. 
categories with the addition of service industries 
and tourism. Such a list covers all the 
development activities of the two programs 
involved. This numbered list appears in Appendix 
1. 
When disaggregated on a sectoral basis the 
financial incentives from the two governmental 
sources were compared. The results of the 
comparison on a district basis appear in Figures 
12 through 21. These are contained in Appendix 2. 
In Figure 10 the results of a similar test for 
northern Ontario as a whole appear. A summary 
table of the results of all these comparisons is 
presented in Figure 11. From this last 
illustration, one can see that the two governments 
have some very obvious differences in their 
260 
Figure 10: 
Sectoral Distribution of RDTA and NODC Funds 
in Northern Ontario, 1970-71 to 1976-77 
SIC Code $N0DC Funds Per 
Cent 
$RDIA Funds Per 
Cent 
-
100,000 
-
.0,931,660 
2,694,300 
99,000 
-
.15 
-
16.19 
3.99 
.15 
22,000 
891,690 
1,215,038 
13,509,720 
1,216,507 
1,166,495 
1.17 
1 Food and Beverage 1,540,508 2.28 
2 Tobacco Products 
3 Rubber and Plastic 1,078,383 1.60 
Products 
4 Leather Industries 
5 Textile Industries 
6 Knitting Mills 
7 Clothing Industries 
8 Wood Industries 
9 Furniture and Fixtures 
10 Paper and Allied 
Industries 
11 P r in t ing , Publishing 789,814 
and Allied Industries 
12 Primary Metal Industries 
13 Metal Fabricating 
Industries 
14 Machinery Industries 
15 Transportation Equipment 
16 Electrical Products 
17 Non-Metalic Mineral 
Products 
18 Petroleum and Coal -
Products 
19 Chemical P roduc t s 412,392 .61 
20 Misce l laneous 858,387 1.27 
Manufactur i ng 
21 Service Industries 5,619,013 8.32 
22 Tourism 29,305,321 4 3.40 
787,406 
628,300 
272,56S 
1,600,119 
6,803,312 
1,089,945 
2,547,322 
1,010,875 
2,236,189 
2.37 
10.07 
1.61 
3.77 
1.50 
3.31 
14,124,324 
9,439,676 
1,832,953 
1,107,333 
281,363 
1,649,936 
2,835,733 
97,002. 
120,666 
333,500 
1.56 
1.24 
.04 
1.76 
2.40 
26.72 
2.41 
2.31 
.54 
27.94 
18.67 
3.63 
2.19 
.56 
3.26 
5.61 
.19 
.24 
.66 
Total 67,529,321 -100 50,561,16L =100 
Source: Calculated from the following: Department of Regional Economic Expansion, 
Reports on Regional Development Incentives, 1970-1977. Ottawa. And Ontario 
'Development Corporation, The Development Corporations Sciicduie ol" Eoans and Guarantees 
Approved, 1970-1977. Toronto. 
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Figure 11 
Sectoral Comparison of Funding 
Supplied by NODC and RDIA 
Timiskaming 
Nipissing 
Sudbury 
Cochrane 
Thunder Bay 
Algoma 
Parry Sound 
Kenora 
Manitoulin 
Rainy River 
.851 ** 
.412 * 
.290 
.242 
.072 
.071 
.063 
.041 
n/a 
n/a 
N. Ontario .216 
* - statistical significance at .05 level 
of confidence 
** - statistical significance at .01 level 
of confidence 
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sectoral priorities for regional development. 
Only Nipissing and Timiskaming had statistically 
significant correlations in this respect. This 
indicates that in these districts the provincial 
and federal governments had similar patterns of 
investment in sectoral terms. Insignificant 
coefficients indicate no similarity in the 
sectoral pattern of incentive investment. For 
both Manitoulin and Rainy River the data was such 
that the r-values could not be calculated. The 
overall picture of Northern Ontario with a 
correlation coefficient of .216 (Fig. 21) 
demonstrates no overall similarity in the sectoral 
priorities of the governments of Ontario and 
Canada. 
Closer examination of the sectoral 
distribution of funds in northern Ontario as a 
whole reveal some interesting findings. Most 
notable in this respect is the provincial emphasis 
on tourism (23). Over 40% of its development 
funds found their way into this sector. For the 
federal government the comparable figure was less 
than 1%. For the service sector (21) a similar 
although less severe difference between the two 
governments is noted. The primary metal industry 
263 
sector (12) provides another contrast in 
government priorities. This time the stronger 
emphasis is on behalf of the federal government. 
This particular contrast can be explained in part 
by a $12 million RDIA grant to Algoma Steel in the 
1972-73 fiscal year. If this disproportionate sum 
were to be removed from the data the figures for 
the two governments would have been more closely 
alligned. 
There were two notable cases where sectoral 
emphases were quite similar. One case was the 
wood industries (8) and the other was the metal 
fabricating industries (13). In both situations, 
however, the federal government supplied both a 
larger absolute amount of capital and a larger 
portion of its total outlay. To the wood 
industries the RDIA program supplied $13.5 million 
or about 27% of its spending compared to $10.9 
million or 16% of NODC funds. For the metal 
fabricating industries in northern Ontario similar 
figures of $9.4 million or 19% of RDIA funds and 
$6.8 million or 10% of provincial funds are 
observed. 
Thus even in Northern Ontario where both 
levels of government operate active industrial 
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development schemes there are still differences in 
priorities. The two governments also concentrate 
their energies on different portions of the 
region. Even within the same district there tends 
to be little correspondence between the areas of 
the economy they try to promote. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The future of Canada as a federal nation is 
a topic of concern to many Canadians at the 
present time. This interest has created an 
increased awareness of some of the problems 
inherent in all federal states. This thesis is 
both timely and relevant in that it examines one 
aspect of the many facets of the federal system. 
Regional development and the bi-level government 
concern for it are no different than any other 
aspect of the dilemma. The roles which both the 
federal and provincial governments assume must be 
understood. Each has an impact on the overall 
process of governing Canada. Their roles are all 
interconnected and face similar problems. In this 
light, the study of the politically important 
topic of regional development has proven to be of 
value. 
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Admittedly no system of government nor any 
form of federalism will be without administrative 
problems. Yet the fact that so much effort has 
been devoted to the study of co-operative 
federalism is indicative of the number of problems 
which have been observed in the older dualistic 
form of federalism. The realistic ideas of 
reducing waste and duplication through 
co-operative federalism run into opposition from 
politicians unwilling to see their present powers 
reduced. Such obstacles must be overcome if 
government is to keep in tune with the new 
economic reality which both Canada and the world 
now face. It is obvious that pressures for change 
within the Canadian political system are now being 
felt. 
Only through intergovernmental co-operation 
will the goal of economic efficiency be realized 
Under such conditions even social goals could be 
reached. and waste and duplication minimized. 
Canada's geography obviously demands some form of 
federal government. Canada must consider the 
economically practical aspects of co-operative 
federalism. 
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In the field of regional development it is 
apparent that some attitudes are changing. The 
agreements made under the early programs such as 
ARDA and ADB made it clear that intergovernmental 
co-operation had a great deal of potential. The 
GDA's have confirmed this point and expanded upon 
it. They represent a plateau reached in the climb 
towards greater federal - provincial co-operation 
in the area of regional economic development. 
Contrasting with the GDA's are the 
unilateral programs which have existed and 
continue to exist. Both levels of government have 
expressed their realization that their programs 
are inevitably influenced by actions at the other 
level. Yet each continues to operate within its 
own sphere. The discussion of the RDIA and ODC 
and their forerunners have made this clear. There 
is obviously room for greater co-operation and a 
potential for success in such interactions. 
Whether for reasons of political credit or 
political power, each level runs its program 
almost as if the other did not exist. 
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The statistical portion of the thesis 
illustrates some of the above points. Although 
they are working on problems within Ontario, the 
federal and provincial governments take different 
approaches and set different priorities. The 
government of Ontario planning the province's 
development through the Design for Development 
program of TEIGA also operates the ODC as a strong 
fiscal tool but under the Ministry of Industry and 
Tourism. The loaning policy of the ODC is such 
that it should favour development in the northern 
and eastern regions of the province and yet it 
continues to pour funds into the prosperous 
southern portion of Ontario. On the other hand, 
concerned only with regional development, DREE, 
through the RDIA program, has been involved with 
only northern Ontario and, for a brief period, 
eastern Ontario. There is, therefore, an apparent 
difference in the 'regional' orientation of the 
two governments' development programs. Yet even 
where, as in northern Ontario, both governments 
are active, differences do appear. There seems to 
be no common strategy or goals for developing that 
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portion of the province. As the programs 
presently operate, the two governments attempt to 
develop different sectors of the economy in most 
districts in that region and for the region as a 
whole. 
It is difficult to make a judgement as to 
whether or not either level of government is 
taking the proper approach. It is also difficult 
to determine whether or not having the two 
approaches operating together are beneficial or 
wasteful. The fact that both governments are 
actively promoting development in northern Ontario 
indicates their awareness of the problem. 
However, their varied approaches to solving it 
show that each perceives the problem and/or 
solution differently. The question which must be 
asked is this: Are two sets of administration 
(supported by public taxes) operating two seperate 
programs really necessary? From the point of view 
of the taxpayer this duplication is probably 
unnecessary. However, for politicians who are 
aware of the potential political credit involved 
with such activities and who wish their powers to 
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remain steadfast, the answer is probably no. They 
might suggest that it is necessary for each level 
of government to set its own priorities from its 
own perspective. At some point in time a 
trade-off will have to be made between the high 
costs of duplicated administrations and political 
vanity. 
It is obvious that a problem does exist in 
this area. There is an evident lack of leadership 
or guidelines to be followed. The federal 
government should be assuming the role of 
initiator of regional economic development 
planning. It should set forth a general yet clear 
policy or plan for Canadian development. The 
federal government would then act within the 
context of this plan with each of its programs 
contributing to some aspect of the plan. 
Such an overall plan would also provide a 
framework within which the individual provinces 
could formulate specific strategies for action. 
Provincial regional development actions would 
thereby complement federal policy. Provincial 
priorities would reflect national priorities. 
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However, the provinces would not be bound by such 
priorities. Allowances must be made for the 
unique devslopment requirements of the individual 
provinces. Therefore, the provinces must be 
permitted to implement fiscal policies which, 
although they may not follow, must not conflict 
with national objectives. 
This arrangement would provide a 
comprehensive system of development. There would 
be a hierarchical division of responsibilities 
while at the same time a similar set of objectives 
would be shared. The result would be a 
rationalized and co-ordinated attack on regional 
development disparities. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Economic Classifications 
1. Food and Beverages 
2. Tobacco Products 
3. Rubber and Plastic Products 
4. Leather Industries 
5. Textile Industries 
6. Knitting Mills 
7. Clothing Industries 
8. Wood Inustries 
9. Furniture and Fixtures 
10. Paper and Allied Industries 
11. Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 
12. Primary Metal Industries 
13. Metal Fabricating Industries 
14. Machinery Industries 
15. Transportation Equipment 
16. Electrical Products, Electronics 
17. Non - Metallic Mineral Industries 
18. Petroleum and Coal Products 
19. Chemical Products 
20. Misc. Manufacturing 
21. Service Industries 
22. Tourism 
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Figure 12 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Cochrane 
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r-value not significant at .05 or .01 
level of confidence 
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Figure 13 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Parry Sound 
NODC 
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Figure 14 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Timiskaming 
NODC 
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Figure 15 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Rainy River 
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Insufficiient data to calculate r-value 
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Figure 16 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Manitoulin 
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Figure 17 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Sudbury 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
TOTAL 
% 
8.42 
.0 
.65 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
13.77 
.63 
.0 
2.96 
36.93 
9.98 
.0 
7.06 
1.04 
.74 
.0 
1.57 
.72 
.0 
9.61 
100.0 
RDIA 
$ 
292,214 
227,215 
477,939 
22,000 
102,818 
1,281,201 
346,276 
245,078 
36,220 
25,672 
54,628 
24,857 
333,500 
3,469,618 
r = .290 n = 22 
r-value not significant at .05 or .01 
level of confidence 
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Figure 18 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Nipissing 
NODC 
$ 
275,300 
914,728 
1,257,420 
1,263,000 
99,000 
68,207 
965,500 
328,000 
52,000 
880,105 
6,208,340 
% 
4.43 
.0 
14.73 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
20.25 
20.34 
1.59 
.0 
1.10 
15.55 
.0 
5.28 
.0 
.84 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
14.18 
100.0 
r = . 
sector 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
TOTAL 
412* 
% 
2.60 
.0 
5.33 
.0 
12.41 
.0 
15.81 
25.35 
10.52 
.23 
.0 
.14 
4.20 
19.93 
4.01 
2.21 
2.23 
.0 
7.24 
.0 
1.68 
.0 
100.0 
n = 22 
RDIA 
$ 
186,816 
382,800 
891,690 
1,136,400 
1,821,977 
756,211 
16,500 
10,000 
301,626 
1,432,800 
288,078 
158,822 
160,250 
520,350 
120,666 
7,187,937 
r-value is significant at .05 
level of confidence 
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Figure 19 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the District of Algoma 
NODC 
$ 
400,000 
540,529 
1,244,555 
948,368 
73,000 
281,600 
2,006,500 
3,408,830 
8,903,482 
% 
4.49 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
6.07 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
13.98 
.0 
10.65 
.0 
.82 
.0 
.0 
3.16 
22.54 
38.29 
100.0 
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TOTAL 
% 
1.06 
.0 
.12 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
13.87 
.0 
.0 
.0 
81.15 
.88 
1.22 
1.30 
.0 
.12 
.0 
.0 
.23 
.0 
.0 
100.0 
RDIA 
$ 
161,697 
18,285 
2,117,314 
12,388,673 
143,136 
186,153 
198,213 
18,600 
34,500 
15,266,561 
r = .071 n = 22 
r-value not significant at .05 or .01 
level of confidence 
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Figure 20 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by Sector 
in the Districyt of Thunder Bay 
NODC 
$ 
100,000 
430,920 
24,220 
314,014 
643,664 
875,180 
220,000 
660,000 
1,841,756 
35,000 
1,211,450 
5,629,885 
12,012,354 
% 
.0 
.0 
.0 
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.83 
.0 
.0 
3.59 
.20 
.0 
2.61 
.0 
5.36 
7.29 
1.83 
5.49 
15.33 
.0 
.0 
.29 
10.09 
46.87 
100.0 
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TOTAL 
% 
2.34 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
36.49 
3.81 
.0 
2.42 
7.52 
7.99 
1.65 
6.40 
.0 
19.81 
.0 
10.83 
.0 
.0 
.0 
100.0 
RDIA 
$ 
116,679 
1,819,728 
190,000 
120,800 
375,150 
398,595 
82,500 
319,337 -
987,668 
539,915 
4,986,372 
r • .072 n = 22 
r-value not significant at .05 or .01 
level of confidence 
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Figure 21 
Recipients of NODC and RDIA Funds by sector 
in the District of Kenora 
NODC 
$ 
241,657 
1,147,679 
22,500 
168,000 
314,000 
120,584 
35,000 
100,000 
325,637 
10,416,985 
12,921,303 
% 
1.87 
.0 
.0 
.0 
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.0 
8.88 
.17 
.0 
1.30 
.0 
2.43 
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.27 
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2.52 
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TOTAL 
% 
1.49 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0 
3.92 
64.69 
.0 
.0 
1.25 
3.45 
1.22 
.0 
2.22 
.0 
.0 
.0 
21.76 
.0 
.0 
.0 
100.0 
RDIA 
$ 
30,000 
— _ 
78,638 
1,298,921 
25,060 
69,300 
44,627 
44,627 
437,000 
2,008,046 
r = .041 n • 22 
r-value not significant at .05 or .01 
level of confidence 
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APPENDIX 3 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviation Year 
Established 
ACDRP Advisory Committee on Urban and 1972 
Regional Planning (P) 
ADA Area Development Agency (or Act) 1963 
(F) 
ADB Atlantic Development Board (F) 1963 
ADIA Area Development Incentives Act (F) 1965 
APEC Atlantic Provinces Economic Council 
(P) 
APPDA Atlantic Provinces Power 1958 
Development Act (F) 
ARDA Agricultural Rehabilitation and 1961 
Development Act (F,J) 
ARDA Agriculture and Rural Development 1965 
Act (F,J) 
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DEVCO Cape Breton Development Corporation 1966 
(F) 
DREE Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion (F) 
1969 
EIO Equalization of Industrial 
Opportunities (P) 
1967 
EODC Eastern Ontario Development 
Corporation (P) 
1973 
FRED Fund for Rural Economic Development 1965 
(F,J) 
GDA General Development Agreement (J) 1972 
JPC Joint Planning Committee (J) 1969 
MFRA Maritiraes Freight Rates Act (F) 1927 
MMRA Maritime Marshland Rehabilitation 1948 
Act (F) 
MTARTS Metropolitan Toronto and Region 
Transportation Study (P) 
1966 
NODC Northern Ontario Development 
Corporation (P) 
1970 
ODA Ontario Development Agency (P) 1962 
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ODC Ontario Development Corporation (P) 1966 
OECD Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (I) 
PFRA Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act (F) 1935 
RDA Regional Development Association 1953 
(P) 
RDC Regional Development Council (P) 1966 
RDIA Regional Development Incentives Act 1969 
(F) 
SA Special Area (F,J) 1969 
SDA Subsidiary Development Agreement 1972 
(J) 
TEIGA Ministry of Treasury, Economics, 1972 
and Intergovernmental Affairs (P) 
F - Federal 
P - Provincial 
J - Joint Federal Provincial 
I - International 
F,J - Federally Initiated, Joint Action 
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